Suresh s/o Suppiah v Jiang Guoliang

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Seng Onn J
• Judgment Date: 11 July 2016
• Neutral Citation: [2016] SGHC 133
• Plaintiff Counsel: Gong Chin Nam (Hin Tat Augustine & Partners)
• Docket Number: Magistrates’ Courts Suit No 357 of 2015 (Registrar’s Appeal (State Courts) No 9 of 2016)
• Date: 11 July 2016
• Hearing Date: 05 April 2016
• Subject Matter: Limitation of Actions -When time begins to run,Statutory Interpretation -Interpretation Act,Time -Computation -Period after which act must be done
• Year: 2016
• Citation: [2016] SGHC 133
• Defendant Counsel: Frances Angeline Shanti d/o Thanarajoo (Tan Kok Quan Partnership)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 17 January 2017

Chan Seng Onn J: Introduction

This Registrar’s Appeal (State Courts) No 9 of 2016 (“HC/RAS 9/2016”) raises a novel point of general importance in the law of limitation that has yet to be conclusively dealt with by our courts. The appellant plaintiff instituted Magistrates’ Courts Suit No 357 of 2015 (“MC/MC 357/2015”) on 7 January 2015 against the respondent defendant for damages in respect of personal injuries suffered by him on 7 January 2012 when the respondent’s vehicle collided into the rear of the appellant’s stationary vehicle. The question for determination in HC/RAS 9/2016 is whether the date on which the appellant’s cause of action accrued is to be excluded or included for the purpose of computing the three-year limitation period under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed).

The computation of time relating to the limitation timeline for causes of action is essential. If even a delay of one day is not a good reason to allow a time-barred claim to proceed (see Ang Sin Hock v Khoo Eng Lim [2010] 3 SLR 179 (“Ang Sin Hock”) at [78]), precise rules for the calculation of limitation periods are required. One day, ie, the period of 24 hours beginning with one midnight and ending with the next or the time it takes the earth to revolve once on its axis (see Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A Garner ed) (West Group, 9th Ed, 2009) at p 453; Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law vol 1 (Daniel Greenberg ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2010) at p 638), may make all the difference in determining whether an action is time-barred or not.

This judgment examines the ambit and interpretation of provisions on the computation of time in the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) and the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed) – as well as relevant common law principles in the common law – and their application to the provisions stipulating limitation periods in the Limitation Act.

I agree with the position taken by the appellant that in computing limitation periods as provided for in the Limitation Act, the date the cause of action accrued should be excluded. Accordingly, the appellant’s action that was filed on 7 January 2015 is not time-barred.

Background Brief facts and procedural history

The appellant and respondent were involved in a road traffic accident on 7 January 2012. It is common ground that, at about 4:00 a.m. to 4:50 a.m., a collision occurred at the junction of Victoria Street and Ophir Road involving motor car no. SGB 8876T driven by the appellant and motor lorry no. GBA 7313Y driven by the respondent. The appellant claims that he had brought his car to a stop at the junction when the traffic light turned amber, and that the respondent’s lorry had collided into the rear of his stationary car shortly after.

On 7 January 2015, the appellant instituted MC/MC 357/2015 claiming damages in respect of personal injuries suffered by him, alleging negligence of the respondent in the driving, management and control of his vehicle. The respondent entered an appearance to the suit on 20 January 2015 and filed a defence on 17 March 2015, primarily relying on s 24A(2) of the Limitation Act to plead that the suit was time-barred as it was not commenced within three years from the date on which the cause of action had accrued.

The respondent then applied in Summons No 4188 of 2015 (“MC/SUM 4188/2015”) to strike out the appellant’s Statement of Claim on the ground that the respondent’s action was time-barred at the time of the issue of the writ on 7 January 2015, the last day to bring the action purportedly being 6 January 2015. The Deputy Registrar hearing MC/SUM 4188/2015 on 18 August 2015 held that the action was time-barred and struck out the appellant’s action.

The appellant appealed against the Deputy Registrar’s decision and at the hearing of Registrar’s Appeal No 50 of 2015 (MC/RA 50/2015) on 16 September 2015, the District Judge dismissed the appeal. The District Judge also heard and dismissed the appellant’s application for leave to appeal against the decision in MC/RA 50/2015 to the High Court on 29 October 2015.

Both parties then appeared before me on 1 March 2016 upon the application of the appellant in Originating Summons No 1048 of 2015 (HC/OS 1048/2015) seeking leave to appeal to the High Court against the District Judge’s decision in MC/RA 50/2015. I granted the appellant leave to appeal, bringing us to the present appeal in HC/RAS 9/2016.

Decision of the Deputy Registrar in MC/SUM 4188/2015

The Deputy Registrar recognised that there were contrary positions in both the case law and material presented to her which were “not reconciled”.¹ She then decided to follow the apparent approach of the High Court in two relatively recent cases (Yan Jun v Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 793 (“Yan Jun”) and Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 2827 v GBI Realty Pte Ltd and another [2014] 3 SLR 229 (“GBI Realty”)) and computed the limitation period to include the day the cause of action accrued. The limitation period was thus held to have expired on 6 January 2015, and the Deputy Registrar struck out the appellant’s action.

Decision of the District Judge in MC/RA 50/2015

In her grounds of decision reported at Suresh s/o Suppiah v Jiang Guoliang [2015] SGMC 31 (the “GD”), the District Judge similarly took the position that the High Court decision of Yan Jun had dealt with the computation of time for the limitation period under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act (which is the same provision that applies in the present case), where the Judge had included the date when the cause of action accrued in computing the limitation period. Hence, the District Judge held that as the accident in the present case had occurred on 7 January 2012, the last date for instituting the action was 6 January 2015. She thus dismissed the appeal against the Deputy Registrar’s decision.

In the proceedings below, the respondent made the argument that only cases dealing specifically with s 24A of the Limitation Act would be relevant for consideration, and that cases interpreting the computation of time for s 6 of the Limitation Act (or s 2 of the Limitation Act 1939 (c 21) (UK) (the “UK Limitation Act 1939”) which was also the provision that related to actions founded on contract or tort) cited by the appellant were not, relying on the Court of Appeal’s holding in Lian Kok Hong v Ow Wah Foong and Another [2008] SGCA 30 at [14] that the two sections cannot apply concurrently (see [5] of the GD). Although the District Judge did not expressly state so, she seemed to have implicitly agreed with this argument when she held that s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act applied and that the decision of Yan Jun applied without addressing the other cases cited by the appellant at all (see [9]–[10] of the GD). This treatment of the contrary authorities seems to be jumping the gun. Although the exact provisions in the Limitation Act that were engaged in those cases may have been different due to the different causes of action, the phrasing of the time limits is largely similar in the format of “action(s)…shall not be brought after the expiration of [time period] from the date on which the cause of action accrued”. With the issue at hand being one of computation of time and not about which limitation period applied, those contrary authorities are prima facie also relevant. Holding otherwise would be an implicit and counterintuitive recognition that the principles relating to the computation of time periods under different provisions in the Limitation Act could differ.

Issues in HC/RAS 9/2016

The focus of the appeal in HC/RAS 9/2016 is on the issue of whether the action was time-barred under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, and the question that determines this issue is whether the date on which the appellant’s cause of action accrued is to be excluded or included for the purpose of computing the three-year limitation period under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act.

Both parties agree that the cause of action arose on the date of the accident on 7 January 2012, and it is also common ground that the appellant had the knowledge required to bring the action on the date of the accident. Thus, the relevant limitation period under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act is three years. If the date on which the appellant’s cause of action accrued were to be excluded, the relevant limitation period would have started running on 8 January 2012 and would hence have expired on 7 January 2015 (this date being the last day for bringing the action). His action instituted on 7 January 2015 would then not be time-barred. If it were to be included though, the relevant limitation period would have expired on 6 January 2015 and his action would therefore be time-barred. The timeline below summarises these two interpretations:

Section 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act reads: 24A.(2) An action to which this section applies, where the damages claimed consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person, shall not be brought after the expiration of — (a) 3 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued

[emphasis added]

As the relevant limitation period provided for is a statutory provision providing for a time period to bring an action before the courts, there are other statutory interpretative provisions that may apply to assist in the computation of time. Section 50 (in particular s 50(a)) of the Interpretation Act, which was cited by the appellant, may be one such provision:

Computation of time

50. In computing time for the purposes of any written law, unless the contrary intention appears — (a) a period of days from the happening of an event or the doing of any act or thing shall be deemed to be exclusive of the day on which the event happens or the act or thing is done;

[emphasis added]

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