Khushvinder Singh Chopra v Mookka Pillai Rajagopal and Others
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Court | Court of Three Judges (Singapore) |
Judge | Karthigesu JA |
Judgment Date | 14 January 1999 |
Neutral Citation | [1999] SGCA 7 |
Citation | [1999] SGCA 7 |
Defendant Counsel | Palaniappan (Derrick Ravi & Partners) |
Subject Matter | Compensation payable,Calculation of compensation under s 128 of Land Titles Act,Land,Caveats,s 128 Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 1994 Ed),Whether caveator's liability to pay compensation already determined,Wrongful lodgment,Whether caveatees' pecuniary loss recoverable |
Docket Number | Civil Appeal No 27 of 1998 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Appellant in person |
Date | 14 January 1999 |
Published date | 19 September 2003 |
(delivering the grounds of judgment of the court): The facts
1.This appeal is a sequel to the decision of this court in CA 108/95 (`CA 108/95`) which was reported in [1996] 3 SLR 457. The material facts that led to the making of the order under appeal have been fully set out there and are briefly as follows. The respondents were the owners of the house, No 91, Jalan Seaview (`the property`), and the appellant was an advocate and solicitor who acted for them in August 1993 in the re-mortgage of the property, which, however, did not materialise. He subsequently acted for them in connection with an option to purchase given by them to a third party which, again, became abortive. At that point in time, the appellant himself became interested in the property, and on 13 October 1993, he obtained an option signed only by the second and third respondents to purchase the property at the price of $1,200,000. Following the grant of this option, on 18 October 1993, he lodged a caveat on the property at the Registry of Titles claiming an interest under the option. On 28 October 1993, the appellant exercised that option and lodged a second caveat claiming an interest in the property as the purchaser. During the same period, all the three respondents granted an option to purchase the same property to two purchasers jointly (`the purchasers`) who exercised it in November 1993.
2.Subsequently, an agreement expressed to be supplemental to the option (`supplemental agreement`) was prepared by the appellant and was signed by all the three respondents and the appellant in late November 1993 which provided for the sale of the property to the appellant. The respondents subsequently refused to proceed with the sale, whereupon the appellant initiated proceedings against them and sought specific performance of the sale and purchase agreement. The respondents alleged undue influence and counterclaimed damages for the loss caused by the caveats lodged by the appellant. At first instance the High Court held that there was neither presumed nor actual undue influence and granted specific performance of the agreement. The respondents appealed, and this court allowed the appeal and ordered, inter alia, the appellant to withdraw his caveats and directed an inquiry be held as to the compensation, if any, pursuant to s 128 of the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 1994 Ed) (`the Act`) and the payment of such compensation to the respondents.
3. The decision below
The enquiry was held before Chao Hick Tin J. Before him the appellant sought to dispute the issue of liability to pay compensation under s 128 of the Act. The learned judge held that the question of liability under s 128 had already been determined by this court and that his task was simply to determine the pecuniary loss, if any, suffered by the respondents on account of the appellant`s caveats being on the register. In other words, all that he was required to do was to assess the quantum of compensation.
4.On the quantum, Chao Hick Tin J found that the appellant knew that the respondents had granted an option to the purchasers and that the purchasers had exercised the option with completion scheduled to take place in February 1994. The appellant was also aware that the purchasers had commenced an action against the respondents for specific performance and damages. Due to the existence of the appellant`s caveats on the register, the sale of the property to the purchasers could not be completed in time. The learned judge held that the late completion interest and costs payable to the purchasers, as well as legal costs of defending the action taken out by them against the respondents should be paid by the appellant. On this item the parties subsequently went before the learned judge again and an order by consent was made. Under that order the appellant was required to pay the respondents, inter alia, the sum of $356,560.61 being late completion interest from 21 February 1994 to 18 November 1996 which the respondents had to pay the purchasers in Suit No 237 of 1994.
5.Chao Hick Tin J further found that there was a mortgage on the property and that the appellant could not deny that he did not know of this mortgage which was to secure a loan. The appellant thus would have known that by lodging the caveats, completion of the sale to the purchasers would be hindered and the respondents would have to continue to pay interest on the loan secured by the mortgage until completion of the sale upon his withdrawal of the caveats. The learned judge therefore held that this head of damage was foreseeable and was a pecuniary loss suffered by the respondents which was attributable to the lodging of the caveats and thus recoverable under s 128(1) of the Act. He therefore ordered that the appellant pay the sum of $131,535.40 which was the additional interest paid on the loan secured by the mortgage. The appellant was also ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry relating to the issue whether the court was bound to carry out the inquiry and 2/3 of the costs of assessment of quantum of compensation payable in part by the respondents to the appellant. The appellant appeals against the whole of this decision.
6. The appeal
The appeal raises the following issues: (1). Whether the inquiry before the learned judge was limited to assessing the quantum of compensation, if any, payable to the respondents.
(2). If the scope of the inquiry was not so limited, whether the caveats were lodged by the appellant wrongfully, vexatiously or without reasonable cause.
(3). Whether the additional interest on the loan secured by the mortgage on the property should in any event be disallowed.
7. Issue of liability under s 128
It is convenient at this stage to refer to s 128 of the Act, which reads as follows:
(1) Any person who wrongfully, vexatiously or without reasonable cause -
(a) lodges a caveat with the Registrar;
(b) procures the lapsing of such a caveat; or
(c) being the caveator, refuses or fails to withdraw such a caveat after being required to do so,
shall be liable to pay compensation to any person who sustains pecuniary loss that is attributable to an act, refusal or failure referred...
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