Iskandar bin Rahmat v Law Society of Singapore

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Valerie Thean J
• Judgment Date: 28 February 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] SGHC 40
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 716 of 2019 and Summons No 4854 of 2019
• Published date: 05 March 2020
• Year: 2020
• Hearing Date: 07 October 2019,10 October 2019
• Plaintiff Counsel: Applicant in person
• Defendant Counsel: P Padman (KSCGP Juris LLP)
• Subject Matter: Legal Profession,Disciplinary procedures,Disciplinary proceedings,Professional conduct,Civil Procedure,Judgments and orders
• Citation: [2020] SGHC 40

Valerie Thean J:

The applicant, Iskandar bin Rahmat, filed a complaint (“the Complaint”) on 14 February 2018 with the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”) against his former lawyers, a team of six defence lawyers who had represented him during a preceding High Court murder trial (“the trial defence team”). An Inquiry Committee (“the IC”) was appointed under the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) and, after considering submissions from Mr Iskandar and the trial defence team, issued its report (“the Report”) recommending that the Complaint be dismissed. After considering the Report, the Council of the Law Society (“the Council”) determined that no formal investigation was necessary and dismissed the Complaint.

In Originating Summons No 716 of 2019 (“OS 716/2019”), Mr Iskandar sought a review of the Council’s determination and an order directing the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for a Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) to be appointed. On 10 October 2019, I dismissed Mr Iskandar’s application with brief reasons, and now furnish grounds of decision for the same.

Background

Mr Iskandar’s Complaint to the Law Society arose out of his murder trial in 2015, in which he was tried for two offences under s 300(a) of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) in respect of the deaths of a 67-year-old man (“D1”) and his 42-year-old son (“D2”).

On 4 December 2015, Tay Yong Kwang J (as he then was) convicted Mr Iskandar on both charges and sentenced him to suffer death: PP v Iskandar bin Rahmat [2015] SGHC 310 (“Iskandar (HC)”) at [101] and [105].

On 3 February 2017, the High Court’s decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal: see Iskandar bin Rahmat v PP and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505 (“Iskandar (CA)”). The appeal defence team comprised a fresh set of lawyers.

Mr Iskandar filed his Complaint against the trial defence team on 14 February 2018. He followed on with two further letters on 5 April and 7 May 2018. The Chairman of the Inquiry Panel appointed the IC on 3 August 2018. In the course of its work, the IC obtained written explanations from the trial defence team on 10 September 2018 (“the written explanation”) and 20 November 2018 (“the further written explanation”). It also heard the four most senior members of the trial defence team on 23 October 2018. One of the remaining two lawyers was overseas and the other was on maternity leave. The IC heard Mr Iskandar orally on 10 December 2018 and 10 January 2019 at the Changi Prison Complex. The IC completed its Report on 7 February 2019. The Report found no prima facie case of ethical breach or other misconduct, and recommended that no formal investigation was required and that the Complaint be dismissed. Having considered the Report, the Council of the Law Society was of the view that no formal investigation by a DT was necessary and informed Mr Iskandar of the same by a letter dated 20 March 2019.

Mr Iskandar thereafter brought the present application for a judge of the High Court to review the determination of the Council under s 96 of the LPA. While Mr Iskandar’s application was filed out of time, the Law Society did not take any objection on this point. I granted Mr Iskandar an extension of time and heard parties on the application.

The application Legal context of application

Under the LPA, the IC’s role is “to determine if there is a prima facie case of ethical breach or other misconduct by a lawyer that warrants formal investigation and consideration by a DT”: Loh Der Ming Andrew v Law Society of Singapore [2018] 3 SLR 837 (“Andrew Loh”) at [62]. As part of its role, the IC “may sieve out and decline to refer to the DT any complaint that, even if taken at face value, would not raise sufficiently grave concerns as to warrant formal investigation”: Andrew Loh at [68], citing the Court of Appeal in Subbiah Pillai v Wong Meng Meng [2001] 2 SLR(R) 556 (“Subbiah Pillai”) at [32], [62]–[63].

The Council considers the IC’s report and then makes a determination under s 87(1) of the LPA. While the Council has a responsibility to provide reasons for its determination if it is challenged, in practice, the Council can simply adopt the reasons of the IC: see Andrew Loh at [79]. This was the situation in the present case. In an application under s 96 of the LPA, a judge is not reviewing the IC’s conclusions directly, but is considering the Council’s determination. Where the Council adopts the findings and reasoning of the IC, the judge is effectively required to assess the IC’s report to consider if the Council’s determination should be departed from. In so doing, the judge sits in the exercise of supervisory as well as appellate jurisdiction. In the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the court is concerned with the legality of the IC’s and Council’s decision-making process, which includes concerns about natural justice: Andrew Loh at [82]. The appellate jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires the judge to “examine the substantive merits of the Council’s and/or the Inquiry Committee’s decision”: Andrew Loh at [83]. When doing so, the judge will be slow to disturb or interfere with the Council’s or IC’s findings of fact, unless it can be shown that supporting evidence was lacking or there was a misunderstanding of the evidence or other exceptional circumstances existed which justified the court doing so: see Wong Juan Swee v Law Society of Singapore [1993] 1 SLR(R) 429 at [14].

In this application, Mr Iskandar sought to invoke both the supervisory and the appellate jurisdiction of the court under s 96 of the LPA. He contended that there were breaches of natural justice on the part of the IC, and that the IC’s Report was tendered late. On the substantive merits, he had raised nine specific issues for the IC’s consideration. He argued that the IC came to the wrong conclusion in relation to the issues raised. I deal with each contention in turn.

Assertions against the IC Delay in IC’s Report

At the hearing of the present application on 7 October 2019, Mr Iskandar pointed out that s 86(3) of the LPA envisages that any report of the IC should be issued within six months of its appointment, even if an extension of time is given. In the present case, the Report was issued on 7 February 2019 although the IC was constituted on 3 August 2018. The Law Society clarified at the adjourned hearing before me on 10 October 2019 that a letter from the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel granting the IC an extension of time erroneously reflected the due date as Tuesday, 5 February 2019, instead of Monday, 4 February 2019. Subsequently, 5 and 6 February 2019 being Chinese New Year, the IC tendered its report on 7 February 2019. The Report was therefore, in effect, late by one working day.

In Law Society of Singapore v Zulkifli bin Mohd Amin and another matter [2011] 2 SLR 620 (“Zulkifli”) at [35]–[36], which concerned a report that was 22 days late, the Court of Three Judges made clear that the timelines set by the LPA were not condition precedents to the exercise of the Law Society’s powers. The modern approach was not to treat every breach as a disempowering or invalidating event, but instead, to look to legislative intent. Section 87(1A) of the LPA was intended to expedite the disposal of such proceedings, not “to put obstacles in the way of disciplining errant advocates and solicitors who were guilty of professional misconduct”: Zulkifli at [36]. Further, no prejudice was suffered by the lawyer who complained of the delay in that case. In the present case, similarly, the time norm specified in s 86(3) of the LPA was intended to expedite proceedings against lawyers by ensuring timely IC reports, not to frustrate disciplinary proceedings. The one-day delay also did not occasion any prejudice to Mr Iskandar. I held that the one-day delay did not invalidate the Report of the IC.

Alleged breaches of natural justice by the IC

Mr Iskandar argued that the IC was biased, had acted in bad faith, and failed to address his complaints sufficiently. These allegations were unfounded. The IC had the benefit of three letters from Mr Iskandar, dated 14 February, 5 April and 7 May 2018. The IC first heard Mr Iskandar orally at the Changi Prison Complex on 10 December 2018. After the first hearing, the IC received an email dated 28 December 2018, ostensibly sent by Mr Iskandar’s sister, requesting the IC to put any further questions for Mr Iskandar in writing and to obtain a written response from him. The IC felt that this was inappropriate, and decided instead to hear directly from Mr Iskandar on any remaining matters. The IC therefore went to the Changi Prison Complex a second time on 10 January 2019 and interviewed Mr Iskandar again. The IC had given Mr Iskandar sufficient opportunity to be heard. From the Report, it can be seen that the IC had adequately applied its mind to the specific facts raised in this case. Mr Iskandar has not pointed to any facts to support his allegations other than arguing that the IC had erred in failing to agree with his arguments. I did not find any merit in this assertion.

Assertions against the trial defence team

I come then to the substantive issues, which were nine assertions put forward by Mr Iskandar regarding the conduct of his trial. In order to put these nine issues in context, I first set out the relevant facts concerning Mr Iskandar’s trial.

The High Court trial

The undisputed facts were as follows. Mr Iskandar was an investigation officer with the Singapore Police Force. Deep in debt, he devised a plan to rob the first deceased (“D1”) of money from his Certis CISCO safe deposit box. Pretending to be a police officer setting up a sting operation, Mr Iskandar told D1 that his safe deposit box was a target and advised him to remove the box’s contents and to set up a closed-circuit television camera instead. Convinced by Mr Iskandar, D1 followed his...