Ng Djoni v Miranda Joseph Jude

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Zeslene Mao AR
• Judgment Date: 23 August 2017
• Neutral Citation: [2017] SGHCR 13
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 401 of 2017
• Year: 2017
• Published date: 31 August 2017
• Hearing Date: 30 June 2017,09 June 2017,14 July 2017,04 August 2017
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lee Wei Yung (Pacific Law Corporation)
• Defendant Counsel: Kwok-Chern Yew Tee (Foo Kwok LLC)
• Subject Matter: Courts and Jurisdiction,Magistrate's Court,Power to transfer proceedings from Magistrate's Court to High Court
• Citation: [2017] SGHCR 13

Zeslene Mao AR: Introduction

In Magistrate’s Court Suit No 24052 of 2015 (“the MC Suit”), the plaintiff, Ng Djoni, claims against the defendant, Miranda Joseph Jude, for damages for personal injury arising out of a car accident. In the present application, the plaintiff sought a transfer of proceedings from the Magistrate’s Court to the High Court under s 54B of the State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) and O 89 r 1(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) on the ground that damages might exceed the jurisdictional limit of the State Courts.

I first heard the application on 9 June 2017. Thereafter, two further hearings were held on 30 June and 14 July 2017 because the plaintiff disclosed fresh evidence. During the hearings, the parties were also asked to consider the possibility of agreeing to an enlargement of the jurisdiction of the State Courts under s 23 of the State Courts Act. However, the parties were unable to agree and the plaintiff elected to proceed with the application for transfer.

Having heard the parties, I dismissed the plaintiff’s application. These are my reasons.

Background to the application

The car accident involving the parties occurred on 27 December 2012 (“the December 2012 accident”). On 23 December 2015, the plaintiff filed a Writ of Summons in the Magistrate’s Court (“the Writ”). The Writ was not served and applications for renewal were filed, first on 15 June 2016 and subsequently on 30 November 2016. On 16 March 2017, the Statement of Claim was filed. The Defence was filed in the MC Suit on 13 April 2017.

On 11 April 2017, the plaintiff filed this application for transfer in the High Court.

The applicable legal principles

Section 54B of the State Courts Act states:

General power to transfer from State Courts to High Court

54B.—(1) Where it appears to the High Court, on the application of a party to any civil proceedings pending in a State Court, that the proceedings, by reason of its involving some important question of law, or being a test case, or for any other sufficient reason, should be tried in the High Court, it may order the proceedings to be transferred to the High Court.

(2) An order under subsection (1) may be made on such terms as the court sees fit.

[emphasis added]

The issue in the present application was whether there was “sufficient reason” for the making of order for transfer. In Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng [2010] 2 SLR 1015 (“Keppel Singmarine”), the Court of Appeal held (at [16]) that the likelihood that a plaintiff’s damages would exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court would, ordinarily, be regarded as “sufficient reason” for the transfer of proceedings to the High Court under s 54B of the State Courts Act (see also Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng [2008] 2 SLR(R) 839 at [38] where the phrase “possibility of the plaintiff’s damages exceeding the jurisdictional limit of the District Court” [emphasis in original] was used). The jurisdictional limit of the State Courts is currently $250,000. (The automatic transfer of cases to the District Courts for actions arising out of motor accidents for damages not exceeding $500,000 under the Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Specified Proceedings to District Court) Order 2016 (Cap 322, S 597/2016) applies only to cases commenced in the High Court on or after 1 December 2016.)

In Keppel Singmarine, the court held that the plaintiff had presented “sufficient reason” that his damages would exceed the jurisdictional limit of the State Courts. The accident had caused the plaintiff to suffer serious injuries to his right arm, which resulted in an amputation. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had been earning about $3,000 a month. As the plaintiff was at the material time 43 years old, an estimate of his claim for loss of future earnings (applying a multiplier of 14 years) was $504,000. It was also submitted that a sum of $80,000 should be awarded for the amputation alone based on past precedents. Based on the severity of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff and the quantification of the damages submitted by the defendant, the court was prepared to accept that there was a “real possibility” that damages would exceed $250,000 (see Keppel Singmarine at [16] and Ng Chan Teng v Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 647 at [24]).

However, the Court of Appeal noted (at [17]) that the presence of a “sufficient reason” did not automatically entitle the plaintiff to have the proceedings transferred to the High Court. It was necessary for the court to evaluate all the material circumstances. In particular, the court had to assess the prejudice that would be visited on the party resisting a transfer and the competing interests of the parties, though the prejudice could not consist of the fact that the damages awarded would exceed $250,000 if the transfer were allowed. The Court of Appeal also noted that the words “may order” in s 54B of the State Courts Act made it “abundantly clear that every transfer under the subject provision is a discretionary one requiring a principled approach that requires a balancing of the respective competing interests of the parties” (at [17]).

Differing from the High Court Judge, the Court of Appeal in Keppel Singmarine found that there was prejudice to the defendant such that an order for transfer ought not to be granted. First, the parties had entered into interlocutory consent judgment apportioning liability between the defendant and the plaintiff a ratio of 70:30. At the time interlocutory consent judgment was entered into, the prevailing position as set out in the Court of Appeal decision in Ricky Charles s/o Gabriel Thanabalan v Chua Boon Yeow [2003] 1 SLR(R) 511 was that by entering into interlocutory judgment, the parties would have been taken to have affirmed the jurisdiction of the District Court, and would have been barred from transferring the proceedings to the High Court. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the defendant in Keppel Singmarine would likely not have entered into consent judgment if it had known that the position was otherwise. Moreover, the application to transfer the proceedings was made four years since the consent judgment had been recorded and six to seven years from the date of the accident. Even if the consent judgment was to be set aside, the court noted that parties would have to re-litigate their respective liabilities and that to require the defendant to do so despite the substantial lapse of time since the accident occurred would be severely prejudicial to the defendant’s interests. The Court of Appeal thus dismissed the application for transfer, awarding costs to the defendant.

In Tan Kee Huat v Lim Kui Lin [2013] 1 SLR 765 (“Tan Kee Huat”), Judith Prakash J (as she then was) allowed an application for transfer. There, the plaintiff was a taxi driver who had been injured by the defendant in a motor accident. The claim proceeded in the District Court, with the defendant consenting to bear 85% of liability for the accident. Subsequently, the plaintiff applied to transfer the case to the High Court on the basis that further medical reports revealed that he would not be able to continue working as a taxi driver. Based on the medical reports and other evidence, the plaintiff quantified his general damages (excluding his claim for loss of earning capacity and/or loss of future earnings) at $463,500 and special damages at $9,834.16 (see Tan Kee Huat at [17]). The defendant resisted the application on the basis that the plaintiff’s claims were not substantiated. The defendant also pointed out that there was a separate medical report which indicated that the plaintiff could still continue his work as a taxi driver. Prakash J noted the defendant’s criticisms of the medical evidence relied on by the plaintiff, but found ultimately that the hearing of the application was not the appropriate forum to determine which doctor’s evidence was more credible (at [33]). On the basis of the evidence before her, Prakash J held that the plaintiff had, prima facie, established the material change in circumstances needed to support an application for transfer. She found that there was no irretrievable prejudice to the defendant and granted an order for transfer.

The parties’ arguments and affidavits filed

The plaintiff argued that his claim was likely to exceed $250,000, relying heavily on his claim for loss of earnings and/or earning capacity. In his first affidavit dated 20 March 2017, the plaintiff stated that he earned an average of about $181,415.75 per year between 2009 and 2011. Since the accident in December 2012, he suffered a drop of income of about $60,000 annually compared with his earnings prior to the accident. According to the plaintiff, the drop in income was a result of the December 2012 accident. He relied on a report from Dr James Lee of James Lee Orthopaedic Surgery dated 27 June 2016 which set out the following conclusion:

The patient sustained a neck and back contusion. He sustained them in 3 separate accidents, i.e., in 19/7/2005, 10/10/2008 and 27/12/2012. He has persistent neck and backache since the accident. The pain is worse on carrying heavy objects, prolonged standing, and walking. He is unable to carry his young children. His neck and back pain comes on with prolonged standing and walking and he is unable to do more showing of his properties. The neck and back pain is also worse when he has to do prolonged driving from point to point. He is thus affected in his job as a housing agent.

[emphasis added]

The plaintiff also set out the following table of his income over the relevant years in his first affidavit which is reproduced below:

Year	Amount
2009	$116,631
2010	$114,713
2011	$208,704
2012	$285,614.23 (est)
2013	$127,836
2014

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