Ng Chan Teng v Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Tay Yong Kwang J
• Judgment Date: 13 January 2009
• Neutral Citation: [2009] SGHC 17
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 556 of 2008
• Date: 13 January 2009
• Published date: 14 January 2009
• Year: 2009
• Plaintiff Counsel: N Srinivasan (Hoh Law Corporation)
• Citation: [2009] SGHC 17
• Defendant Counsel: K Anparasan and Sharon Lim (Khattar Wong)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: Jurisdiction,Power to transfer proceedings from District Court to High Court,Whether assessment of damages proceedings could be transferred to High Court where interlocutory judgment had been entered in District Court,Section 54B(1) Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed),High court,Courts and Jurisdiction,Whether plaintiff estopped from seeking transfer of proceedings after having taken out application under O 14 r 12 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) for determination of preliminary point,Meaning of "sufficient reason" in s 54B(1) Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed),Civil Procedure,Whether defendant would be prejudiced if assessment of damages proceedings were transferred to High Court,Transfer of proceedings from District Court to High Court

13 January 2009

Tay Yong Kwang J:

Introduction

1 The present Originating Summons No 556 of 2008 (“OS 556”) concerns an application by the plaintiff, Ng Chan Teng, to transfer his action commenced in the District Court against the defendant, Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd, to the High Court. The plaintiff’s application is made pursuant to s 54B of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCA”) read with s 18 and paragraph 10 of the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed).

2 The parties filed written submissions and it was originally agreed that oral arguments and replies would be made before me on a date to be fixed. At the fixing of dates, the parties informed the Assistant Registrar that they would stand by their written submissions without the need for further elaboration. Accordingly, I deliver my decision based on the parties’ written submissions.

The facts

3 The plaintiff, a shipwright and a former employee of the defendant, was involved in an industrial accident on 13 November 2001 (“the accident”) while working on the defendant’s premises. As a result of the accident, he sustained severe injuries to his right arm. The plaintiff subsequently commenced legal proceedings in DC Suit No 4765 of 2002/Z in the District Court against the defendant for personal injury and loss.

4 The parties then negotiated on the quantum of damages payable and the plaintiff’s then solicitors (“the plaintiff’s former solicitors”) quantified the total damages at $725,000 in their letter dated 20 March 2003 to the defendant. Despite the fact that the total damages quantified by the plaintiff’s former solicitors exceeded the $250,000 jurisdictional limit of the District Court, the action remained in the District Court. On 7 May 2004, the parties entered into a consent interlocutory judgment wherein the defendant accepted 70% liability for the accident and the plaintiff accepted 30% liability for contributory negligence, with damages to be assessed. After the consent interlocutory judgment was entered, another letter was sent by the plaintiff’s former solicitors on 9 November 2005 which proposed quantifying the total damages at $923,790. This was not accepted by the defendant. Since the parties could not agree on the damages payable, the matter proceeded for an assessment of damages hearing. Just prior to the hearing, on 25 May 2006, the plaintiff appointed his present solicitors.

5 Although the total damages quantified by the plaintiff’s former solicitors exceeded the $250,000 jurisdictional limit of the District Court, the plaintiff’s present solicitors did not apply to transfer the action from the District Court to the High Court after taking over the plaintiff’s case because of the consent interlocutory judgment and the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ricky Charles s/o Gabriel Thanabalan v Chua Boon Yeow [2003] 1 SLR 511 (“Ricky Charles”).

6 Shortly thereafter, an issue arose between the parties on the maximum amount of damages that the District Court could award on the basis of the defendant’s 70% liability. The plaintiff took the view that the maximum sum ought to be the District Court limit as defined in s 2 of the SCA, ie, $250,000, while the defendant’s position was that the maximum amount that could be awarded was 70% of the District Court limit, ie, $175,000. In other words, there was a dispute as to whether the deduction for contributory negligence was to be made from the District Court limit or from actual damages assessed. Consequently, the plaintiff referred the matter to the District Court for determination pursuant to O 14 r 12 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“the O 14 r 12 application”). The matter eventually went all the way up to the Court of Appeal and was finally resolved by the Court of Appeal in March 2008 (see Keppel Singmarine Dockyard Pte Ltd v Ng Chan Teng [2008] 2 SLR 839 (“Keppel Singmarine Dockyard”)).

7 The history of the O 14 r 12 application, which culminated in the Court of Appeal’s decision of Keppel Singmarine Dockyard, are summarised at [7]-[9] of that decision and I need not repeat them here. The Court of Appeal resolved the matter in the plaintiff’s favour (Keppel Singmarine Dockyard at [29]-[30]) and also went on to express the view that the specific holding in Ricky Charles that an action commenced in the District Court may not be transferred to the High Court after interlocutory judgment has been entered in the District Court should no longer be followed (Keppel Singmarine Dockyard at [32]). I will elaborate on the Court of Appeal’s decisions in both Ricky Charles and Keppel Singmarine Dockyard in the later part of this judgment.

8 With the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard, the plaintiff was no longer constrained by Ricky Charles from applying for a transfer of the action. He therefore proceeded with this application to transfer the District Court action to the High Court. The plaintiff’s solicitors had written to the defendant’s solicitors to seek a transfer by consent but they were not agreeable to a transfer.

The parties’ submissions

9 The plaintiff submitted that the crux of his application lies in the prospect of the quantum of damages exceeding the jurisdiction of the District Court. This, according to the plaintiff, would constitute “sufficient reason” under s 54B of the SCA to transfer his action to the High Court. Although a consent interlocutory judgment has already been entered in the District Court, this would not be an impediment to the transfer so long as no prejudice is caused to the defendant, given the Court of Appeal’s latest decision in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard. The plaintiff further submitted that the Court of Appeal in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard made it clear that the fact that the damages awarded may exceed $250,000 if the transfer is allowed cannot be a “prejudice” to the defendant that would justify the refusal of such a transfer.

10 The defendant, on the other hand, submitted that the plaintiff has not shown sufficient reason to justify the transfer of the proceedings and that irretrievable prejudice will be caused to the defendant if such a transfer is allowed. In respect of the former contention, the defendant argued that no reason or explanation has been offered by the plaintiff’s former solicitors why the action was commenced in the District Court. There has been no material change in the circumstances after the commencement of the action and the plaintiff has not shown that he made a genuine mistake regarding the quantum of his claim. In respect of the latter contention, the defendant argued that it would be[note: 1]:

… deprived of the benefit of the consent Interlocutory Judgment in respect of the Plaintiff’s admission of 30% liability in part or in full if the Plaintiff is now allowed to re-litigate the maximum quantum payable by taking this matter to the High Court as the Plaintiff is already time barred from commencing any fresh action in the High Court.

11 The defendant, in fact, questioned whether the defendant could now seek to transfer the action after consent interlocutory judgment was entered below. The defendant submitted that the Court of Appeal’s comments in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard on the specific holding in Ricky Charles were merely obiter and the Court of Appeal did not overrule its previous decision in Ricky Charles. According to the defendant, Ricky Charles was thus still good law and remained binding. The defendant further questioned if this was an appropriate case for the transfer of proceedings as the plaintiff’s present solicitors had taken out the O 14 r 12 application to dispose of the entire case on the point of law and should not now change their position and apply to transfer the action to the High Court as that would defeat the very purpose of taking out the O 14 r 12 application. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s present solicitors must be estopped from applying to transfer the action to the High Court.

My decision

12 In my view, it is plain from a perusal of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard, which is a decision on the very facts of the case before me, that the plaintiff’s application should be allowed.

13 Although the views of the Court of Appeal in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard (regarding the transfer of proceedings from the District Court to the High Court after entry of interlocutory judgment) (see [31]-[39]) could arguably be said to be obiter (as the question before the Court of Appeal was that posed in the O 14 r 12 application, ie, whether deduction for contributory negligence was to be made from the District Court limit or from actual damages assessed), the Court of Appeal, in no uncertain terms, stated that (at [32]):

… the specific holding in Ricky Charles that an action commenced in the District Court may not be transferred to the High Court where interlocutory judgment has been entered in the former court should not be followed as it proceeded on the wrong assumptions.

Indeed, at the start of its judgment in Keppel Singmarine Dockyard, the Court of Appeal stated that it would “reappraise” whether the courts ought to “persevere in adhering” to the decision in Ricky Charles given the “practical difficulties” that it had engendered (at [6]):

As an aside, it bears mention that counsel for the respondent clarified that the reason why the above O 14 r 12 application had been filed was that the assessment of damages could no longer be transferred to the High Court in view of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ricky Charles s/o Gabriel Thanabalan v Chua Boon Yeow [2003] 1...