Tan Ah Yeo and Another v Seow Teck Ming and Another

• Judge: Chao Hick Tin JC
• Judgment Date: 14 February 1989
• Neutral Citation: [1989] SGHC 13
• Citation: [1989] SGHC 13
• Defendant Counsel: Loh Boon Huat and David Ling (Godwin & Co)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Dr Myint Soe and K Chettiar (Murphy & Dunbar)
• Date: 14 February 1989
• Docket Number: Suit No 1399 of 1981
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: English Law,arts 1 & 12 Collision Convention 1910,Delay in issuing writ,Action commencing after expiration of limitation period,Admiralty and Shipping,Civil Procedure,Whether Parliament may widen scope of international convention in its application when enacting an Act,Whether substantial grounds or special reasons shown to justify extension,s 8 UK Maritime Conventions Act 1911,s 4(1) Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act (Cap 54),Discretion under s 8 of UK Maritime Conventions Act 1911,Discretion of court to extend period,Imperial statute,s 8 of UK Maritime Conventions Act 1911,Statute enacted to give effect to international conventions,Whether s 8 of UK Maritime Conventions Act 1911 applicable to ordinary common law negligence action,s 3 Limitation Act (Cap 163),Whether repealed in whole or in part by a local statute,Whether still part of Singapore law,Whether substantial grounds and special reasons shown to justify extension,Pending negotiations at material time -Delay in issuing writ,ss 1, 9 & 10 Maritime Conventions Act 1911 [UK]

Cur Adv Vult

This is an action by the personal representatives of Tay Kian Ho, deceased, claiming damages on behalf of the estate and the widow and children of the deceased under s 12 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43) arising out of a collision along the Singapore river between tongkang SC 542A and motor lighter SA 54D on 24 May 1978. The action is based on the negligence of the first defendant in steering the tongkang. The first defendant was alleged to be the servant or agent of the second defendant, the owner of the tongkang. The deceased was the steersman of the motor lighter.

The writ was issued on 30 April 1981. The statement of claim was not filed until 12 February 1982. Both the writ and the statement of claim were served on the first and second defendants on 10 and 9 March 1982 respectively. Appearance and defence of the defendants were filed on 11 March 1982. Summons for directions was taken out on 25 July 1984. The action was set down for trial on 18 September 1984. On 11 December 1987, the case was fixed for hearing on 4 August 1988.

On 26 July 1988, nine days before the date of hearing, the defendants by a notice for further directions applied for an order permitting them to amend their defence to add an additional ground. The defence, as originally filed, contains the usual denial of negligence and alternatively avers that there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. By this application to amend, the defendants sought to add the additional ground that the action is time-barred by reason of s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911. The application to amend was granted by the learned assistant registrar on 1 August 1988.

In view of the amendment to the defence, the plaintiffs applied by motion to this court for certain preliminary questions or issues to be decided before all other issues in the action. As presented, the preliminary questions for my decision are these:

(i) is the Imperial Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (the MC Act) part of the laws of Singapore or only s 1 thereof;

(ii) does the MC Act apply to a case where both vessels are Singapore registered internal water craft and collision takes place in the internal waters of Singapore and the parties are Singaporeans;

(iii) is the limitation period prescribed in s 8 of the MC Act applicable to an ordinary common law action for negligence for the benefit of the estate of the deceased, which also includes a dependency claim;

(iv) in the event that the answer to (iii) is in the affirmative, will the court, in the circumstances of this case, exercise its discretion under the proviso to s 8 thereof to extend the period of limitation prescribed therein. Applicability of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 I will now proceed to deal with each of these questions in turn. The Maritime Conventions Act 1911 was enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament, in the words of the long title, `with a view to enabling certain Conventions to be carried into effect`. The MC Act was intended to give effect to two conventions, dealing respectively with collisions between vessels and with salvage, which were adopted at a conference at Brussels held in 1910. Singapore was then a colony. By the signature and ratification of the United Kingdom, the two Conventions were extended to Singapore. On Singapore becoming an independent state in 1965, Singapore informed the depositary state of the Conventions that she accepted the Conventions: see Singh on International Maritime Law Conventions , Vol 4 at p 2959. Section 9 of the MC Act provides that `this Act shall extend throughout His Majesty`s dominions and to any territories under his protection and to Cyprus: provided that it shall not extend to the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand ...`. As a colony, Singapore was undoubtedly a part of His Majesty`s dominions: see s 18 of the Interpretation Act 1889 and 32 Halsbury`s Statutes at p 447. It is clear beyond any doubt that the MC Act applied to Singapore in 1911. My attention has not been drawn to any subsequent Act of the United Kingdom (until 1963) or of Singapore which repealed the MC Act in so far as its application to Singapore is concerned. Accordingly, the MC Act is still part of the law of the land.

Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to rely on s 4(1) of the Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act (Cap 54) (the CNPI Act) to say that only s 1 of the MC Act applies in Singapore. Let me set out s 4(1) in full:

This Act shall not apply to any claims to which s 1 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 applies and that Act shall have effect as if this Act had not been passed.

A plain reading of this section shows that it recognizes that the MC Act applies in Singapore. I do not see how one could say that by this section, all the other provisions of the MC Act, except s 1 thereof, have ceased to apply in Singapore. All that s 4(1) says is that the CNPI Act does not apply to a claim that falls within s 1 of the MC Act. It does in no way repeal any of the other provisions of the MC Act. At one point in his argument, Dr Myint Soe seemed to suggest that the MC Act applies in Singapore by virtue of s 4(1) of the CNPI Act. For the reasons given above, this suggestion is without any merit.

An ancillary argument advanced is based on the fact that in Vol 8 of the 1955 Revised Edition of the Laws of Singapore , the MC Act was not listed as one of the imperial statues which applied in Singapore. In my view, it is clear that Vol 8 was not intended to be exhaustive. Nowhere in that volume was that stated to be so. Instead, s 13 of the Revised Edition of the Laws Ordinance 1951 expressly provided that `The Revised Edition of Ordinances may also contain a reprint of such imperial statutes ... as the Commissioners consider useful to include.` It is not without significance that in the case The Atlantic Faith [1978] 2 MLJ 187 it was assumed by the parties and the court that the MC Act applied in Singapore.

General scope of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911

The arguments under this head rest basically on art 1 of the Collision Convention 1910, the relevant part of which reads:

Where a collision occurs between sea-going vessels or between sea-going vessels and vessels of inland navigation the compensation due ... shall be settled in accordance with the following provisions in whatever waters the collision takes place.

The plaintiffs pointed out that as in the present case the collision was not between two sea-going vessels or between a sea-going vessel and a vessel of inland navigation, the Convention does not apply. They contended that since the MC Act is enacted to give effect to the Convention, it should be interpreted in line with the Convention. Reliance was also placed on the second proviso to art 12 of the Convention which stipulates that `where all persons interested belong to the same State as the court trying the case, the provisions of the national law and not of the Convention are applicable`. Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued that the Act does not apply to a case where both parties are Singaporeans, the vessels are Singapore inland craft and the collision occurs in the Singapore river.

Section 1(1) of the MC Act provides that `where by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of those vessels ... .` Section 2(1), in dealing with loss of life or personal injuries, also simply refers to `any person` and `vessel` without any qualification. The arguments of the plaintiffs amount to asking this court to qualify the word `vessels` to mean that at least one of them must be a sea-going vessel and the expression `any person` to mean one of the parties must be a citizen of another country. I do not see any justification for making any such qualifications to words which are plain on the face of those words. If Parliament had intended that the MC Act applies only in the situation where one of the vessels involved is a sea-going vessel, it could have easily so prescribed.

I would add that s 10 of the MC Act provides that the Act `shall be construed as one with the Merchant Shipping Acts`. Our Merchant Shipping Act defines `vessel` to include `any ship or boat or air cushioned vehicle or floating rig ...` and `ship` is defined to include `every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars`. Section 9(3) of the MC Act also provides that that Act applies `in whatever waters the damage` occurred. Under the MC Act the nationalities of the parties are totally irrelevant. There is nothing in the MC Act or the Merchant Shipping Act which warrants the restrictive interpretation advocated by counsel for the plaintiffs.

In my view the arguments of the plaintiffs proceeded on a fallacious premise: that just because the MC Act is enacted to give effect to the two Conventions Parliament may not widen the scope of the Act to cover its own nationals or its own inland water craft. Contrary to what is contended by the plaintiffs, the second proviso to art 12, in fact, reinforces that view. I know of no general principle of international law which forbids that neither can I find any rule of domestic law which supports that premise. While I accept that it is a principle of legal policy that an Act should be interpreted to conform with international law, there is nothing here in conflict between the MC Act and the Collision Convention.

I would, however, hasten to add that if indeed in a particular case there is a real conflict between international law and national law, national law must prevail: see Cheney v Conn [1968] 1 All ER 779 and Collco Dealings Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner [1961] 1 All ER 762. In this regard, I can do no better than to cite the following passage from Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes , 12th Ed, at p 183:

Under the general presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its

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