Public Prosecutor v Tan Teck Hin

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 27 March 1992
• Date: 27 March 1992
• Docket Number: Criminal Motion No 18 of 1991
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)

Public Prosecutor

Plaintiff

and

Tan Teck Hin

Defendant

[1992] SGCA 20

L P Thean J

,

Chan Sek Keong J

and

Warren L H Khoo J

Criminal Motion No 18 of 1991

Court of Criminal Appeal

Constitutional Law–Fundamental liberties–Protection against retrospective criminal laws–Punishment provision amended to enhance the punishment for repeat offenders–Whether sentencing of offenders under amended provision constituted breach of rule against retrospective criminal laws if earlier offence took place prior to amendment to provision–Article 11 (1) Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed)–Road Traffic–Offences–Drink driving–Punishment for repeat offender–Section 67 (1) Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1985 Rev Ed)–Section 18 Road Traffic (Amendment) Act 1990 (Act 7 of 1990)–Statutory Interpretation–Statutes–Terminology–Distinction between 'repeal' and 'amendment'

The accused was convicted on one charge of driving while under the influence of drink under the amended s 67 (1) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the Act”). He had also been previously convicted on a similar charge of driving while under the influence of drink under the pre-amended s 67 (1) of the Act. The amendment to s 67 (1) of the Act enhanced the punishment for repeat offenders to a mandatory term of imprisonment. The district judge treated the accused as a first offender and sentenced him to a fine of $1,000 and disqualified him from driving all classes of vehicles for four years. The Prosecution appealed to the High Court which varied the fine of $1,000 to a sentence of imprisonment of one month. Additionally, the High Court held that the accused should be treated as a first offender as it would otherwise breach the constitutional rule against retrospective criminal laws. The Public Prosecutor successfully applied to the High Court to reserve the following question of public interest for the decision of the Court of Appeal: “Whether a court, for purposes of sentencing an accused person convicted under s 67 (1) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276) as amended by Act 7 of 1990, should take into account his previous conviction under the same section before the amendment and impose a minimum fine of $3,000 and a term of imprisonment?”

Held, allowing the motion:

(1) When a statute was repealed, it was treated as if it had never existed except as to transactions past and closed. Thus subordinate legislation, unless saved by the repealing enactment, lapsed on the repeal of the provisions under which it was made: at [27].

(2) Where an Act had been amended, the presumption was that it was intended that the Act should continue to be operative, but as from the date of the amendment, in its amended form: at [28].

(3) In the instant matter, there was no question concerning the survivability of an act done under a repealed statutory provision. The previous conviction of the accused was a fact that did not cease to exist on the repeal. Hence the question of whether s 67 (1) was amended or repealed was irrelevant: at [25] and [33].

(4) What Parliament intended to do by the amendment was to enhance the punishment for persons found guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol and drugs as the offence was unchanged except for the prescribed punishment: at [35].

(5) The previous conviction of the accused under s 67 (1) of the Act should be taken into consideration in deciding whether the proper punishment should be as for a second or subsequent offence: at [41].

(6) The instant interpretation did not breach the constitutional rule against retrospective criminal laws as the offence with which the accused was being charged was an offence at the time it was committed: at [45].

Beaumont v Yeomans (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 562 (distd)

Campbell v The King (1949) 95 Can CC 63 (folld)

Green, Re [1936] 2 DLR 153 (folld)

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed)Art 11 (1) (consd)

Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 1985 Rev Ed)s 67 (1) (consd)

Road Traffic (Amendment) Act1990 (Act 7 of 1990)s 18 (consd)

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985Rev Ed)s 60

Bala Reddy (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the appellant

Wee Pan Lee (Wee Tay & Lim) for the respondent.

Judgment reserved.

Warren L H Khoo J

(delivering the judgment of the court):

1 The respondent was convicted on 28 July 1991 by a District Court on his own plea on a charge of driving while under the influence of drink on 9 June 1990 under s 67 (1) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276) (“the Act”). He was sentenced to a fine of $1,000, in default three months' imprisonment, and he was disqualified from driving all classes of vehicles for four years.

2 The respondent was also charged and convicted on two other road traffic-related charges, but these are not of any relevance to the matter before this court. He had previously on 5 March 1990 been convicted on a similar charge of driving while under the influence of drink under s 67 (1) of the Act before it was amended. This conviction is relevant to the question before this court.

3 Section 67 (1) of the Act was amended with effect from 2 April 1990 in such a way that the punishment for both first time and repeat offenders was increased. Section 67 (1) before the amendment read as follows:

Any person who, when driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, is under the influence of drink or of a drug to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of such vehicle, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months,and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both. [emphasis added]

4 Section 67 (1) after the amendment reads as follows:

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