Lee Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor
Court | Court of Three Judges (Singapore) |
Judge | Choo Han Teck J |
Judgment Date | 12 May 2008 |
Neutral Citation | [2008] SGCA 20 |
Citation | [2008] SGCA 20 |
Subject Matter | Whether additional mens rea requirement of secondary offenders is that of subjective knowledge on the part of secondary offender in relation to the likelihood of collateral offence happening,Purposive interpretation of Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed),When does interpretation give effect to legislative intent,Common object,Proof of evidence,Complicity,Courts and Jurisdiction,Court judgments,Classification as a facilitative statute,Whether doctrine of stare decisis applying,Binding force,Relationship of s 30 Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) with s 378(1)(b)(i) Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed),Requisite intention,Confessions of accomplice not jointly charged,Characterisation of hearsay rule considering nature of Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed),Meaning of "criminal act",Statutory Interpretation,Statutes,Proof of common intention,Gang robbery,Whether existing interpretation of s 396 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) in conformity with interpretation of s 34 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed),Whether existing interpretation of s 149 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) in conformity with interpretation of s 34 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed),Participation,Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed),Criminal Procedure and Sentencing,Whether s 34 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) requiring common intention of parties to commit the offence actually committed in a "twin crime" situation,Inferences made from circumstances of case,Whether recourse to English common law permissible in interpreting Penal Code,Whether out-of-court confessions of co-accused not party to proceedings falling within general prohibition against hearsay evidence,Criminal Law,Admissibility,Statements,Manner in which common intention may be proved,Whether secondary offender possessing such requisite intention,Approach of courts in dealing with long-standing decisions that were shown to be incorrect,Whether existing interpretation of ss 111 and 113 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) in conformity with interpretation of s 34 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed),Whether s 34 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) requiring presence at scene of criminal act to constitute participation,Relationship between hearsay rule as expressed in Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed),Common intention,Confessions,Abetment,Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed),Section 34 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed),Admissibility of evidence,Whether out-of-court confessions of co-accused not party to proceedings admissible under s 378(1)(b)(i) Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed),Evidence,Hearsay |
Plaintiff Counsel | Rupert Seah (Rupert Seah & Co) and B Uthayachanran (B Uthayachanran & Co) |
Defendant Counsel | Lau Wing Yum, Vincent Leow and Tan Wee Soon (Attorney-General's Chambers) |
Published date | 01 July 2008 |
12 May 2008 |
Judgment reserved. |
Introduction
1 This is the appeal of Lee Chez Kee (“the appellant”) against his conviction of a charge of murder with common intention under s 302 read with s 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”). This appeal raises difficult issues of law relating broadly to the areas of evidence and criminal common intention. While this appeal affords the opportunity to clarify these areas of law, I am fully aware that, at the end of the day, it is the result of the appeal which must remain at the forefront of the decision, given the nature of the offence and, more importantly, the irreversible punishment that will be visited upon the appellant should his appeal be dismissed. To facilitate understanding, I first set out the schematic arrangement of the contents of this judgment followed immediately by a brief background of the facts including the trial proceedings below:
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………...... |
1 |
BACKGROUND FACTS……………………………………………………...... |
4 |
The parties’ cases at the trial below…………………………………….......... |
5 |
The Prosecution’s case below…………………………………............ |
5 |
(1) The discovery of the deceased’s body..................................... |
5 |
(2) Events before and after the robbery......................................... |
7 |
(3) The appellant’s statements...................................................... |
10 |
(4) Too’s statements.................................................................... |
16 |
The appellant’s case below..................................................................... |
17 |
The decision of the trial judge........................................................................... |
20 |
The involvement of the appellant in the deceased’s murder...................... |
21 |
The common intention of the parties........................................................ |
24 |
Summary of the trial judge’s reasoning.................................................... |
26 |
ISSUES ON APPEAL............................................................................................ |
27 |
ADMISSIBILITY OF TOO’S STATEMENTS................................................... |
28 |
Introduction and the proceedings below............................................................ |
28 |
The trial judge’s reasoning...................................................................... |
29 |
(1) General propositions............................................................... |
29 |
(2) The scope of section 378(1) of the CPC................................. |
30 |
(a) The legislative intent behind section 378(1) of the CPC.. |
31 |
(b) Contrary interpretation would lead to absurdity and |
|
Summary of the trial judge’s reasoning.................................................... |
37 |
The parties’ submissions in the present appeal................................................... |
38 |
The appellant’s submissions.................................................................... |
38 |
The Prosecution’s submissions................................................................ |
38 |
Analysis and discussion.................................................................................... |
39 |
The hearsay rule under the EA................................................................ |
40 |
(1) Conceptual basis.................................................................... |
40 |
(2) The prevailing judicial approaches........................................... |
42 |
(a) Reference to the hearsay rule without regard to the EA.. |
42 |
(b) Implicit reference to the hearsay rule in the EA............... |
43 |
(3) Problems with the existing judicial views and the way forward.. |
45 |
The hearsay rule under the CPC............................................................. |
45 |
The scope of section 378(1)(b)(i) of the CPC......................................... |
46 |
(1) Preliminary observations......................................................... |
46 |
(2) Are the provisions in the UK Bill the exact equivalent of the |
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(a) Amendments by the Select Committee showing |
|
(b) Absence of provision in the UK Bill relating to co- |
|
(3) The legislative intent behind section 378(1)(b)(i) of the CPC.... |
56 |
(a) Relevant principles of intepretation................................. |
56 |
(b) The rules of law governing the admissibility of |
|
(c) Section 378(1) of the CPC subject to provisions on |
|
Does this interpretation of section 378(1)(b)(i) of the CPC lead to absurdity and inconsistency?................................................................... |
|
Does section 378(1)(b)(i) of the CPC apply to admit Too’s statements in the present case?.................................................................................... |
|
(1) Section 30 of the EA.............................................................. |
62 |
(2) The rationale behind section 30 of the EA................................ |
64 |
(3) Can the rationale behind section 30 of the EA be extended to |
|
Conclusion in relation to the admissibility of Too’s statements............................ |
68 |
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 34 OF THE PENAL CODE...................... |
69 |
Introduction and preliminary observations......................................................... |
69 |
Background on the Indian Penal Code.............................................................. |
73 |
The enactment of the Indian Penal Code................................................. |
73 |
The interpretation of the Indian Penal Code............................................. |
75 |
The correct interpretation of section 34 of the Penal Code................................ |
77 |
Typical requirements.............................................................................. |
77 |
Criminal act............................................................................................ |
77 |
Participation........................................................................................... |
78 |
(1) The need for presence?........................................................... |
79 |
(a) The Singapore courts’ present requirement.................... |
80 |
(b) Restatement of the requirement..................................... |
82 |
(2) Participation in “twin crime” situations...................................... |
84 |
(a) The Singapore courts’ present requirement.................... |
84 |
(b) Restatement of the requirement..................................... |
88 |
Proving the common intention................................................................. |
88 |
(1) The Singapore courts’ present requirement.............................. |
88 |
(2) Restatement of the requirement............................................... |
89 |
Common intention in “twin crime” situations............................................ |
90 |
(1) The Singapore courts’ present requirement.............................. |
90 |
(a) Intention to commit the offence committed..................... |
91 |
(b) Common intention to commit the primary offence........... |
93 |
(c) Other decisions............................................................. |
95 |
(2) Restatement of the requirement............................................... |
97 |
(a) The argument for a narrower reading of section 34 of |
|
(b) The approach in other jurisdictions................................ |
101 |
(c) Analysis: The historical underpinnings of section 34 of |
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(d) Analysis: The doctrine of common purpose and section |
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(d) The relevance of sections 35 and 38 of the Penal Code. |
118 |
(e) Analysis: Abetment provisions under sections 111 and |
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In furtherance of the common intention.................................................... |
122 |
(1) The Singapore courts’ present requirement.............................. |
124 |
(a) Subjective knowledge................................................... |
125 |
(b) Objective foreseeability................................................. |
126 |
(c) Strict liability plus intention of actual doer to further |
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(d) Strict liability per se....................................................... |
128 |
(2) Restatement of the requirement............................................... |
130 |
(a) Requirement of English common law.............................. |
131 |
(b) Conformity with the abetment provisions of the Penal |
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(c) Conformity with the common object provision in section |
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(d) Subjective knowledge approach consistent with other |
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