Anwar Siraj v Tang I Fang

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: A P Rajah J
• Judgment Date: 17 March 1982
• Neutral Citation: [1982] SGHC 11
• Date: 17 March 1982
• Subject Matter: Defendant chairman of corporation,Personal or pecuniary interest or involvement of judge in a case which he tried,Injunction restraining defendant from participating in disciplinary inquiry or adjudicating on matter concerning plaintiff,Proper defendant,Disciplinary inquiry,Civil Procedure,Whether rule of necessity applied,Whether rule of necessity applied in this case,Administrative Law,Objection to adjudicator,Natural justice,Disciplinary tribunals,Whether corporation should have been made defendant instead,Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa,Parties
• Docket Number: Motion in Suit No 3866 of 1981
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: J Grimberg (Drew & Napier)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: JB Jeyaretnam (JB Jeyaretnam & Co)

The plaintiff joined Jurong Town Corp (the Corporation in November 1973, having been appointed to a senior officer`s post of assistant secretary. The Corporation was established in 1968 under the Jurong Town Corporation Act (Cap 209) (the Act) for the purpose of providing facilities for the management of industrial estates and sites in Singapore and amenities for the advancement of the well-being of the people living and working in such industrial estates and sites. The Corporation consists of a chairman, a full-time officer of the Corporation, a deputy chairman and 15 other members.

The following sections of the Act are, to my mind, relevant to the issues raised in this motion:

Section 5(5) of the Act provides:

If for any reason the Chairman is absent or unable to act or the office of Chairman is vacant, the Deputy Chairman or in the absence of both the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman any member of the Corporation duly appointed by the members present at any meeting of the Corporation may exercise all or any of the powers conferred, or perform all or any of the duties imposed, on the Chairman under this Act.

Under s 5(7):

A member of the Corporation, shall not, in any meeting of the Corporation, participate in any discussion relating to and shall not vote in respect of, any business in which he is interested, and if he does so his vote shall not be counted nor shall he be counted in the quorum present at such meeting.

Section 7(1) and (2) read as follows:

(1) The Corporation may from time to time appoint and employ such officers and servants as may be necessary for the purposes of this Act and may from time to time dismiss them.

(2) All officers and servants of the Corporation shall be under the administrative control of the Corporation.

Sometime after the Corporation came into existence the Corporation formulated a set of service rules and regulations for its monthly paid employees known as the `Terms and Conditions of Service` (hereinafter referred to as `the Regulations`) which amongst other things provided for the conduct and discipline of its employees.

The plaintiff received promotions after his appointment on contract, of which the Terms and Conditions of Service formed part, and, on 1 September 1976, was appointed secretary of the Corporation and so became the head of the Secretariat Division, one of seven divisions in the Corporation.

In May 1980, as a result of re-organization, the Secretariat Division was absorbed by the Development Division. The plaintiff was again promoted to the post of deputy head of the Development Division in the superscale grade; he covered the duties of the head whenever the latter was away.

As for the defendant, he was appointed chairman of the Corporation for a term of one year on 1 April 1979 and his appointment was renewed for a further two years from 1 April 1980. Some two or three weeks before 31 March 1981 the defendant suggested to the plaintiff that he should resign his employment with the Corporation and join Intraco Ltd, a company incorporated in Singapore. The plaintiff did not accede to the chairman`s suggestion and declined to tender his resignation.

On 31 March 1981 he was handed a letter transferring him from 1 April as administrative officer, Jurong Port, a post that was below that held by him as deputy head, Development Division. He inquired the reason for his transfer and correspondence thereupon passed between him and the Head of the Development Division. He also wrote to the Minister of Trade and Industry of his dissatisfaction.

Arising from the correspondence he received a letter on 13 August 1981 from the general manager of the Corporation (App I) accusing him of having committed offences as set out in the Schedule thereto (App II) under the Regulations and requiring him, pursuant to r 119(2)(b) of the Regulations, to show cause within 14 days why action should not be taken against him. Regulation 119 is set out in App III.

By a letter dated 24 August 1981 addressed to the general manager the plaintiff objected to the chairman adjudicating on three of the charges against him, as the chairman himself was involved in them. Further correspondence ensued culminating in the letter dated 29 September 1981 wherein the Corporation took the view that `since the rules do not provide any alternative procedure, the chairman is bound to act in accordance with the rule`.

It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff commenced proceedings on 15 October 1981 against the defendant for an order to restrain him from proceeding to inquire into offences under the Regulations of the Jurong Town Corporation, alleged against him and from deciding his guilt thereon and from taking any part whatsoever in the inquiry into the said offences.

On the same day the plaintiff obtained an interim injunction against the defendant restraining him from so proceeding and so deciding until further order. The matter has now come up for further hearing before me.

Mr Grimberg, counsel for the defendant, raised two defences on behalf of his client, namely, (1) that the plaintiff is suing the wrong party and (2) that, if the defence of (1) was unavailable to him, then, he would rely on the rule of necessity to take him out of the common law principle that no man shall sit in judgment over his own case. ( Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa .)

Defence (1): That of the wrong party being sued

At the very outset of his case Mr Grimberg contended that the defendant was not the proper person to be sued herein and submitted that it was the Corporation who should have been defendant; in furtherance of his contention he drew my attention to the fact that all the letters that had been written to the plaintiff on this matter were by the general manager of the Corporation and not by the defendant.

There is no evidence before me that this matter had ever been brought before the Board of the Corporation, which, under the Act, is authorized to appoint and dismiss employees (s 7(1)). From the evidence before me the only persons who were aware of what was going on in reference to these charges against the plaintiff were (1) the defendant himself, (2) the head of division to which the plaintiff belonged and (3) the general manager, who was the chief administrative officer of the Corporation.

The plaintiff does not object and has never objected to a disciplinary inquiry on the charges being conducted by the Corporation; on this he has no quarrel with the Corporation. What he does object to is to the defendant, who is personally involved in some of the charges, acting and exercising his powers as chairman under regs 119(3), 119(4) and 119(5). Mr Jeyaretnam, counsel for the plaintiff, says that, this being the situation, there is no real need to bring in the Corporation as a defendant. He also referred me to O 15 r 6 Rules of the Supreme Court which reads:

(1) No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of any party; and the court may in any cause or matter determine the issues or questions in dispute so far as they affect the rights and interests of the persons who are parties to the cause or matter.

There has never been any dispute between the plaintiff and the Corporation as to its right to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff and no restraining order is being sought against the Corporation as such. What is in dispute is whether the chairman, the instigator and the sole witness in some of the charges against the plaintiff, should participate in these proceedings, more particularly in pronouncing guilt under reg 119(4). In these circumstances the defendant, in my view, has been properly made party to these proceedings as his presence is necessary for determining the point at...