Ren Mingyue v Wang Qingguo

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Hoo Sheau Peng
• Judgment Date: 09 February 2006
• Neutral Citation: [2006] SGDC 16
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Published date: 16 March 2006
• Year: 2006
• Plaintiff Counsel: William Ong (Central Chambers Law Corporation)
• Defendant Counsel: Ellen Lee (Ramdas & Wong)
• Citation: [2006] SGDC 16

9 Feb 2006

District Judge Hoo Sheau Peng

Parties’ Particulars

1 Petitioner: Ren Mingyue (‘the wife’), homemaker, 44 years old.

2 Respondent: Wang Qingguo (‘the husband’), university lecturer, 48 years old.

3 Child: A daughter (‘the child’), a student, 18 years old.

4 Date of marriage: 4 February 1986 in the People’s Republic of China (‘China’).

5 Date of Decree Nisi: 20 July 2004 based on three years’ separation with the consent of the wife.

6 The parties are from China. In 1992, they migrated to Singapore with the child.

Orders Made

7 Following the grant of the decree nisi, the ancillary matters were adjourned to be heard in chambers. The husband filed six affidavits, and the wife filed four affidavits. On the ancillary matters, I made these orders by consent:

(1) there be joint custody of the child of the marriage, with care and control to the wife, and liberal access to the husband.

(2) the husband is to pay $1,300 per month as maintenance for the child.

(3) the husband is to pay all the educational expenses, including fees, of the child.

8 In addition, I made the following orders:

(4) the monthly maintenance for the child shall be paid into the child’s bank account, with the number to be inserted into the order of court, and shall commence 1 November 2005, and thereafter be payable 1^st of every month.

(5) there be no further division of the matrimonial assets, and each party is to retain assets in his and her own name.

(6) the husband is to pay the wife lump sum maintenance of $134,400, based on $800 x 12 x 14, in 2 equal instalments on 15 December 2005 and 15 January 2006.

(7) liberty to apply.

(8) no order as to costs.

Appeal

9 The wife has appealed against Orders 2, 5, 6 and 8, being the issues of maintenance, division of the matrimonial assets and costs. I now give brief reasons for the orders.

Disclosed Matrimonial Assets

10 The husband’s disclosed assets comprised:

(a) the matrimonial flat at Block 611 Clementi West St 1 #02-286 Singapore 120611 (‘the flat’). Its estimated value ranged from $233,000 to $249,000. There was an outstanding loan of about $50,000. It yielded a net value of around $183,000 to $199,000;

(b) POSB bank account, with around $21,890;

(c) Citibank MaxiSave account, with around $8,119;

(d) Citibank Time Deposits, with $30,000;

(e) Citibank Unit Trusts, with $380,357 and US$140,362, amounting to about $646,763;

(f) Bank of China account, with RMB55,795, amounting to about $11,000;

(g) CPF ordinary account, with about $10,344, CPF special account, with about $1,834, and CPF medisave account, with about $31,705;

(h) NUS ASPF ordinary account, with about $53,204, and NUS ASPF special account, with about $89,001;

(i) house in Zhitang, China (‘Zhitang house’); and

(j) 222 new Singapore shares and 1,217 of economic restructuring shares in CPF account.

11 For the Zhitang house, the wife claimed its value as $40,000. The husband stated that it was meant for his parents. Being in a rural area, it was difficult to get a valuation. In 1991, its construction costs were only RMB35,000. It could not be worth very much. I accepted the husband’s position. I took into account the construction costs, amounting to about $7,000 as the value of the Zhitang house. I found the total matrimonial assets of the husband to be around about $1,093,860 to $1,109,860, taking into account items (a) to (i). No value was attached to item (j) by the parties. In this regard, I accepted the wife’s contention that all matrimonial assets acquired during the marriage should be considered for possible division, and not just those acquired before the breakdown of the marriage: Yeo Gim Tong Michael v Tianzon [1996] 2 SLR 1.

12 The wife’s disclosed assets comprised:

(a) OCBC savings account, with around $3,052;

(b) OCBC current account, with around $3,000;

(c) CPF ordinary account, with about $24,823, CPF special account, with around $72, CPF medisave account, with around $477, CPF investment account, with around $3,845;

(d) UOB bullion and future account, with around $4,646;

(e) 400 economic restructuring shares.

13 The husband claimed that the wife also has a POSB account, with around $5,442 as at 1997, an OCBC ACU FD account, with around $12,956 as at 2002, and a DBS foreign currency fixed deposit, with around $25,742 as at 2002. I accepted the wife’s claim that the accounts have been closed, and the amounts expended. The husband also claimed that the wife has a house in Hangzhou, China. As the house was in a prime area, it has substantial value. However, I accepted the wife’s position that the house belonged to her father. Taking into account items (a) to (d), the wife’s assets amount to around $39,915. Again, no value was attached to item (e) by the parties.

Division of Assets

14 On 28 March 2001, the parties entered into a deed of separation in Chinese (‘the deed’): see pages 34 to 36, the husband’s first affidavit (‘HA1’). The translation of the paragraphs that deal with the division of assets state:

3. Both parties have agreed to the division of the following assets. Wang Qingguo [the husband] shall pay a total of S$220,000 to Ren Mingyue [the wife]; all the assets in the house (including the present HDB flat) shall be given to Wang Qingguo except Mingyue’s personal belongings.

4. Both parties have acknowledged that the above-mentioned assets distribution is an one-off and a permanent issue. That is, one party is not allowed to raise any request in respect of assets and finance at any time and under any circumstances from the other party in future.

15 Pursuant to the deed, the husband paid $220,000 to the wife. In addition, he refunded $20,000 into the wife’s CPF account, being the wife’s share of the HDB housing grant to the parties, as required by the CPF Board. Accordingly, the wife transferred the flat into the husband’s sole name. Before me, the wife contended that the deed was not binding on her. She asked for an equal share of the disclosed matrimonial assets. The husband resisted any further division of the matrimonial assets, requesting the court to give full effect to the deed.

16 By s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353) (‘the Charter’), the court has the power to order a division of the matrimonial assets. By s 112(2), the court has the discretion to decline to exercise such power, based on all the circumstances of the case. A relevant consideration would be ‘any agreement between the parties with respect to the ownership and division of the matrimonial assets made in contemplation of divorce’: see s 112(2)(e).

17 In Wong Kam Fong, Anne (m.w) v Ang Ann Liang [1993] 2 SLR 192, the High Court stated:

The courts have no interest in encouraging matrimonial litigation …. Indeed, the ‘clean break’ principle means that the law encourages spouses to avoid bitterness after family break-down and to settle their money and property problems (see Minton v Minton [1979] AC 593 at 608). A settlement agreement can of course be attacked in the same way as any other contract (see Lord Atkins in Hyman at pp 625-626). However, if the agreement is valid as a contract, and if circumstances have not changed so drastically since the agreement was made that it would not be fair to give effect to that agreement, then the court may, in its discretion, respect the parties' wishes and decline to exercise its powers …

18 The burden was on the wife who wanted to depart from the terms of the deed to satisfy the court why it should not give effect to it: see Wong Kam Fong (supra). First, the wife stated that the husband took advantage of her, and exploited his position by not providing full information of his assets. Secondly, the wife claimed that she was ignorant of its legal effect, and did not have the benefit of legal advice. The wife relied on Chia Hock Hua v Chong Choo Je [1995] 1 SLR 380. There, the High Court was concerned with an agreement for payment of lump sum maintenance. By the then s 110 of the Charter, now s 116, such an agreement shall not be effective until it has been approved by the court. The High Court listed certain factors to determine whether an agreement is valid and reasonable, such that the court should endorse it. To sum up, relying on the case, at ¶17, the wife was asking the court to consider ‘whether there was mistake, duress or undue influence such as the husband being in a superior bargaining position and he took an unfair advantage by exploiting his position and the agreement was entered into without the wife having the full knowledge of all the relevant facts and or legal advice.’

19 Turning to the contention that she did not have full knowledge of the state of affairs, the wife vaguely explained that the parties only dealt with the flat when drawing up the deed. She did not know what the husband’s other assets were. The husband computed the sum of $220,000 as her projected income for the next 10 years if she were to work in Singapore: see paragraph 5, page 2 of the wife’s first affidavit (‘WA1’). She also said she wanted $300,000 for the flat, but he persuaded her to accept $220,000: paragraph 25, at page 5 of the wife’s second affidavit (‘WA2’). I disbelieved her evidence. The wife was a graduate, and has experience working in financial fields. By her own admission, she worked as a broker in Kingly Management from October 1992 – June 1993, a manager in Asia FX from July 1993 – June 1994 and a senior manager in Rolvin Holding from July 1994 – July 1995: see paragraphs 15 – 17, pages 5 - 6, WA2. With the sum of $220,000 from the husband, she made various trades and investments. Unfortunately, by her admission, she lost about $100,000: see paragraph 10 – 11, pages 3 – 4, WA1, and paragraph 8, page 2, the wife’s third affidavit (‘WA3’). While she has not been successful in her career or her investments, the wife was not ignorant of financial matters. It was highly unlikely that she did not enquire about the assets at stake.

20 Further, the value of the flat at that time...