Thomas & Betts (SE Asia) Pte Ltd v Ou Tin Joon and Another

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Karthigesu JA
• Judgment Date: 06 February 1998
• Neutral Citation: [1998] SGCA 5
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 239 of 1997 (Notice of Motion No 330 of 1997)
• Date: 06 February 1998
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1998
• Plaintiff Counsel: Joseph Kan (Drew & Napier)
• Citation: [1998] SGCA 5
• Defendant Counsel: Daniel Lim (Shook Lin & Bok)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,s 50 Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 1997 Ed),Meaning of "within seven days",Striking out appeal against interlocutory order,Failure of appellants to apply to judge for hearing of further arguments within seven days of order,s 34(1)(c) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322),Whether computation of seven days governed by O 3 r 2 and O 56 r 2 or s 150 of Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 1997 Ed),Appeals,O 3 r 2 & O 56 r 2 Rules of Court 1996

Judgment:

LP THEAN JA

(delivering the grounds of judgment of the court): This was an application by the respondents to strike out the appeal against the interlocutory order made by a judge in chambers. The ground of the application was that the appellants had not applied to the judge for hearing of further arguments within seven days of the order and therefore had failed to comply with s 34(1)(c) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322), which governs the right of appeal against an interlocutory order. Thus the appeal was not properly constituted and should be struck out. For the reasons we give hereunder, we held that there was non-compliance with that provision, but we granted the appellants an extension of time for making the application.

2.The appellants are the plaintiffs and the respondents the defendants in this action. On 23 October 1997, an interlocutory order was made by the judge in chambers striking out certain paragraphs of the appellants` statement of claim. The appellants on 1 November 1997 applied to the learned judge for hearing of further arguments in court. The learned judge declined to hear further arguments, and following that the appellants filed the notice of appeal on 21 November 1997, appealing against the whole of the interlocutory order. On 10 December 1997 the respondents applied to this court to strike out the appeal.

3.The provision that governs the right of appeal against an interlocutory order made by a judge in chambers is s 34(1)(c) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322) (the Act). This section provides as follows:

No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases:

(a)

(b)

(c) subject to any other provision in this section, where a Judge makes an interlocutory order in chambers unless the Judge has certified, on application within 7 days after the making of the order by any party for further argument in court, that he requires no further argument;

4.The question before us was how the period of seven days as prescribed by this section was to be computed. It was the respondents` contention that as the learned judge made the interlocutory order on 22 October 1997 the last day for the application was 29 October 1997. As the appellants applied for hearing of further arguments only on 1 November 1997, the appellants were out of time and did not comply with that section. On the other hand, the appellants contended that the Rules of Court govern, inter alia, the time within which an application under the Act is to be made. Order 56 r 2 prescribes the time for making the application under s 34(1)(c) of the Act, and r 2, so far as relevant, provides:

(1) A party dissatisfied with any interlocutory order made by a High Court Judge in Chambers may, within 7 days of the making of such order, apply to the Judge for further arguments in Court in accordance with practice directions for the time being issued by the Registrar.

(2) Unless the Registrar informs the party making the application within 14 days of the receipt of the application that the Judge requires further arguments, the Judge shall be deemed to have certified that he requires no further arguments.

(3)

(4)

Next, the appellants invoked O 3 r 2 which prescribes how the time for doing an act...