Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius and Another v Tan Harry and Another

• Judge: Chao Hick Tin JA
• Judgment Date: 14 July 2004
• Neutral Citation: [2004] SGCA 31
• Citation: [2004] SGCA 31
• Defendant Counsel: Daniel John and Marc Wang (John Tan and Chan),Lek Siang Pheng and Christopher Chong (Rodyk and Davidson)
• Published date: 22 July 2004
• Plaintiff Counsel: Myint Soe and Deepak Raja (MyintSoe and Selvaraj)
• Date: 14 July 2004
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 136 of 2003
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Appeals,Whether co-appellants required to identify specific issues appealed against in respective notices of appeal to obtain benefit of each other's successful appeal,Appeals from Registrar to judge in chambers,Orders 56 r 1, 57 r 3(2) Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed),Civil Procedure

14 July 2004

Chao Hick Tin JA (delivering the judgment of the court):

1 This appeal raised the important question as to whether two separate defendants (in this case, “the appellants”), who appeal against different heads of damages assessed by the assistant registrar and who succeed in respect of their separate appeals, are entitled to the benefits of each other’s success. In this case, the judge who heard the appeals in chambers held that they were not so entitled. On their further appeal to this court, we affirmed the decision below for the reasons that follow.

The background

2 The plaintiffs, the respondents herein, were the dependants and administrators of the estate of one Philip Tan Kok Leong (“the deceased”) who died while undergoing surgery at the Gleneagles Hospital (“the second appellant”). Dr Aloysius Teo Chee Yeow (“the first appellant”) was the anaesthetist in attendance during the operation. The deceased was the son of the respondents.

3 The respondents instituted proceedings against the appellants claiming, inter alia, for loss of dependency and special damages for the death of their son.

4 Liability was admitted by the appellants and interlocutory judgment was entered in favour of the respondents. The assessment of damages came before the assistant registrar, who made the following awards:

Dependency loss $180,580.80
Special damages $37,513.90
Pain and suffering $2,500.00
Bereavement pursuant to the Civil Law Act $10,000.00
(Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed)

5 The amount awarded for special damages consisted of the following components:

(a) Legal costs incurred by the respondents $20,000.00
in attending the coroner’s inquiry into
their son’s death

(b) Medical expenses $5,335.63

(c) Costs of obtaining letters of administration $3,407.40
for the deceased’s estate

(d) Funeral expenses $8,770.87

6 All the parties appealed against various aspects of the assessment. The first appellant, by way of Registrar’s Appeal No 164 of 2003, appealed only in respect of the award of $180,580.80 for loss of dependency. By Registrar’s Appeal No 162 of 2003, the second appellant appealed only against the award of $20,000 in respect of the legal costs incurred by the respondents for attending the coroner’s inquiry. The respondents also appealed against several of the awards, including the quantum given for their dependency claim. The respondents also asked for aggravated damages.

7 Woo Bih Li J rejected the respondents’ appeal: see Tan Harry v Teo Chee Yeow Aloysius [2004] 1 SLR 513. However, as regards the first appellant’s appeal, the judge held that the respondents were not entitled to any award for loss of dependency because the respondents had already inherited a sum (consisting of, inter alia, cash in the deceased’s bank account, publicly-listed shares and a car), in excess of their loss of dependency, as beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate.

8 As regards the second appellant’s appeal, Woo J also ruled that the respondents were not entitled to claim for the legal costs incurred by them in attending the coroner’s inquiry as this head of claim was not only not pleaded by the respondents, it was withdrawn at the commencement of the assessment of damages.

9 It was after Woo J had made his rulings on the two appeals of the appellants and that of the respondents that the respective counsel for each appellant submitted that each appellant should be entitled to the benefits of the other’s successful appeal. The judge rejected this submission, stating that each appellant had confined their appeal to a specific head. He said that while it was true that under the interlocutory judgment the appellants were jointly and severally liable to the respondents for damages, the ultimate total sum which each appellant would be liable for would depend on the awards made at the assessment together with any appeals therefrom. The judge felt that each appellant should be bound by what each had sought in his notice of appeal.

10 Thus the appellants appealed to this court against the judge’s ruling which refused to accord to each appellant the benefits of the other’s success.

Issues

11 Before us very much the same arguments were canvassed. They may be summarised under the following heads:

(a) Since an appeal to the judge in chambers was a rehearing, there was no need for each of the appellants to identify in his notice of appeal the specific issues or heads which he was challenging.

(b) In the light of the notices of appeal filed by the appellants, as well as those of the respondents, the whole assessment should, in fact, be open to review by the judge in chambers.

(c) The judge’s ruling was inconsistent with the interlocutory judgment under which the appellants’ liability was joint and several.

However, some authorities canvassed before the judge were not pursued before us.

12 Relying on the decision of this court in Chang Ah Lek v Lim Ah Koon [1999] 1 SLR 82, the appellants argued that Woo J should have dealt with their appeals as though the matter had come before him for the first time. Counsel submitted that the judge should have exercised original jurisdiction as opposed to appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the exercise of the original jurisdiction was invoked by way of “notices of appeal”. In any case, the appellants should not be required to formally appeal against every point when those very points were the subjects of the respondents’ own appeal.

13 References were also made by the appellants’ counsel to O 56 r 1...