Yeo Gim Tong Michael v Tianzon

• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Judge: Karthigesu JA
• Judgment Date: 26 March 1996
• Neutral Citation: [1996] SGCA 14
• Citation: [1996] SGCA 14
• Defendant Counsel: Wong Chai Kin (Wong Chai Kin)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Simon Tan (Allen & Gledhill)
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 139 of 1995
• Date: 26 March 1996
• Subject Matter: Matrimonial property,s 106 Women's Charter (Cap 353),Whether subject to division,Inter-spousal gifts,Premium to compensate for award of property to the other spouse,Assets acquired after breakdown of marriage,Whether correctly awarded,Family Law

Cur Adv Vult

This appeal arose from the hearing of ancillary matters in the matrimonial proceedings between the wife, who was the petitioner, and the husband, the respondent, and once again concerns the vexed question of division of matrimonial assets under s 106 of the Women`s Charter (Cap 353). The matrimonial assets consisted mainly of the matrimonial home, the husband`s moneys in his account with the Central Provident Fund Board (CPF moneys) and his motor car. In dividing the assets between them the High Court awarded to the wife 50% of the total value of the matrimonial assets. The husband now appeals against this decision complaining that the amount awarded to the wife was in error and was excessive.

Brief facts

The parties were married on 31 August 1980 in the Philippines. The husband is a Singaporean and at the time of the marriage was working there. The wife is a Filipina, and is now a permanent resident in Singapore. Both are domiciled in Singapore. Two children were born: Jennifer on 27 March 1982 and Josephine on 22 February 1983. Josephine unfortunately passed away on 25 October 1993 as a result of a road traffic accident. From 1984 to December 1993 the parties lived at their matrimonial flat, namely Blk 470 Tampines St 44, #05-192, Singapore 1852 (the flat). The flat was purchased on 1 August 1985 by the husband and cost $77,700, which was paid solely from his own funds.

In September 1993, the wife petitioned for a divorce on the ground that the marriage had broken down irretrievably owing to the unreasonable behaviour of the husband. In October 1993, the husband filed an answer as well as a cross-petition. The wife and Jennifer then left the matrimonial home in December 1993. Subsequently, Kan Ting Chiu JC (as he then was) made an interim order in April 1994 for a joint custody of the child with the wife having the care and control of the child. Separate sums as interim maintenance for the child and the wife were also ordered.

The petition came on for hearing before Lai Kew Chai J. It was part-heard and was adjourned to a further date to be fixed. Prior to the date being fixed, negotiations took place between the parties and the husband agreed to withdraw the answer and the cross-petition and the wife agreed to withdraw the reply and answer to the cross-petition. Following that, in September 1994 the petition then uncontested came on for further hearing before Lai Kew Chai J. The learned judge granted the decree nisi to the wife and adjourned for hearing in chambers all ancillary matters. These matters then came on for hearing before Choo Han Teck JC in July and August 1995, and he made the order now under appeal.

Decision below

The main issue of contention before the learned judge was the matrimonial flat: each of them wanted the flat for himself or herself. The learned judge decided as follows:

I made the order that the respondent [the husband] may keep the matrimonial flat, and with that in mind, I ordered that the petitioner [the wife] be given a 50% share of the value of the matrimonial assets which I determined as S$589,332.95. I told parties that if I had ordered the flat to be transferred to the petitioner her share of the matrimonial assets would be in the region of 40% (inclusive of the value of the flat). As both parties were equally keen to have the flat I placed a premium of 10% on it. I also ordered that the respondent advance S$50,000 within 14 days to the petitioner and the balance as and when the CPF Board will release the money to him. I further ordered that the respondent shall have no claim to any compensation payable in respect of their daughter`s civil claim and that the petitioner takes over the conduct of the claim.

The appeal

The main issue before us was whether the learned judge was right in awarding to the wife 50% of the total value of the matrimonial assets. The husband advanced several arguments against the decision of the learned judge. First, it was contended that in computing the value of the matrimonial assets acquired by the husband only the period commencing from the date of the marriage and ending on the date when the marriage irretrievably broke down, ie 9 September 1993, being the date the wife filed the petition, should be reckoned. Therefore any assets acquired by the husband prior to the marriage should be excluded: Lam Chih Khian v Ong Chin Ngoh [1993] 2 SLR 253 at p 259. So also should be excluded the assets acquired after the marriage had broken down. The reason is that the division was premised on the indirect contribution of the wife, such as looking after the home and caring for the family. It was admitted that she stopped washing, ironing and cooking for the husband after she had filed the divorce petition, and thus as from that date her contribution ceased. It follows that she was not entitled to any share in the assets acquired solely by the husband`s effort as from that date. Hence, in so far as the husband`s CPF moneys are concerned, only the amount accrued or acquired during the period from the date of marriage to 9 September 1993 should be taken into account. As of that date the husband`s CPF moneys stood at $254,283.08 and from this should be deducted the sum of $32,371.23 being the amount of the CPF moneys accumulated by the husband before the marriage, thus leaving a balance of $221,911.85.

We agree that the husband`s CPF moneys accrued or accumulated prior to the date of the marriage should be excluded in the computation of the husband`s assets for division under s 106 of the Women`s Charter. But, we are unable to accept that assets acquired by a party, and in this case the husband, after the date of the breakdown of the marriage should not be included. Subsection (1) and (3) of s 106 each refer to assets acquired `during the marriage`, and the marriage is only dissolved when the decree nisi is made absolute. Normally the ancillary matters come before the court for hearing prior to the date when the decree nisi is made absolute. As a matter of practicality, the court would take, for the purpose of determining the assets falling within s 106, in the case of CPF moneys of the spouses, the latest statements issued by the Central Provident Fund Board, and in other cases the assets of the spouses as of that date. Therefore any assets acquired during the marriage including those acquired after the marriage has broken down fall to be considered under these provisions. What contribution a spouse makes to the acquisition of such assets during this period depends on the facts of the case. In making a division under s 106(3) the court would have regard to the period in which the husband and wife have ceased to cohabit and the indirect contribution, if any, made by the wife during the period. In this case, the wife`s indirect...