Jeyaretnam JB v Attorney General

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong J
• Judgment Date: 15 December 1988
• Neutral Citation: [1988] SGCA 17
• Date: 15 December 1988
• Subject Matter: Whether court may inquire into allegation of non-compliance with rules of natural justice,Administrative Law,Natural justice,Abuse of privileges,Parliament,Powers of Parliament to punish by way of fine,Contempt of Parliament,s 24 Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 217),Whether oral hearing required to be given,Privileges and immunities,Constitution of the Republic of Singapore art 163,Constitutional Law,Proceedings before Committee of Privileges and in Parliament,Whether findings of abuse of privileges and contempt reviewable by court,ss 3(1), 20(1), 20 (2), 21(1) & 24 Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 217),Complaints of abuse of privileges and contempt of Parliament
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 66 of 1987
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Fong Kwok Jen and Soh Tze Bian (Attorney General's Chambers)
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Appellant in person

Cur Adv Vult

The appellant was at the material time a member of Parliament. On 27 January 1987, Parliament, inter alia, passed two resolutions as follows:

First resolution

That this Parliament doth agree with the Committee of Privileges in their first report contained in Paper Parl 3 of 1987 and resolves:

(1) that Mr JB Jeyaretnam is guilty of abuse of the privileges of Parliament in his allegations of executive interference in the judiciary; and

(2) that a fine of $1,000 be imposed upon him.

Second resolution

That this Parliament doth agree with the Committee of Privileges in their second report contained in Paper Parl 4 of 1987 and resolves:

(1) that Mr JB Jeyaretnam is guilty of contempt of the Committee of Privileges and of Parliament by his publication of the five offending newsletters relating to the proceedings of the Committee of Privileges between 8 and 12 September 1986; and

(2) that a fine of $5,000 for each of the five offending letters be imposed upon him.

Pursuant to these resolutions the Clerk of Parliament demanded from the appellant payment of the sums of $1,000 and $25,000 respectively. The appellant, however, refused to make any payment. In consequence, the Attorney General, the respondent, acting under s 23 of the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 217) on behalf of the government of Singapore instituted two actions in the subordinate courts, namely, MC Suit No 2339 of 1987 claiming for the sum of $1,000 and DC Suit No 1451 of 1987 claiming for the sum of $25,000. After the commencement of the actions, the respondent took out an application for summary judgment in each action for the amount claimed. The applications were heard before the registrar, and he ordered that judgments for the respective amounts be entered against the appellant with costs. The appellant appealed against the decisions of the registrar, and the appeals came before Fa Chua J. At the hearing before FA Chua J only the appeal in DC Suit 1451 of 1987 was argued, as it was agreed that the result of the appeal in MC Suit 2339 of 1987 would follow that of the former. The learned judge at the conclusion of the hearing dismissed both the appeals. Against the decisions of the learned judge, this appeal is now brought.

The question before us is whether there is any triable issue either of fact or of law in the defences raised by the appellant. In MC Suit No 2339 of 1987 the only defence raised by the appellant is that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice on the part of the Committee of Privileges (the committee) and Parliament. The appellant in DC Suit No 1451 of 1987 raised three defences and they are as follows:

(i) The committee was wrong in law in finding that the appellant was guilty of contempt of the committee and of Parliament by his publication of the five newsletters relating to the proceedings of the committee between 8 and 12 September 1986. The five offending newsletters, even if they were perverted reports and contained distortions and serious misrepresentations, cannot and do not amount to contempt of the committee or of Parliament. Accordingly, Parliament was wrong in accepting the report of the committee and passing the second resolution as it did.

(ii) Parliament was not empowered by law to impose the fines by way of punishment and therefore acted in excess of its authority in so doing.

(iii) There was a breach of the rules of natural justice in the proceedings before the committee and in the proceedings in Parliament in that the appellant was not given an opportunity to be heard.

Before we consider these defences seriatim it is necessary to recount briefly the events that led to the imposition of the fines on the appellant by Parliament. On 19 March and 30 July 1986 the Leader of the House complained in Parliament of the appellant`s allegations made in Parliament of executive interference in the judiciary, and the complaints were then referred to the committee. The complaints were subsequently set out in detail in a memorandum which was sent to the Clerk of Parliament on 19 August 1986 and a copy of which was transmitted to the appellant. The committee sat in September 1986 for five days and while the hearing was in progress the appellant wrote and sent to the residents of his constituency daily a newsletter purporting to be a report on the daily proceedings of the committee; in toto there were five newsletters. In consequence, on 9 October 1986 the Leader of the House made another complaint to the Speaker of the House in respect of these five newsletters. The Speaker on 18 October 1986 wrote to the appellant forwarding a copy of the complaint stating that the complaint appeared to establish a prima facie case of contempt of the committee and of Parliament, and requesting that a reply from the appellant, should he wish to reply, be submitted before the committee met again. By his letter of 10 November 1987 addressed to the chairman of the committee (who was also the Speaker), the appellant replied to the complaint. The committee determined the two complaints and made its reports to Parliament. On 27 January 1987 Parliament accepted the reports and passed the two resolutions finding the appellant, in respect of the first complaint, guilty of abuse of the privileges of Parliament in his allegations of executive interference in the judiciary and imposing a fine of $1,000, and in respect of the second complaint, guilty of contempt of the committee and of Parliament by his publication of the five offending newsletters relating to the proceedings of the committee between 8 and 12 September 1986 and imposing a fine of $5,000 for each of the five offending letters, making a total of $25,000.

We now turn to consider the defences raised, and we propose to consider the first two defences raised in DC Suit No 1451 of 1987, and thereafter the defence of breach of the rules of natural justice which was raised in both the suits. In considering these two defences it is necessary to examine first the legal basis on which Parliament exercises its jurisdiction to punish its members and, for that matter, others for contempt, and secondly, the jurisdiction of the courts to investigate and determine what Parliament has already determined and resolved upon as contempt. The starting point is of course the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore and art 163 thereof provides:

It shall be lawful for the legislature by law to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities or powers of Parliament.

Pursuant to this provision the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 217) (the Act) was passed, and s 3 thereof (as amended subsequently), in so far as relevant, provides:

(1) The powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and of the Speaker, Members and Committees of Parliament shall be the same as those of the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom and of its Speaker, Members or Committees at the establishment of the Republic of Singapore.

(2) Such privileges, immunities and powers shall for all purposes be construed and have effect as if such privileges, immunities and powers were prescribed by this Act, and it shall not be necessary in any proceedings to plead the same but the same shall be judicially noticed in all the courts.

(3) ...

Provision in terms similar to that of s 3(1) of the Act had been the subject of judicial interpretation more than a hundred years ago in the case of Dill v Murphy 1 Moore NS 487; 15 ER 784. There, the legislative assembly of Victoria was constituted by the Colonial Act 1854 which was ratified and set out in the Schedule to the Imperial Act of Parliament, 18 & 19 Vict c 55. By s 35 of the Act of 1854 it was enacted, among other things, that it should be lawful for the legislature by any Act to define the privileges, immunities and powers to be held, enjoyed and exercised by the council and assembly, and by members thereof respectively, subject, however, to the proviso that no such privileges, immunities and powers should exceed those held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland or the members thereof. Pursuant to that revision an Act, 20 Vict No 1, was passed by the colonial Parliament which provided that the legislative council and the legislative assembly of Victoria respectively and the committees and members thereof respectively should hold, enjoy and exercise such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as, at the time of the passing of the Act of 1854, were held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the committees and members thereof. One George Dill published a number of the Argus newspapers containing an article on the subject of the police committee of the legislative assembly, in respect of which the assembly of Victoria resolved that the article was `a scandalous breach of the privileges of this House`, and he was ordered to attend the assembly which he failed to do. In consequence the assembly resolved: `That George Dill, having been ordered to attend this House this day and not attending in obedience to such order, is guilty of a contempt and that he be sent for in the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms and that Mr Speaker do issue his warrant accordingly.` Pursuant to that resolution a warrant was issued and George Dill was taken into custody and detained. He challenged the detention by a writ of habeas corpus but was unsuccessful. Subsequently, he was released from custody by the order of the legislative assembly upon payment of certain fees to the Serjeant-at-Arms. Thereafter, he commenced an action against the Speaker and Sergeant-at-Arms for assault and false imprisonment. It was held by the Supreme Court of Victoria that the Commons House of Parliament had the power to commit for contempt by virtue of ancient...