Marplan Pte Ltd v AG

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 16 April 2013
• Date: 16 April 2013
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 166 of 2013
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Marplan Pte Ltd

Plaintiff

and

Attorney-General

Defendant

[2013] SGHC 80

Andrew Ang J

Originating Summons No 166 of 2013

High Court

Administrative Law—Judicial review—Ambit—Appeal from Magistrate's Court to High Court—High Court judge allowed appeal and refused leave to appeal—Whether High Court judge's decision could be judicially reviewed

Administrative Law—Remedies—Quashing order—Appeal from Magistrate's Court to High Court—High Court judge allowed appeal and refused leave to appeal—Applicant applied to quash High Court judge's decision on basis that respondent had withheld evidence and High Court judge drew wrong conclusions from evidence—Whether decision ought to be quashed

This was an ex parte application for leave pursuant to O 53 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (‘the Rules’) for judicial review to quash Lee Seiu Kin J's (‘Lee J’) decision in District Court Appeal No 24 of 2012 (‘the Appeal’).

The Appeal concerned a supply contract dispute. The applicant (‘the Applicant’) was the plaintiff in the suit below. Two sets of invoices reflecting two different prices had been issued and the parties disagreed as to which set of invoices evidenced the true agreement. The district judge favoured the set with the higher prices. Lee J found that the evidence was, at best, equivocal. He allowed the Appeal on the basis that the Applicant had not discharged its burden of proof and failed to disclose evidence uniquely within its control which could have supported its claim.

On 14 January 2013, the Applicant applied to Lee J for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but was refused. The Applicant then appealed against Lee J's refusal of leave. When it was pointed out to him that Lee J's decision to refuse leave was final under s 34 (2) (a) read with s 34 (2 B) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (‘the SCJA’), the Applicant took out this application for judicial review on the bases that (a)Lee J had erred when he drew an adverse inference from the Applicant's failure to disclose evidence as an application for disclosure of this evidence had failed before the District Judge; and (b)the evidence was only equivocal because the Defendant had suppressed documents. The application (‘the Application’) was filed and served on the Attorney-General pursuant to O 53 r 1 (3) of the Rules of Court.

Held, dismissing the application:

(1) The decision of a High Court judge acting in that capacity was not reviewable. Under s 27 (1) of the SCJA and the common law, the supervisory jurisdiction of the court only applied to decisions of inferior courts and tribunals. Section 27 of the SCJA had to be read as a whole and referred only to judicial review of the subordinate courts. Section 27 (4) strained out cases where an applicant was merely seeking to re-litigate an issue which could, and ought, to have been raised on appeal to a superior court. The proper route for reviewing a decision of a superior court was by way of appeal and not by judicial review: at [12] , [15] , [17] , [19] and [21] .

(2) The High Court and the Court of Appeal were treated as a unitary Supreme (and superior) Court. Allowing judicial review over a High Court judge would mean that Singapore's superior court might exercise supervisory jurisdiction over itself. This made nonsense of the word ‘supervisory’. A High Court judge could not exercise supervisory jurisdiction over another High Court decision as this would be a re-litigation of issues with the potential result of a conflicting decision on the same issue in two courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction: at [24] , [25] , [27] and [28] .

(3) The substance of the application was also wholly inappropriate for judicial review. Judicial review differed from an appeal; the former regulated the manner and validity of decision-making while the latter concerned its correctness. The Applicant sought an order that the district judge's decision be upheld. This would have required this court to substitute the district judge's decision for that of the appellate court. The grounds which were raised also concern the substance of Lee J's decision. The first ground questioned Lee J's findings, implicitly inviting this court to make fresh findings of fact. The second ground sought to impugn the respondent's conduct. Neither concerned the manner of Lee J's decision-making. This application belonged in the domain of an appeal and not of judicial review: at [30] , [31] and [33] to [35] .

(4) This application was an abuse of process as it was, in essence, a back-door appeal and attempt to introduce fresh evidence by a side wind. The Applicant was given ample opportunity to canvass arguments and to produce evidence which could properly dispose of the case: once before the district judge and twice before the appellate court. This was wholly unlike a case where there had been no opportunity to appeal and judicial review was the only means of supervising an inferior court. Lee J's decision refusing leave to appeal was final under s 34 (2) (a) and 34 (2 B) of the SCJA. The SCJA intended to make the High Court judge the final gatekeeper for leave applications of a particular type and this Application sought to circumvent this purpose: at [38] and [40] to [42] .

Abdul Wahab bin Sulaiman v Commandant, Tanglin Detention Barracks [1985-1986] SLR (R) 7; [1984-1985] SLR 555 (refd)

Bright Impex v PP [1998] 2 SLR (R) 961; [1998] 3 SLR 405 (refd)

Burrell v R (2008) 82 ALJR 1221 (refd)

Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council [2011] SGHC 131 (folld)

Poh Soon Kiat v Hotel Ramada of Nevada [1999] 2 SLR (R) 756; [1999] 4 SLR 391 (refd)

Tee Kok Boon v PP [2006] 4 SLR (R) 398; [2006] 4 SLR 398 (refd)

R v Peterborough Magistrates' Court, ex parte Dowler [1997] QB 911 (refd)

R v Wandsworth Justices, exparte Read [1942] 1 KB 281 (refd)

Racal Communications Ltd, Re [1981] AC 374 (refd)

Wong Hong Toy v PP [1987] SLR (R) 213; [1994] 2 SLR 396 (refd)

Wong Keng Leong Rayney v Law Society of Singapore [2006] 4 SLR (R) 934; [2006] 4 SLR 934 (refd)

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) s 266

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed)

Customs Act (Cap 70, 1995 Rev Ed) s 130 (1) (c)

Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) s 5 (a)

Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) O 53 r 1, O 53 r 1 (3)

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) ss 2, 3, 9, 10 (3) , 27, 27 (1) , 27 (2) , 27 (4) , 29 (3) , 34 (2) (a) , 34 (2 B)

Glen Koh (Glen Koh) for the applicant

Khoo Boo Jin and Linda Esther Foo Hui Ling (Attorney-General's Chambers) for the non-party.

Andrew Ang J

1 This was an ex parte application for leave pursuant to O 53 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (‘the Rules’) for judicial review to quash Lee Seiu Kin J's decision in District Court Appeal No 24 of 2012 (‘the Appeal’) which had commenced as Magistrate's Court Suit No 8131 of 2010 (‘the Suit’).

2 I dismissed the application and now give my reasons.

Background facts

3 The Suit was a claim on a supply and installation contract for gymnastics products supplied to Raffles Gymnastics Academy (S) Pte Ltd (‘the Respondent’). Marplan Private Limited (‘the Applicant’), was the plaintiff supplier at trial. One issue in dispute was the contractual purchase price of the gymnastics products. There were two sets of February invoices, reflecting different prices. The Applicant claimed that there had been a manufacturer's price increase reflected in the set of February invoices which indicated a higher contractual price (‘the Higher February Invoices’). The Respondent claimed that there had been no such price increase, but rather, that a 30% discount had been agreed and applied to the contract price, and reflected in the second set of February invoices.

4 The district judge held that the Higher February Invoices evidenced the parties' agreement on the purchase price. The district judge ordered, inter alia, that the Respondent pay the Applicant the balance purchase price of $45,656.85 in respect of the main claim.

5 The Respondent appealed and Lee J allowed the appeal on the basis that the Applicant had failed to discharge his burden of proof. In his decision dated 23 November 2012, Lee J found that evidence showing a manufacturer's...