Lim Mey Lee Susan v Singapore Medical Council

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Philip Pillai J
• Judgment Date: 26 May 2011
• Neutral Citation: [2011] SGHC 131
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 1252 of 2010
• Year: 2011
• Published date: 27 May 2011
• Hearing Date: 15 February 2011,14 February 2011,21 February 2011
• Plaintiff Counsel: Lee Eng Beng SC, Tammy Low, Christine Huang and Elizabeth Wu (Instructed counsel) (Rajah & Tann LLP) and Bernice Loo (Allen & Gledhill LLP)
• Defendant Counsel: Alvin Yeo SC, Melanie Ho, Lim Wei Lee, Sugene Ang and Jolyn de Koza (Wong Partnership LLP),Chong Chin Chin and Sharon Lim
• Citation: [2011] SGHC 131

Philip Pillai J: Leave Application

This was an application for leave under O 53 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) to apply for: (a) a Quashing Order against the decision of the Singapore Medical Council (“SMC”) to appoint a Disciplinary Committee (“2nd DC”) to hear the disciplinary proceedings relating to the purported overcharging of fees by the Applicant; and (b) a Prohibiting Order prohibiting the SMC from taking any steps to bring disciplinary proceedings against the Applicant on the subject of matters covered by the charges in the Notice of Inquiry by the Disciplinary Committee (“1st DC”) dated 20 July 2009 regarding purported overcharging of fees. It should be noted that the Applicant has also applied, in the same originating summons, for a Declaration that the Medical Registration (Amendment) Regulations 2010 (S 528/2010) (“Amendment Regulations”) are void.

The Court of Appeal in Public Service Commission v Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR(R) 133 explained that the requirement of seeking the leave of court (at [23]) was:

… intended to be a means of filtering out groundless or hopeless cases at an early stage, and its aim is to prevent a wasteful use of judicial time and to protect public bodies from harassment (whether intentional or otherwise) that might arise from a need to delay implementing decisions, where the legality of such decisions is being challenged. …

Leave is not granted unless the court is satisfied that: (a) the matter complained of is susceptible to judicial review; (b) the applicant has sufficient interest in the matter; and (c) the material before the court discloses an arguable or prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the public law remedies sought by the applicant. Additionally, as these orders are discretionary remedies, the court has a discretion to refuse leave where the circumstances warrant a refusal (see Singapore Civil Procedure 2007 (G P Selvam chief ed) (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2007) at para 53/8/22).

I noted the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Pang Chen Suan v Commissioner of Labour [2008] 3 SLR(R) 648 at [56]:

We should like to add by way of guidance to judges who hear ex-parte applications for leave for judicial review that the purpose of requiring leave is to enable the court to sieve out frivolous applications. A case such as the present which clearly raises issues which require more than a cursory examination of the merits should have been heard as a substantive application. There is no reason why an ex-parte application such as [the applicant’s] could not have been heard inter partes and disposed of on the merits as a substantive application. ...

Both parties agreed that I could hear the leave application as well as the substantive application in order to expedite the process and leave the parties to file any appeal to the Court of Appeal thereafter.

The only question before me at this leave stage was whether the material before me disclosed an arguable or prima facie case in favour of granting the public remedies. I noted what the Court of Appeal, in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294, had to say on the meaning and scope of the phrases ‘a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion’ and ‘what might on further consideration turn out to be an arguable case’ (at [22]):

This passage appears susceptible to two slightly different interpretations. One is that the court should quickly peruse the material put before it and consider whether such material discloses “what might on further consideration turn out to be an arguable case”. The other is that the applicant had to make out a “prima facie case of reasonable suspicion”. In our view, both tests present a very low threshold and it is questionable whether there is really any difference in substance between the two interpretations.

The Court of Appeal (at [25]) then ruled that what is required is not a prima facie case, but a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion (see also Teng Fuh Holdings Pte Ltd v Collector of Land Revenue [[2007] 2 SLR(R) 568).

That the decisions of the SMC, a creature of statute engaged in the performance of public acts and duties, are susceptible to judicial review and that the Applicant has sufficient interest in the matter were not disputed. Accordingly, it was only necessary to...