Brown Noel Trading Pte Ltd v Singapore Press Holdings Ltd and others (No 2)

• Judge: Lim Teong Qwee JC
• Judgment Date: 18 August 1993
• Neutral Citation: [1993] SGHC 194
• Citation: [1993] SGHC 194
• Defendant Counsel: Salem Ibrahim (Harry Elias & Pnrs)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Jimmy Yim (Drew & Napier)
• Date: 18 August 1993
• Docket Number: Suit No 828 of 1993
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: O 42 r (8)(1) & (2) Rules of the Supreme Court 1990,O 56 r 2(1), (2) & (3) Rules of the Supreme Court 1990,Whether registrar can allow extra time pending further argument,ss 18(3), 29A(1) & 34(1)(c) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322) & First Schedule,Approving draft order,ss 29A(1) & 34(1)(c) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322),Whether judge has jurisdiction to hear further argument after judgment entered and perfected,Inherent,High Court,Jurisdiction to her further argument,Jurisdiction,Civil Procedure,Judgments and orders,Jurisdiction to hear further argument, affirm, vary or set aside order it made

I dismissed an application in chambers and granted an application for further argument. The order dismissing the application was then drawn up and entered and when the application came before me again later I held that I had no jurisdiction to hear further argument. The appeal is against this decision.

This action was commenced by writ issued on 19 April 1993 and on the same day an order was made ex parte for an injunction against the defendants. The first defendant applied for an order that the injunction be dissolved and for consequential orders and on 28 May 1993 I dismissed the application. The injunction against the second and third defendants was dissolved and they are not concerned in this appeal. On 4 June 1993 the first defendant applied for further argument and on 9 June 1993 the registrar informed its solicitors that I would hear further argument. The application eventually came before me again on 8 July 1993. By then the order I made on 28 May 1993 had been drawn up and entered. It came about in this manner. On 4 June 1993 a draft of the order was submitted to the first defendant`s solicitors for approval. That was the day they applied for further argument and they took no action on the draft. On 9 June 1993, the day the registrar informed them that I would hear further argument, the plaintiff`s solicitors drew the registrar`s attention to O 42 r 8 and the order was drawn up and entered accordingly. Order 42 r 8 provides:

(1) Where the party in whose favour a judgment or order is given or made is represented by a solicitor, a copy of the draft shall be submitted for approval to the solicitor (if any) of the other party who shall within two days of the receipt thereof, or within such further time as may in any case be allowed by the Registrar, return such copy with his signed consent or any required amendments thereto.

(2) When the solicitor omits to return the copy of the draft within the time prescribed, he shall be deemed to have consented to the terms thereof.

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Although the first defendant had applied for further argument it did not apply to the registrar for further time under O 42 r 8(1). Mr Salem submitted that the registrar could only allow further time to agree and settle amendments but I am unable to see that his power should be so limited. I think this would have been a proper case to apply to the registrar for further time. So when the application came before me again on 8 July 1993 the position was that I had made an order dismissing it on 28 May 1993 and the order had been drawn up and entered on 9 June 1993. The powers of the High Court include those set out in the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322) and under s 18(3) these powers are exercisable in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court. There is power to grant an injunction and in accordance with O 29 r 1 an interlocutory injunction may be granted and it may be granted ex parte and in accordance with O 32 r 6 such an order may be set aside. The order made ex parte was also expressed to be `until further order`. The High Court undoubtedly had power to hear the first defendant`s application to dissolve the injunction but once it had heard and determined it by making an order dismissing it there was no power to rehear the application or to affirm vary or set aside the order already made or to make some other order. That would be exercising appellate jurisdiction in respect of its own order. That is the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Appeal by s 29A(1) which provides:

The civil jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal shall consist of appeals from any judgment or order of the High Court in any civil cause or matter whether made in the exercise of its original or of its appellate jurisdiction, subject nevertheless to the provisions of this Act or any other written law regulating the terms and conditions upon which such appeals may be brought.

In Re St Nazaire Co , Jessel MR said at p 98:

Now, what was that right of rehearing? Was it original jurisdiction, or was it appellate jurisdiction? There can, as it seems to me, be but one answer to that question - it was appellate juridiction.

Later at the same page he said:

... indeed, every rehearing was an appeal, although every appeal was not a rehearing.

Baggallay LJ said at pp 100-101:

Having regard to the several clauses of the Judicature Act, to which the Master of the Rolls has referred, to which I may add also the 19th section of the same Act, which provides, `That the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction and power to hear and determine appeals from any judgment or order, save as hereinafter mentioned, of Her Majesty`s High Court of Justice or of any judges or judge thereof,` it appears to me that, with the particular exceptions which are to be found in different

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