Civil Procedure

Published date01 December 2004
Date01 December 2004
AuthorJeffrey PINSLER LLB (Liverpool), LLM (Cambridge), LLD (Liverpool); Barrister (Middle Temple), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. Cavinder BULL MA (Oxford), LLM (Harvard); Barrister (Gray’s Inn), Attorney-at-Law (New York State); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore).
Appeals

6.1 A number of cases reported in 2004 dealt with appeals. Firstly, a number of these cases dealt with the rule in Ladd v Marshall[1954] 1 WLR 1489 on the admission of further evidence on appeal. Secondly, some cases dealt with the requirement of leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s 34(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed) (‘SCJA’). Thirdly, there were cases dealing with various aspects of Notices of Appeal. Two other cases dealt with other miscellaneous points.

The rule in Ladd v Marshall

6.2 Three cases dealt with the rule in Ladd v Marshall (supra para 6.1) on the admission of further evidence on appeal. Ladd v Marshall lays down three conditions that must be fulfilled before further evidence can be admitted on appeal:

(a) it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at trial;

(b) the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have had an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and

(c) the evidence must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible.

6.3 It was held in Jurong Town Corp v Wishing Star Ltd[2004] 2 SLR 427 that the Ladd v Marshall principles do not apply in an interlocutory appeal. The plaintiff, Wishing Star Ltd (‘WSL’), had commenced legal proceedings against Jurong Town Corporation (‘JTC’) for wrongful termination of

contract. After the matter had been set down for trial, JTC applied for security for costs. The assistant registrar dismissed JTC”s application. This was affirmed by the High Court on appeal. In the meantime, trial had commenced. JTC appealed against the High Court”s decision not to order security for costs. At that time, the trial was part heard and some witnesses had been examined. JTC sought to admit as evidence transcripts of the cross-examination of WSL”s managing director.

6.4 The Court of Appeal held that the strict principles in Ladd v Marshall did not apply to an interlocutory appeal. The restriction in O 57 r 13(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1997 Rev Ed) only applied to an appeal against ‘a judgment after trial or hearing of any cause or matter on the merits’. Nevertheless, the court retained a discretion in the matter and should guard against attempts by a party to ‘retrieve lost ground’ by relying on evidence which he could or should have put before the court below (at [27]). The court therefore dismissed the appeal and denied the motion to adduce the transcripts as the examination of WSL”s managing director had not been completed and it would have been inappropriate for the court to reach any conclusion on such partial evidence.

6.5 The two cases of Ang Leng Hock v Leo Ee Ah[2004] 2 SLR 361 and Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam[2004] 2 SLR 392 dealt with the applicability of the Ladd v Marshall principles in the context of an appeal from a registrar”s assessment of damages to a judge in chambers.

6.6 The High Court”s decision in Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam[2003] 3 SLR 666 held that the principles of Ladd v Marshall applied to Registrar”s appeals and found that the Court of Appeal decision in Lian Soon Construction Pte Ltd v Guan Qian Realty Pte Ltd[1999] 2 SLR 233 was not determinative of the issue.

6.7 The High Court in Ang Leng Hock v Leo Ee Ah (supra para 6.5) followed the High Court in Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam (supra para 6.6), holding that the Ladd v Marshall principles applied to appeals from a registrar”s assessment of damages. The court found that the assessment hearing had all the characteristics of a trial and there was no fundamental difference with the hearing of a trial before a judge. On that basis, the High Court found no reason not to apply the Ladd v Marshall test to the adduction of fresh evidence on an appeal to the judge in chambers from an assessment of damages hearing before a registrar.

6.8 In Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam (supra para 6.5), the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the decision of the High Court as there was no basis to overturn the judge in chambers” exercise of discretion in affirming the assistant registrar”s decision. However, the Court of Appeal considered both the decisions of the High Court in Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam (supra para 6.6) and Ang Leng Hock v Leo Ee Ah (supra para 6.5) and reversed the position, holding that not all the conditions in Ladd v Marshall would apply to a Registrar”s Appeal.

6.9 The Court of Appeal recognised that the objective of having an assessment of damages by a registrar was for administrative convenience to save the judges” time. This objective would not be met if parties were entitled to freely adduce new evidence on appeal to a judge in chambers. As a rule, parties should present their entire evidence at the assessment.

6.10 The Court of Appeal held, however, that a Registrar”s Appeal should not be treated in the same way as an appeal from the judge in chambers to the Court of Appeal. A judge in chambers exercised confirmatory, not appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, not all the conditions in Ladd v Marshall should apply. The first condition would not apply as this was a very stringent requirement and would not be appropriate for a Registrar”s Appeal.

6.11 However, parties should not assume that they were entitled to freely bring in fresh evidence. The discretion to admit fresh evidence rested with the judge and reasonable conditions must be set. In the premises, the second and third conditions of Ladd v Marshall would apply.

6.12 With respect, the Court of Appeal”s decision strikes an appropriate balance. Parties must still make every effort to present all relevant evidence at the assessment. However, they are not prevented from bringing additional credible evidence on appeal to the judge in chambers if they have a good reason why this was not done before the Registrar.

Leave to appeal

6.13 In Hailisen Shipping Co Ltd v Pan-United Shipyard Pte Ltd[2004] 1 SLR 148, the Court of Appeal dismissed a motion by an intervener to have the plaintiff”s appeal struck out on the ground that the plaintiff failed to apply for leave under s 34(2)(a) of the SCJA.

6.14 In that case, Pan-United Shipyard Pte Ltd (‘PUS’) had commenced an in rem action for the sum of $170,000 due from Castle Shipping Company

and arrested the vessel Dilmun Fulmar. At this time, Castle had already sold the vessel to Hailisen Shipping Co Ltd (‘Hailisen’). Hailisen applied as an intervener to set aside the warrant of arrest and sought damages for the wrongful arrest. The assistant registrar set aside the warrant of arrest, but did not award damages. On appeal, Belinda Ang Saw Ean J affirmed the assistant registrar”s decision, and ordered that Hailisen was entitled to damages to be assessed. PUS appealed against Ang J”s decision without seeking leave. Hailisen sought to strike out PUS”s appeal on the ground that s 34(2)(a) of the SCJA requires leave to be obtained for any appeal where the amount or value of the subject matter at the trial is $250,000 or less, but the amount in dispute in the in rem action was only $170,000.

6.15 The Court of Appeal held that the relevant question to be asked was what was the ‘subject matter’ before Ang J (at [15]). The Court of Appeal found that the subject matter was ‘not the claim of $170,000 of PUS but the questions of whether the warrant of arrest of the vessel should be set aside, and if so, whether there should be an order for an assessment of damages’. (at [15]). Neither of these bore any specific value. Thus, the matter did not fall within s 34(2) of the SCJA and no leave was required.

6.16 The other reported decision on the requirement of leave to appeal is The Melati (No 2)[2004] 2 SLR 555. In this case, the respondents took out a writ in rem against the appellants. However, the appellants did not take any steps in the proceedings until over a year later when they filed and served a statement of claim out of time.

6.17 The appellant objected to the late service of the statement of claim in breach of O 18 r 1 of the Rules of Court. The respondent applied to court seeking leave to extend time for filing of the statement of claim and a declaration that the statement of claim filed and served be deemed regular and in accordance with the Rules of Court. The assistant registrar dismissed the application and ordered the statement of claim to be struck out. On appeal, the judge in chambers allowed the appeal and extended time for the filing of the statement of claim and retrospectively validated the service of the statement of claim. After the judge certified that no further arguments were required, the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. Eight days after the appellant”s case was filed, the respondent sought to strike out the appeal on the ground that s 34(2)(d) of the SCJA required leave to be obtained for any appeal against an order refusing to strike out an action or a pleading or a part of a pleading.

6.18 The Court of Appeal held that the fundamental question related to the true nature of the orders made by the judge. The judge below had exercised her discretion to grant an extension of time for the respondents to file the statement of claim out of time. That was not a refusal to strike out the statement of claim.

6.19 The nature or effect of the orders made by the judge should be apparent from the orders themselves. But if the orders were at all unclear, reference should be made to the prayers in the application. It was incorrect to refer to the orders made by the assistant registrar as these had been set aside by the judge in exercise of her confirmatory jurisdiction.

6.20 In any event, the judge was not dealing with any arguments that the statement of claim be struck out. The Court of Appeal pointed out that while s 34(2)(d) of the SCJA did not elaborate on what would amount to a refusal to strike out a statement of claim...

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