Wong Meng Cheong and another v Ling Ai Wah and another

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Lai Siu Chiu J
• Judgment Date: 27 October 2011
• Neutral Citation: [2011] SGHC 233
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Hearing Date: 08 July 2011,25 July 2011,05 August 2011,07 July 2011,01 July 2011,04 July 2011,28 June 2011,28 July 2011,27 July 2011,12 July 2011,15 July 2011,27 June 2011,06 July 2011,30 June 2011,22 July 2011,08 August 2011,29 June 2011,14 July 2011,19 July 2011,11 July 2011,18 July 2011,20 July 2011,05 July 2011,26 July 2011
• Docket Number: Suit No 607 of 2010 and Originating Summons No 1435 of 2005
• Plaintiff Counsel: Andre Maniam SC, Chua Sui Tong, Aw Wen Ni and Edwin Cheng (WongPartnership LLP)
• Defendant Counsel: Cavinder Bull SC, Yarni Loi, Yvette Anthony and Kong Man Er (Drew & Napier LLC),Daniel Koh, Adrian Tan and Lanx Goh (Eldan Law LLP),Anthony Lee and Marina Chua (Bih Li & Lee)
• Subject Matter: Mental Disorders and Treatment,Trusts,Civil Procedure
• Published date: 09 November 2011

Lai Siu Chiu J: Introduction

It is a happy thing to be the father unto many sons.¹ That was true for most of the life of the octogenarian Wong Yip Chong (“WYC”), the central figure in this case, Suit No 607 of 2010 (“the Suit”). He was the patriarch of the Wong family and a prominent psychiatrist in Singapore until he was stricken with Alzheimer’s disease. WYC’s eldest son was Wong Meng Cheong (“WMC”), the first plaintiff, while Wong Meng Leong (“WML”), who is the second plaintiff was his second son. The second defendant Wong Meng Weng (“WMW”), was WYC’s youngest son. WMW was born to a different mother from the plaintiffs, namely to Patricia Ling Ai Wah (“PL”), the first defendant. WMC and WML are the sons of Tan Kim Yam (“TKY”), who was WYC’s wife. Besides the three sons, WYC had a fourth son in Wong Meng Kong (“WMK”) a psychiatrist, and a daughter, Wong Mei Sheong (“WMS”) who is an artist, with TKY. Both appeared as witnesses for the plaintiffs.

This Suit started life on 2 July 2010 as an originating summons (“OS 648 of 2010”) filed by WMC, WML and WMW as the plaintiffs with PL as the sole defendant. It was converted to a writ on 11 August 2010 as the dispute raised highly contentious issues of fact. The then plaintiffs had prayed that a transfer IA/54236J dated 8 December 2004 (“the Transfer”) in respect of a property situated at 5 Chancery Hill Road, Singapore 309644 (“5CHR”) (whereby the manner of holding had been changed to include PL as a joint tenant) be declared null and void. After OS 648 of 2010 was converted to a writ, WMW declined to be a plaintiff and he was therefore made a co-defendant to the Suit with PL.

In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs pleaded in the alternative that the joint tenancy of 5CHR should be severed and the property sold if the Transfer was found to be valid. On 30 November 2010, before the Suit came on for trial, the plaintiffs filed two statutory declarations in their capacities as WYC’s deputies. One of the statutory declarations was to sever the joint tenancy of 5CHR. On 1 December 2010, they followed that up with an applicationin the Suit for a declaration that their statutory declaration to sever the joint tenancy of 5CHR be declared valid. I dismissed this application on 1 February 2011 because it raised the identical issue which was going to be litigated at this trial.

Besides her defence, PL filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs on 20 September 2010. She prayed for a declaration that she is the sole beneficial of 5CHR and another property located at No 50 Draycott Park, #28-01 Draycott Towers, Singapore 309644 (“the Draycott Property”) which she had held in joint tenancy with WYC since 2002. The plaintiffs had also attempted to sever the Draycott Property’s joint tenancy – the other statutory declaration they filed on 30 November 2010 was for this purpose.

In another action, Originating Summons No 1435 of 2005 (“the Originating Summons”), WMC, WML and WMW were appointed as members of a committee of the person and estate of WYC (“the CPE”) by the Court on 20 October 2005 under s 9 of the Mental Disorders and Treatment Act (Cap 178, 1985 Rev Ed). When the Mental Disorders and Treatment Act was repealed and the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (“the MCA”) came into force on 1 March 2010, the members of the CPE were deemed to be deputies appointed by the Court under the MCA to act jointly to make decisions on WYC’s behalf, pursuant to the savings provisions in the Third Schedule of the MCA.

After the CPE was constituted, it took out an ex parte Summons No 5378 of 2006 on 23 November 2006 to seek repayment of a loan that WMC allegedly extended to WYC on 30 January 1999 in a transaction which involved a company called Synapse Company Pte Ltd (“Synapse”). Pursuant to this application, which was made unanimously, the Court ordered that a sum of about $1m be returned to WMC from WYC’s estate on 14 December 2006 (“the Synapse Order”). On 7 April 2010, the three deputies of WYC took out another ex parte Summons No 1542 of 2010. This application was for them to be empowered to sell WYC’s properties. The power to sell was granted on 13 May 2010 (“the 2010 Order”).

On 15 December 2010, WMW applied via three summonses to revoke the appointments of WMC and WML as deputies of WYC; set aside the 2010 Order and set aside the Synapse Order. The substance of these summonses filed by WMW in the Originating Summons was the same as several of the reliefs prayed for in the counterclaims of both defendants in the Suit. Given the substantial overlap in issues of fact and law, the Originating Summons was consolidated with the Suit on 28 January 2011. I also granted leave to PL and TKY, the second intervener, to intervene in the issues arising from the Originating Summons under s 38(2), MCA and O 99 r 2 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) . Both were sufficiently connected to WYC and clearly had a real interest in the plaintiffs’ appointment and powers as WYC’s deputies.

I had decided the following issues in the oral judgment that I delivered on 8 August 2011 after the trial concluded: whether PL was the sole beneficial owner of 5CHR; if PL was not the sole beneficial owner of 5CHR, whether the Transfer was valid; if the Transfer was valid, whether 5CHR’s joint tenancy should be severed and the property sold; whether PL was the sole beneficial owner of the Draycott Property; whether the Synapse Order should be set aside; whether the 2010 Order should be set aside; and whether the plaintiffs’ appointments as deputies of WYC should be revoked. Essentially, I dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in the Suit with costs and awarded judgment to the two defendants on their counterclaim. As the plaintiffs have filed an appeal (in Civil Appeal No 104 of 2011) against my decision, I shall now set out the grounds of my judgment in full.

Whether PL was the sole beneficial owner of 5CHR

WYC met PL sometime in 1969 while she was his clinic assistant. They developed a friendship. In or around 1972, WYC told PL that he had developed feelings for her. He disclosed to her that TKY suffered from schizophrenia. PL was initially reluctant to begin a relationship with WYC in view of his married status. I should point out that WYC was also 22 years older than PL. WYC’s sincerity however eventually won PL over. He promised PL that he would take care of her and treat her as his wife. He also bought her two rings and hosted a dinner with PL’s parents and siblings to formalise their union as husband and wife, albeit not in a legally valid way since WYC never divorced TKY. Soon after that, WYC and PL began cohabitating, initially at a house in Jalan Novena Selatan. After they began living together, TKY and her children continued to live in another house at 37 Goldhill Avenue (“37GHA”). However, WYC visited TKY and his children at 37GHA daily.

In 1975, WMW was born. A year later, WYC bought a property at 7 Whitley Road (“7WR”) for PL to effectuate his promise of taking care of her. The plaintiffs submitted that 7WR was not beneficially owned by PL as its purchase was funded by WYC, and that gave rise to a presumption of resulting trust in favour of WYC: Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 at [34]. I found that the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted. I accepted PL’s evidence that 7WR was intended by WYC to be a gift to her. WYC and PL were not married to each other, and PL would have had no claim against WYC for her maintenance if their relationship ended. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable that WYC sought to assure PL of the security of their relationship by providing her with a house in which they could raise their child. The gift was perfected when 7WR was bought in PL’s sole name. WYC, PL and WMW lived there together, and PL considered it her “matrimonial home”.

Sometime in 1981, WYC and PL decided to purchase a new property for their occupation as 7WR was not a conducive place to raise WMW. They chose 5CHR. 5CHR was acquired in this way. 7WR was sold on or about 3 April 1982 for $670,000. Since 5CHR was purchased before the sale of 7WR, WYC borrowed monies from Wong Yip Chong Pte Ltd (“WYCPL”) to pay for the purchase price of $790,000 first. WYCPL was a company incorporated by WYC in 1972 to run his psychiatric hospital, which was then called the Singapore Nursing Home and situated at Dunearn Road.

In a letter dated 5 May 1981, WYC gave specific instructions to the vendor of 5CHR that it should be transferred to PL on completion. Those instructions were also conveyed to the vendor’s solicitors. Pursuant to the instructions, 5CHR was transferred to PL’s sole name on 17 July 1981. Because 5CHR was to be extensively renovated and hefty costs would be incurred in the process, WYC asked PL whether she was willing to transfer 5CHR to WYCPL as a temporary measure. On 18 March 1982, PL transferred 5CHR to WYCPL for a sum of $770,000 which was in fact never paid to her.

I found that the parties’ common intention, immediately after 5CHR was transferred to WYCPL, was for PL to own the beneficial interest of 5CHR solely. The parties had intended for PL’s interest in 7WR to be replaced by her interest in their new “matrimonial home”, 5CHR. To this end, on 13 September 1982, PL transferred the sale proceeds of 7WR to WYC for the payment of 5CHR’s purchase. This was reflected in the flow of funds set out in PL’s and WYC’s bank passbooks. A common intention constructive trust had arisen, and it therefore did not matter that the purchase price of 5CHR exceeded the proceeds obtained from selling 7WR. WYCPL, which was then under the control of WYC, held 5CHR on trust for PL.

On 11 February 1985, however, WYC caused WYCPL to transfer 5CHR to himself solely. This transfer was motivated principally by tax considerations as there was a tax concession for owner-occupied properties. PL did...