Jeyaretnam JB v Attorney General

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chua F A J
• Judgment Date: 03 September 1987
• Neutral Citation: [1987] SGHC 36
• Docket Number: Summons in Chambers No 3268 of 1987 (District Court Suit No 1451 of 1987)
• Date: 03 September 1987
• Year: 1987
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Plaintiff Counsel: Appellant in person
• Citation: [1987] SGHC 36
• Defendant Counsel: Chao Hick Tin and Soh Tze Bian (Attorney General’s Chambers)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Subject Matter: arts 4, 9(1) & 63 Constitution of the Republic of the Singapore,Constitutional Law,Complaint of contempt of Parliament,Powers of Parliament to punish for contempt,Whether findings of contempt reviewable by court,Contempt,Administrative Law,Whether question of life or personal liberty involved,Whether oral hearing required to be given,Parliament,ss 3(1), (2), 5 & 20 Parliament (Privileges, Immunities & Powers) Act (Cap 217),Written explanation given,Natural justice

Parliament on 27 January 1987 passed a resolution that the defendant JB Jeyaretnam was guilty of contempt of the Committee of Privileges and of Parliament by his publication of five offending newsletters relating to the proceedings of the Committee of Privileges between 8 and 12 September 1986, and that a fine of $5,000 for each of the five offending letters be imposed upon him.

Notice in writing was given by the Clerk of Parliament to the defendant of the said fines by letter dated 3 February 1987, which was delivered to him on 4 February 1987, wherein the defendant was asked to pay the fines totalling $25,000 within seven days of receipt of the letter but the defendant failed to pay.

The plaintiff, the Attorney General, Singapore, sued the defendant on behalf of the government of Singapore for the sum of $25,000 and costs in DC Suit No 1451 of 1987.

On 10 March 1987, the plaintiff applied for summary judgment against the defendant. On 7 April 1987, the Registrar of the Subordinate Courts ordered that judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the defendant for the amount claimed in the statement of claim and costs judgment was accordingly entered.

The defendant appealed to the High Court against the registrar`s decision. I dismissed the appeal and now give my reasons.

The defences raised by the defendant were:

(a) The finding by the Committee of Privileges and of Parliament that the publication of the five offending newsletters by the defendant amounted to contempt of the Committee of Privileges or of Parliament was wrong in law.

(b) Parliament acted in excess of its jurisdiction in imposing the fines for contempt.

(c) The Committee of Privileges and Parliament had failed to observe the rules of natural justice.

The defendant submits that these are all substantial questions of law to be tried.

The defendant contends before me that Parliament here is a creature of statute - the Singapore Constitution - and must find its powers in the Constitution. The defendant argues that Parliament is not supreme; it is our Constitution that is supreme. The defendant contends that our Constitution entrusts the courts with the function of deciding whether the acts of the legislature are in accordance with our Constitution. Based on that contention the defendant submits that the authorities on British constitutional and parliamentary practices which have been cited by the plaintiff in the course of arguments are inapplicable to this case.

It is true that the concept of the supremacy of the Constitution is enshrined in art 4 of the Constitution of Singapore. However, our Constitution is based essentially on the Westminster model and adopts and codifies most, if not all, of the laws, customs, conventions and practices of the British constitutional and parliamentary system.

Article 63 of our Constitution expressly provides that Parliament may by law determine and regulate the privileges, immunities and powers of Parliament. Section 3(1) of our Parliament (Privileges, Immunities & Powers) Act (Cap 217) provides for the reception by our Parliament of the privileges, immunities and powers of the British House of Commons. Standing Order 104 of the Standing Orders of our Parliament provides that in cases of doubt the Standing Orders of our Parliament shall be interpreted in the light of the relevant practice of the British House of Commons and in any matter for which the Standing Orders of our Parliament do not provide the British practice shall be followed, but no restriction which the British House of Commons has introduced by Standing Order shall be deemed to extend to our Parliament or its members until our Parliament has provided by Standing Order for such restriction.

Section 3(2) of the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities & Powers) Act (Cap 217) even goes so far as to provide that the privileges, immunities and powers of the British House of Commons shall for all purposes be construed and have effect as if they were prescribed by the Act itself and it shall not be necessary in any proceedings to plead the same but the same shall be judicially noticed in all the courts.

There is no merit whatsoever in the contention of the defendant. Our Parliament has the right to control its own proceedings and to regulate its internal affairs without interference by the courts. Whatever matter arises concerning Parliament ought to be examined, discussed or adjudicated in Parliament and not elsewhere.

In Bradlaugh v Gossett [1884] 12 QBD 271, the plaintiff, Charles Bradlaugh, was elected a member of Parliament in May 1883. He was not allowed to take the oath required by the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866 by the Speaker of the House of Commons. On 9 July 1883, the House of Commons passed a resolution restraining the plaintiff from taking the oath and resolving that `the sergeant-at- arms do exclude Mr Bradlaugh from the House until he shall engage not to further disturb the proceedings of the House`. The disturbance in question arose from the attempt of Mr Bradlaugh to take the oath which the law required him to take and which a resolution of the House prevented him from taking. The plaintiff sought from the Court of Queen`s Bench, first a declaration that the order of the House of 9 July be declared to be beyond the power and jurisdiction of the House to make, and to be void; secondly, an order restraining the defendant, the sergeant-at-arms, from preventing him by force from entering the House and taking the oath as a member. But the court decided against Mr Bradlaugh on the ground that the order under which the sergeant acted related to the internal management of the procedure of the House, over which they had no jurisdiction. Both Lord Coleridge CJ and Stephen J considered that the exclusive jurisdiction of the House in this instance was essential for the discharge of its functions, and was based upon necessity.

Lord Coleridge in his judgment said (at p 275):

What is said or done within the walls of Parliament cannot be inquired into in a court of law. On this point all the judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning in the subject - Burdett v Abbott 104 ER 501 and Stockdale v Hansard 112 ER 112 - are agreed, and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the Houses over their own members, their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. To use the words of Lord Ellenborough `they would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it.

He concluded his judgment by saying at p 277:

The history of England, and the resolutions of the House of Commons itself, show that now and then injustice has been done by the House to individual members of it. But the remedy, if remedy it be, lies, not in actions in the courts of law (see on this subject the observations of Lord Ellenborough and Bayley J in Burdett v Abbott 104 ER 501) but by an appeal to the constituencies whom the House of Commons represents.

It follows that this action is against principle and is unsupported by authority, and that therefore the demurrer must be allowed, and that there must be judgment for the defendant.

Stephen J in his judgment said at p 278:

I think that the House of Commons is not subject to the control of Her Majesty`s courts in its administration of that part of the statute law which has relation to its own internal proceedings, and that the use of such actual force as may be necessary to carry into effect such a resolution as the one before us is justifiable.

He then went on to cite many authorities for this principle and said at p 280:

Whatever may be the reasons of the House of Commons for their conduct, it would be impossible for us to do justice without hearing and

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