Wong Juan Swee v The Law Society of Singapore

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Lai Siu Chiu JC
• Judgment Date: 13 March 1993
• Neutral Citation: [1993] SGHC 57
• Date: 13 March 1993
• Subject Matter: Inexcusable ignorance,Failing to inform third party of a bankrupt's status,Legal Profession,Unawareness of extent of professional duty to third party,Breach,Professional conduct,Failure in assisting perpetration of fraud on third party,s 88 Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1990 Ed)
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 395 of 1991
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Raymond Tan (Robert WH Wang & Woo)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Michael Khoo (Michael Khoo & BB Ong)

The plaintiff, an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, applied to set aside or otherwise vary, the order made by the defendants and conveyed to her in their letter dated 10 April 1991 (`the letter`) that she pays a penalty of $500 under s 88(1) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 1990 Ed)(`the Act`); she has since paid the penalty.

The facts leading to the letter according to the plaintiff`s affidavit are as follows:

(a) the defendants received a complaint against the plaintiff by a letter dated

13 June 1990 from one Christine Lim Sok Choo (`the complainant`);

(b) the complainant is a dealer`s representative whose mother had previously instructed the plaintiff on a property transaction. The plaintiff later engaged the complainant`s services in the sale of shares on which the plaintiff`s brother Henry Wong gave the complainant instructions;

(c) the complainant alleged that:

(i) sometime in early February 1990, a Francis Tan Hak Miang (`Francis Tan`) telephoned her, introduced himself as a friend of Henry Wong and expressed an interest to open an account with her, which was subsequently done;

(ii) on 7 February 1990 Francis Tan telephoned the complainant to place his first orders. The complainant was unsuccessful in her attempt to contact the plaintiff that morning on the telephone to verify Francis Tan`s creditworthiness. She managed to speak to the plaintiff in the afternoon and the plaintiff confirmed that she knew Francis Tan, that he was a very rich man, the complainant could make a lot of money from dealing for him but the complainant ought to be careful as Francis Tan could give her a lot of problems. The complainant informed the plaintiff that Francis Tan had placed two orders for one hundred lots of shares each, the plaintiff assured the complainant that such orders were nothing to Francis Tan;

(iii) in reliance on the plaintiff`s assurances the complainant executed Francis Tan`s orders that day and continued to purchase shares for him in subsequent separate transactions;

(iv) Francis Tan failed to pay and to take delivery of most of the shares when due despite the complainant`s repeated reminders. Finally on 22 February 1990 the complainant informed Francis Tan that unless he paid for the shares her company would force sell the same. Francis Tan told her not to do so and he would get a letter from the plaintiff to request her company to hold the shares until Monday, 26 February 1990;

(v) the complainant spoke to the plaintiff later that day and the plaintiff confirmed that she had been instructed by Francis Tan to write a letter that he undertook to collect the shares between 26 and 27 February. When the complainant questioned her the plaintiff said she was not guaranteeing anything. The complainant expressed doubt whether such a letter would be acceptable to her company to which the plaintiff replied that she had written such letters previously to other broking houses for Francis Tan and none had objected so far;

(vi) later that afternoon Francis Tan visited the complainant`s office with the plaintiff`s letter addressed to the complainant`s company stating:

Mr Tan Hak Miang has instructed us to write to inform you that he undertakes to collect the shares bought through your company between 26 February and 27 February 1990.

Her deputy general manager accepted the plaintiff`s letter but Francis Tan never collected his shares;

(vii) on 23 February 1990 her company conducted a bankruptcy search on Francis Tan and ascertained therefrom that he had been an undischarged bankrupt since 18 November 1983;

(viii) the complainant telephoned the plaintiff the same day. The plaintiff was surprised and asked how the complainant had found out about Francis Tan`s bankruptcy. The complainant inquired why the plaintiff had kept the information from her, the plaintiff said it was on Francis Tan`s instructions. The plaintiff said she was the solicitor who petitioned for Francis Tan`s bankruptcy. However, the plaintiff assured the complainant that despite his status Francis Tan would be able to pay for his shares or for any loss in the event her company force sold the same;

(d) the complainant said the plaintiff had misconducted herself knowing of his bankruptcy, in:

(i) representing and reassuring the complainant that Francis Tan was in a position to participate in the sale and purchase of securities;

(ii) allowing the complainant to trade for Francis Tan; and

(iii) reassuring the complainant`s company as a solicitor in her letter dated 22 February 1990 that Francis Tan would collect his shares;

(e) by her letter dated 29 August 1990 the plaintiff gave her explanation to the inquiry committee wherein she, inter alia, denied that in the telephone conversation with the complainant on 7 February 1990:

(i) the complainant had asked for Francis Tan`s credit standing;

(ii) the complainant had asked for Francis Tan`s reference or that she had given him any references;

(iii) she had recommended Francis Tan to the complainant or had said he was a very rich man;

(f) at the hearing of the inquiry committee on 10 and 17 September 1990 the plaintiff was present with her counsel;

(g) on 13 December 1990 she received a letter from the defendants stating:

the inquiry committee was of the view that no formal investigation by a disciplinary committee was necessary. They nevertheless find that in giving a wrongful reference to a third party you have thereby conducted yourself unprofessionally and has recommended that a penalty be imposed on you.

The defendants inquired whether she wished to be heard under s 85(3) of the Act `before the council considers imposing any such penalty`.

(h) on her indicating that she wished to be heard, the defendants notified the plaintiff that she would be heard on 3 January 1991. Attempts by the plaintiff`s then solicitors to obtain a copy of the inquiry committee`s report were unsuccessful. The defendants wrote to her on 29 January 1991 to say that they were unable to release the inquiry committee`s report but they set out the findings of the committee;

(i) through her solicitors the plaintiff sought clarification from the defendants on the committee`s findings since she had disputed the complainant`s version of the 7 February telephone conversation. By their reply of 7 March 1991 the defendants stated:

the inquiry committee had found that Ms Wong had told the complainant to watch out in her business dealings with Mr Francis Tan and that he was not to be believed, but having gone that far, your client withheld the vital information about the fact that Mr Francis Tan was an undischarged bankrupt, especially she was instructed in putting him in bankruptcy as she was the solicitor for the petitioning creditor.

(j) on 5 April 1991 the plaintiff appeared with her counsel before the defendants` council to show cause under s 88(3) of the Act;

(k) on 8 April 1991 the plaintiff`s solicitors wrote to the defendants` president to inquire whether the council was obliged to review the inquiry committee`s findings and recommendations before making its decision that a penalty should be imposed on her;

(l) by the letter the defendants informed the plaintiff that it had decided to impose a penalty of $500 on her.

The plaintiff prayed that the defendants` aforesaid order be set aside as:

(i) there was no basis both in fact and at law for the findings of the inquiry committee as conveyed to her in their letters dated 13 December 1990 and

29 January 1991;

(ii) she had not given the complainant a reference on Francis Tan;

(iii) even if the purported telephone conversation with the complainant did take place on 7 February 1990 which she denied, she was not under a professional duty to inform the complainant that Francis Tan was a bankrupt;

(iv) the defendants` council was wrong to accept the findings of the inquiry committee and to decide to impose a penalty on her before she was asked to be heard;

(v) having regard to all the circumstances it was wrong of the defendants` council to impose the penalty of $500 on her.

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