Pearson v Chen Chien Wen Edwin

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 25 February 1991
• Date: 25 February 1991
• Docket Number: Originating Motion No 9 of 1991
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Chen Chien Wen Edwin

Plaintiff

and

Pearson Judith Rosemary

Defendant

[1991] SGHC 31

Chao Hick Tin J

Originating Motion No 9 of 1991

High Court

Civil Procedure–Appeals–Notice–Filing of extension of time–Whether High Court had jurisdiction to hear application to extend time to file and serve notice of appeal where time to file appeal had lapsed–Sections 18 (2), 18 (3) and 36 (1) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed)–Order 3 r 5 and O 57 rr 4 and 17 The Rules of the Supreme Court 1970–Courts and Jurisdiction–High Court–Powers of High Court–Whether High Court had jurisdiction to hear application to extend time to file and serve notice of appeal where time to file appeal had lapsed–Whether application for extension of time filed in High Court merely formal defect since such applications heard by single judge–Sections 18 (2), 18 (3) and 36 (1) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed)–Order 3 r 5 and O 57 rr 4 and 17 The Rules of the Supreme Court 1970

The applicant in this originating motion was the respondent in the divorce proceedings. Orders were made by the Judicial Commissioner relating to custody and other ancillary matters. By way of this originating motion, the applicant sought an order for extension of time to appeal against the Judicial Commissioner's orders. Counsel for the applicant made a bona fide mistake in computing the time for filing a notice of appeal and time for the filing of a notice of appeal had expired.

The originating motion was commenced in the High Court as stated in the heading of the motion papers. Counsel for the respondent opposed the motion on the preliminary point that the High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the motion.

Held, dismissing the originating motion:

(1) On one construction of O 57 r 17 of The Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, the opening words of O 57 r 17, “without prejudice to the power of the Court of Appeal … to extend the time prescribed by any provision of this Order”, effectively implied that extending any time prescribed under O 57 may only be done by the Court of Appeal. What followed thereafter in r 17 were the exceptions where the court below was permitted to grant extension of time: at [8].

(2) On an alternative construction of r 17, where the time limit prescribed for filing and serving the notice of appeal had expired, the application to extend time to do both the acts must be made to the Court of Appeal: at [12].

(3) Even though an application for extension of time to file a notice of appeal may be heard by a single judge under s 36 (1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed), the defect was one which touched on jurisdiction and could not be disregarded: at [15].

Austin Reed Ltd v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 765; [1956] 2 All ER 509n (folld)

Karno v Spratt [1909] WN 251 (refd)

Lee Lee Cheng v Seow Peng Kwang [1960] MLJ 1 (distd)

R v Bloomsbury and Marylebone County Court, ex parte Villerwest Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 362; [1976] 1 All ER 897 (distd)

Rules of the Supreme Court1970, TheO 3r 5, O 57rr 4, 17 (consd);O 3r 3

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed)ss 18 (2) (h), 18 (3), 36 (1) (consd)

Sim Mei Ling (Ang JW & Partners) for the applicant

K S Rajah (B Rao & K S Rajah) for the respondent.

Chao Hick Tin J

1 This originating motion is brought by the respondent in Divorce Petition No 1789 of 1989 seeking an order that the respondent's time for appealing against the order of the...