Wong Meng Cheong v Ling Ai Wah

JurisdictionSingapore
Judgment Date27 October 2011
Date27 October 2011
Docket NumberSuit No 607 of 2010 and Originating Summons No 1435 of 2005
CourtHigh Court (Singapore)
Wong Meng Cheong and another
Plaintiff
and
Ling Ai Wah and another
Defendant

Lai Siu Chiu J

Suit No 607 of 2010 and Originating Summons No 1435 of 2005

High Court

Civil Procedure—Costs—Principles—Deputies acted unreasonably and without bona fides in commencing litigation on behalf of deputised person—Whether deputies should be indemnified against their costs—Order 99 r 13 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed)—Section 40 (2) Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177 A, 2010 Rev Ed)

Civil Procedure—Costs—Principles—Plaintiffs conducted case in bad faith and in improper or oppressive manner—Whether unsuccessful plaintiffs liable to pay costs on indemnity basis—Order 59 r 2 (2) Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed)

Civil Procedure—Experts—Expert evidence—Expert's reports not complying with Rules of Court—Whether expert's reports should be disregarded—Order 40 A r 3 (2) Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed)

Equity—Undue influence—Actual—Transfer of property to long-time partner—Whether transferee exerted undue influence on transferor

Equity—Undue influence—Presumed—Transfer of property to long-time partner—Whether relationship of trust and confidence existed—Whether transaction was inexplicable

Mental Disorders and Treatment—Legal capacity—Transferor executed transfer of property—Transferor possessed functional dexterity to perform as clinical psychiatrist at material time and carry out other daily activities—Objective medical evidence such as brain scans of transferor available—Whether statutory test for capacity was applicable—Whether transferor suffered from impairment of mind—Whether transferor lacked mental capacity to execute transfer—Section 4 (1) Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177 A, 2010 Rev Ed)

Mental Disorders and Treatment—Management of patients' property and affairs—Deputies knowingly acted for own interests at expense of deputised person—Whether deputies failed to act in best interests of deputised person—Whether appointment of deputies to be revoked—Whether new deputy to be appointed

Mental Disorders and Treatment—Management of patients' property and affairs—Deputised person holding properties as joint tenant with another—Deputised person possessed other sources of funds for his maintenance—Whether to sever joint tenancies of properties and liquidate them for funds

Trusts—Constructive trusts—Property was dealt with unilaterally by transferee—Whether transferee became new sole beneficial owner after transfer

The plaintiffs were deputies of Wong Yip Chong (‘WYC’). They were two of the sons WYC had with his wife, Tan Kim Yam (‘TKY’), who was the second intervener in these proceedings. The first defendant and first intervener, Ling Ai Wah (‘PL’), was the long-time partner of WYC. She had a son with WYC called Wong Meng Weng (‘WMW’). WMW was the second defendant and was the third deputy of WYC.

On 20 October 2005, the plaintiffs and WMW were appointed as the three members of a committee of the person and estate of WYC (‘the CPE’) in Originating Summons No 1435 of 2005 (‘the Originating Summons’). They were deemed to be deputies when the Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177 A, 2010 Rev Ed) (‘the MCA’) came into force on 1 March 2010.

In this suit (‘the Suit’), the plaintiffs prayed that a transfer dated 8 December 2004 (‘the Transfer’) in respect of a property (‘5CHR’) which WYC owned, whereby the manner of holding had been changed to include PL as a joint tenant, be declared null and void. 5CHR was first bought in the name of PL in 1981 after a property (‘7 WR’) where WYC lived with PL was sold. 5CHR was later transferred from PL to a company incorporated by WYC (‘WYCPL’) in 1982, and then transferred to WYC in 1985.

The plaintiffs claimed that WYC lacked the mental capacity to execute the Transfer or that it was the result of undue influence exerted by PL. The plaintiffs and PL called expert witnesses to provide opinions on WYC's medical condition at the material time in the form of written reports (‘Expert's Reports’) and oral testimony.

The plaintiffs also pleaded that the joint tenancy of 5CHR should be severed and the property sold if the Transfer was found to be valid. On 30 November 2010, before the Suit came on for trial, the plaintiffs filed two statutory declarations as WYC's deputies. One statutory declaration was to sever 5CHR's joint tenancy.

Besides her defence, PL filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs. She prayed for a declaration that she was the sole beneficial owner of 5CHR and another property (‘the Draycott Property’) which she had held in joint tenancy with WYC since 2002. The plaintiffs had also attempted to sever the Draycott Property's joint tenancy by the other statutory declaration they filed on 30 November 2010.

After the CPE was constituted, it obtained a court order dated 14 December 2006 that a sum of about $1 m be returned to the first plaintiff from WYC's estate (‘the Synapse Order’). The CPE obtained another court order dated 13 May 2010 which empowered them to sell WYC's properties (‘the 2010 Order’). In the Originating Summons, WMW applied to revoke the appointments of the plaintiffs as WYC's deputies; set aside the 2010 Order and set aside the Synapse Order.

The Originating Summons was consolidated with the Suit given the substantial overlap in issues of fact and law. PL and TKY also applied to intervene in the issues arising from the Originating Summons.

Held, dismissing the claim and allowing the counterclaim in part:

(1) Leave was granted to PL and TKY to intervene in the issues arising from the Originating Summons under s 38 (2) of the MCA and O 99 r 2 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (‘ROC’). Both of them were sufficiently connected to WYC and clearly had a real interest in the plaintiffs' appointment and powers as WYC's deputies: at [7].

(2) Although the purchase of 7 WR was funded by WYC, the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted. The evidence showed that 7 WR was clearly intended by WYC to be a gift to PL: at [10].

(3) The common intention of WYC and PL, immediately after 5CHR was transferred from PL to WYCPL (which was then under the control of WYC), was for PL to own the beneficial interest of 5CHR solely. The parties had intended for PL's interest in 7 WR to be replaced with her interest in 5CHR. A common intention constructive trust had arisen, and it therefore did not matter that the purchase price of 5CHR exceeded the sale proceeds of 7 WR: at [13].

(4) After 5CHR was transferred from WYCPL to WYC, there was a new common intention between WYC and PL that WYC was to be the new beneficial owner of 5CHR solely. This common intention could be inferred from the manner whereby WYC was able to unilaterally deal with 5CHR thereafter: at [15] and [16].

(5) In the absence of other vitiating factors, the Transfer's validity depended on whether WYC had the mental capacity to execute it. Taking into account the applicable law, and the factual and medical evidence, WYC was competent to execute the Transfer at the material time. He was unlikely to be suffering from Alzheimer's disease then. Even if he did suffer from an impairment of the mind in December 2004, WYC was still able to make a decision for himself regarding the execution of the Transfer: at [25].

(6) The statutory test for capacity could be applied even though the MCA had not come into force when WYC executed the Transfer in December 2004 because it was consistent with the common law definitions which were applicable in other contexts. Given that the MCA was enacted to guide proxy decision-making and not to alter the pre-existing conception of autonomy embodied in the common law, its concept of capacity was no different from the common law's: at [27].

(7) The test for capacity found in s 4 (1) of the MCA could be reduced into two components. There was a diagnostic threshold of an impairment of brain or mind function, and that had to result in a functional inability to make a decision due to the lack of any of the elements in s 5 (1) of the MCA: at [29].

(8) The plaintiffs bore the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that WYC lacked capacity at the material time under s 3 (2) of the MCA: at [30].

(9) WYC's conduct which preceded the execution of the Transfer showed that his decision was not merely rational in its outcome, but was carefully taken. WYC made his decision after he had identified and weighed the respective interests of parties who would be potentially affected, including his own. There was abundant and corroborated evidence that WYC possessed sufficient functional dexterity. He continued to discharge his professional duties as a clinical psychiatrist, drive a car with passengers and socialise with third parties after the Transfer was executed. He also signed various corporate documents after December 2004: at [26] and [54].

(10) The Expert's Reports of the plaintiff on WYC's medical condition did not satisfy the mandatory requirements laid down by O 40 A r 3 (2) of the ROC. First, an expert owed his duty to the court and this required him to disclose any special relationship between the party who called him and the expert because the expert had to not only be impartial but had to also appear to be so. The expert should avoid being the witness of a party with whom he had a special relationship. If that was unavoidable, he had to disclose the relevant facts. Given the extent of the personal and professional relationships of the plaintiffs' experts with the plaintiffs, the former should not have been briefed as expert witnesses: at [58] and [62].

Secondly, apart from any appearance of bias, both of the plaintiffs' experts displayed instances of partiality to the plaintiffs' case. They were selective in the presentation of the relevant medical evidence: at [63].

Thirdly, an expert's report had to give details of any literature or other material on which the expert witness had...

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    ...To further illustrate the point, I find it useful to refer to Lai J’s decision in Wong Meng Cheong and another v Ling Ai Wah and another [2012] 1 SLR 549 at [63], where she said: ... I found that both of the plaintiffs’ experts did display instances of partiality to the plaintiffs’ case. Th......
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    ...both before and during the litigation. This list is however, not exhaustive (Wong Meng Cheong and another v Ling Ai Wah and another [2012] 1 SLR 549 at [199]). The court thus should have regard to all the circumstances of the case, to ensure that there is “some conduct or circumstance which......
  • Leow Li Yoon v Liu Jiu Chang
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    ...must possess for his decisions to be considered autonomous and hence valid (see Wong Meng Cheong and another v Ling Ai Wah and another [2012] 1 SLR 549 (“Wong Meng Cheong”) at [27]). In Wong Meng Cheong, the court considered that a transfer of property can be invalidated if it is shown that......
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    ...Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and others [2016] 1 SLR 748 (“Sandipala”) and Wong Meng Cheong and another v Ling Ai Wah and another [2012] 1 SLR 549 (“Wong Meng Cheong”). The plaintiff’s submissions can be summarised as follows: The defendant failed to give full and proper disclosure of all relevant ......
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5 books & journal articles
  • EXPERT EVIDENCE AND ADVERSARIAL COMPROMISE
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 2015, December 2015
    • 1 December 2015
    ...Ltd[2010] 2 SLR 724 at [44], citing Khoo Bee Keong v Ang Chun Hong[2005] SGHC 128 at [87]. 22 See Wong Meng Cheong v Ling Ai Wah[2012] 1 SLR 549 at [200]. See para 7 below. 23JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v Teofoongwonglcloong[2007] 4 SLR(R) 460 at [63]. 24[2012] 1 SLR 549. 25 At both a personal......
  • A TALE OF TWO CAPACITIES
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 2022, March 2022
    • 1 March 2022
    ...72 Perrins v Holland [2011] Ch 270; [2010] WTLR 1415; [2010] EWCA Civ 840 at [23]. 73 See for instance Wong Meng Cheong v Ling Ai Wah [2012] 1 SLR 549 at [27]. 74 For a good summary of the existing principles, see Fehily v Atkinson [2017] Bus LR 695 at [76]–[103]. See also Gibbons v Wright ......
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    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 2012, December 2012
    • 1 December 2012
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