Teng Ching Sin and Another v Leong Kwong Sun

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Karthigesu JA
• Judgment Date: 21 February 1994
• Neutral Citation: [1994] SGCA 22
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 142 of 1992
• Date: 21 February 1994
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Year: 1994
• Plaintiff Counsel: NK Pillai (Harry Elias & Pnrs)
• Citation: [1994] SGCA 22
• Defendant Counsel: K Bala Chandran (Mallal & Namazie)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Personal injuries cases,Special damages,Measure of damages,Whether multiplicands for nursing care and loss of earnings awards sustainable,Whether multipliers of five years and two years for a 65-year-old plaintiff excessive,Whether pre-trial transport expenses of family members for visits to respondent while in hospital recoverable,Damages

Cur Adv Vult

At about 8.20am on 26 June 1987, the respondent was driving his motor car EH3712H along Bras Basah Road in the direction of Beach Road and was approaching the junction of Bras Basah Road and Victoria Street followed by a bus SBS6994T driven by the first appellant. Both the bus and the motor car were on the lane next to the bus lane. At or just before the junction, the bus collided into the rear of the respondent`s motor car, and, as a result of the collision, the motor car was propelled forward to some 65ft, colliding into the rear of another car which was stationary on the extreme right lane of Bras Basah Road on the opposite side of the Victoria Road junction. The bus, however, remained stationary after the collision. Arising from the collision, the respondent suffered severe back injuries; he was hospitalized for 441 days and was discharged from hospital only on 11 September 1988.

The respondent brought this action against the first appellant as the driver of the motor bus and the second appellant as the employer of the first appellant. The action was tried before the learned judicial commissioner Mr KS Rajah, who held that the first appellant was solely to blame for the accident. Before him, the following items of general and special damages were agreed: (i) general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity in the sum of $120,000; (ii) hospital and medical expenses incurred up to date of trial in the sum of $13,925.60; and (iii) future surgery and medical expenses in the sum of $1,250. As for the other items of general and special damages not agreed upon, the learned judicial commissioner made the following awards:

(1) Transport expenses of family for visits made to hospital $ 2,000

(2) Transport expenses for future visits based on a multiplier $ 250

of 5 years and a multiplicand of $50 pa

(3) Expenses for future medical aids based on the same multiplier $ 855

and a multiplicand of $171 pa

(4) Nursing care from 15 September 1988 till trial at $400 per month $ 18,800

(5) Future nursing care based on a multiplier of 5 years and $ 24,000

a multiplicand of $400 per month

(6) Pre-trial loss of earnings at $750 per month $ 46,500

(7) Post-trial loss of future earnings based on a multiplier of 2 years $ 18,000

and a multiplicand of $750 per month

Against the decision of the learned judicial commissioner, this appeal has been brought; the appeal is against both liability and quantum of damages awarded. On liability, the appellant took issue with the finding of the learned judicial commissioner that the first appellant was solely to blame and contended that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence. As for the quantum of damages, he took issue with the determination of the following:

(a) the award of $2,000 for the transport expenses for family members visiting the plaintiff in the hospital;

(b) the multiplier of 5 years in items (2), (3) and (5) above and the multiplier of 2 years in item (7);

(c) the award of $400 per month for past and future nursing care, and

(d) the award of $750 per month for past and future earnings.

On the question of liability, the learned judicial commissioner accepted the respondent`s evidence that he slowed down as his car was approaching the junction and rejected the first appellant`s evidence that the respondent`s car suddenly came to a stop without any warning, as a result of which the collision took place. He held that the first appellant in following the respondent`s car did not drive at a speed at which he could pull up behind the respondent`s car when the latter slowed down even after he (the first appellant) had applied the brakes twice. He further held that deceleration without warning was not an act of negligence and found no negligence on the part of the respondent in slowing down when he approached the traffic lights. He came to the following conclusions:

... On the above evidence, I had no difficulty in finding that the defendant was solely to blame. He was driving so fast, did not keep a proper look out and did not slow down to enable him to stop when approaching pedestrian crossings. I found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The defendant pleaded guilty and admitted to facts that establish his negligence. The bus collided into the car after brakes were applied twice when approaching the pedestrian crossings. The defendant expected the plaintiff to increase his speed to get through the lights showing green. The plaintiff however, was more cautious and had slowed down to enable him to stop should the lights change. That is not negligence.

He distinguished the present case from Tong Khing Kia & Anor v Yeo Kong Boon , where the driver of a motor car suddenly stopped along Dunearn Road to pick up a passenger without any warning and a motor bus following could not stop in time and collided into the rear of the car. It was held that the driver of the motor car was solely responsible for the accident.

Before us, counsel for the appellants attacked the finding of the learned judicial commissioner as follows:

(a) that the finding that the respondent did not suddenly stop his car but merely slowed down was in error;

(b) that, even if the respondent had merely slowed down, he had not given any signal before so doing and thus was in breach of a duty of care to drivers of vehicles behind him; and

(c) that the finding that deceleration without warning did not amount to an act of negligence was an error.

In our judgment, the learned judicial commissioner was justified in reaching the finding that the respondent did not brake and stop suddenly. There was evidence from an independent witness, one Tan Peng Seng, a passenger of the bus. Tan said that he was standing just beside the bus driver and facing the road and had clear view of the front. The first time he saw the car in front was when the bus driver applied the brakes and the car was then moving rather slowly. The bus driver `jammed the brakes` the second time to avoid the collision but could not avoid the collision. But Tan could not say whether the car came to a stop at the time of collision. The learned judicial commissioner was entitled to accept the evidence of the respondent that as he approached the junction with the traffic lights showing green in his favour, he slowed down in anticipation that the light would change. There was evidence from the first appellant that he saw the brake lights of the respondent`s car at the rear light up. That being so, the first appellant had warning that the respondent was applying his brakes and slowing down.

Counsel for the appellants sought to persuade us that there was a duty of care on a driver who slowed down to give signal (presumably by hand) that he was slowing down, and he relied on rr 87 and 89 of the Highway Code which are as follows:

(87) Keep a watch on the traffic behind you by glancing in your mirror.

(89) Everytime you intend to turn, stop or slow down, give the correct signal. Signal in good time and maintain the signal long enough to enable others to anticipate your movement. Make sure that your direction indicator gives the signal intended, and that it is cancelled immediately after use.

In...