Public Prosecutor v Lee Soon Lee Vincent

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 03 August 1998
• Date: 03 August 1998
• Docket Number: Magistrate’s Appeal No 77 of 1998
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Public Prosecutor

Plaintiff

and

Lee Soon Lee Vincent

Defendant

[1998] SGHC 264

Yong Pung How CJ

Magistrate’s Appeal No 77 of 1998

High Court

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing—Sentencing—Drink driving—Whether imprisonment term mandatory for repeat offender—Mitigating factors—Legal limit only slightly exceeded—Previous drink-driving offence several years ago—Section 67 Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed)—Road Traffic—Offences—Drink driving—Whether imprisonment term mandatory for repeat offender—Section 67 (1) Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed)—Statutory Interpretation—Construction of statute—Ascertainment of parliamentary intention—Examination of legislative history—Acts had to be read as whole—Reference to parliamentary debates—Section 67 (1) Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed)—Words and Phrases—“Shall be liable?—“And?—Section 67 (1) Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed)

The respondent pleaded guilty to two charges. The first charge was for drink-driving under s 67 (1) (b) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed) (“RTA?) and the second was for speeding under s 63 (4), punishable under s 131 (a) of the RTA. The Prosecution appealed in respect of the sentence imposed for drink-driving on the ground that an imprisonment term should have been imposed because this was the respondent’s second conviction for drink-driving. The central issue in this appeal was whether, under s 67 of the RTA, an imprisonment term was mandatory for a repeat offender who was driving under the influence of drinks. The answer to the question depended largely on the proper construction to be given to the phrase “shall be liable? and the word “and? as found in the section.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) Although, prima facie, the phrase “shall be liable? contained no obligation or mandatory connotation, a consideration of case law, legislative history, and parliamentary debates revealed that Parliament had to have intended that imprisonment be mandatory for repeat offender convicted under s 67 (1) of the RTA: at [14], [32] to [37].

(2) If Parliament intended for the punishment to be alternative and cumulative, the word “or to both?, as was used in s 64 (1), could easily have been employed. Further, the punishment under the old s 67 (1) was already alternative and cumulative. This suggested that Parliament would not have altered the wording by inserting the word “and? if no change was intended by the amendment: at [35] to [36].

(3) With regard to sentencing, the court took into account that the respondent had exceeded the legal limit by only three micrograms, that his previous drink-driving offence was some seven years ago, that he pleaded guilty to the present offence and had co-operated with the police when stopped. As such, the court sentenced the respondent to two weeks’ imprisonment in addition to the fine of $6,000 and four years’ disqualification: at [39] and [40].

Chua Ben Cheong v PPMagistrate’s Appeal No 388 of 1991 (refd)

Ng Chwee Puan v R [1953] MLJ 86 (refd)

PP v Phua Keng Tong [1985-1986] SLR (R) 545; [1986] SLR 168 (refd)

PP v Tan Teck Hin [1991] 1 SLR (R) 266; [1991] SLR 514, HC (refd)

PP v Tan Teck Hin [1992] 1 SLR (R) 672; [1992] 1 SLR 841, CA (folld)

Public Prosecutor v Lee Ah Sam [1949] MLJ 236 (refd)

Seah Swee Hock v PPMagistrate’s Appeal No 176 of 1997 (not folld)

Official Secrets Act (Cap 213, 1985Rev Ed)ss 5,17 (2)

Penal Code (Cap 224,1985Rev Ed)s 344

Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1994Rev Ed)s 67 (1)

Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Rev Ed)ss 67, 67 (1) (consd);ss 63 (4),64 (1), 65,65A (1) (b),67 (1) (b), 68,68 (1),131 (1) (a)

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed,1993 Reprint)s 60

Emergency Regulations Ordinance1948 (No 10 of 1948) (Malaya)reg 5 (1)

Sowaran Singh and Toh Han Li (Deputy Public Prosecutors) for the appellant

Jan Chua Peck Kiang and Lim Swee Tee (Chua Dhillon Tan & Partners) for the respondent.

Yong Pung How CJ

The charges

1 On 6 March 1998, the respondent pleaded guilty in the court below to two charges. One charge was for drink driving under s 67 (1) (b) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1997 Ed) (“RTA?), and the second was for speeding under s 63 (4) and punishable under s 131 (1) (a) of the RTA.

2 The Prosecution appealed only in respect of the sentence imposed under s 67 (1) (b)of the RTA, for which the respondent was fined $6,000 (in default three months’ imprisonment) and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence for all classes of vehicles for four years.

3 At the end of the hearing before me on 30 June 1998, I allowed the Prosecution’s appeal. I now give my reasons.

The facts

4 The facts of this case were straightforward. On 17 October 1997 at about 8.40pm, one VSC 1370 Roger Chua (“VSC Chua?) was patrolling along the Tampines Expressway towards the direction of the Seletar Expressway. VSC Chua then spotted the respondent driving his vehicle in a zigzag manner and overtaking twice from the left-hand side at a speed of about 108km/h when the speed limit was 80km/h. VSC Chua managed to stop the respondent, and he noted that the latter’s breath smelled of alcohol. The respondent was subsequently brought to the traffic police station where he was subjected to a breath evidential analyser test. The test revealed that the respondent had 38 micrograms of alcohol per 100 millilitres of breath, thus exceeding the legal limit by three micrograms.

5 Further investigations revealed that the respondent had been charged and convicted of drink-driving in 1991, for which he was fined $1,500 and disqualified from driving Class 3 vehicles for one year.

6 In the court below, after the respondent pleaded guilty, the Prosecution urged the district judge to impose an imprisonment term since this was the respondent’s second conviction for drink-driving under s 67 of the RTA. The submission was that an imprisonment term was mandatory for a repeat offender.

7 The Defence, however, relied on the recent case of Seah Swee Hock v PPMagistrate’s Appeal No 176 of 1997 which I presided over to contend that the District Judge could exercise her discretion not to impose an imprisonment term.

The decision below

8 After reference to ss 67 and 68 of the RTA as well as the facts in Seah’s case, the district judge concluded as follows:

1. 10 In setting aside the custodial sentence inSeah Swee Hock’s case, the Honourable Chief Justice clearly took the view that imprisonment was not mandatory under s 68. The...