Xu Jiang Lin v Tiong Seng Contractors Pte Ltd
| Jurisdiction | Singapore |
| Judge | Aedit Abdullah |
| Judgment Date | 30 December 2005 |
| Neutral Citation | [2005] SGDC 270 |
| Court | District Court (Singapore) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Published date | 02 February 2006 |
| Plaintiff Counsel | Srinivasan (Hoh Low Corporation) |
| Defendant Counsel | M P Rai (Cooma and Rai) |
| Subject Matter | Civil Procedure,Determination of questions of law or construction of documents,Plaintiff seeking leave during hearing of application under O 14 r 12 to amend questions presented to court for determination,Whether court having jurisdiction or power to allow such amendment,Whether court should exercise such jurisdiction or power,Order 14 r 12 Rule of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed),Employment Law,Objection to assessment of compensation,Plaintiff sending letter to Ministry of Manpower to withdraw application for workmen's compensation after receiving Commissioner for Labour's assessment of compensation,Plaintiff also purportedly sending separate letter of objection to compensation on same day,Defendant challenging authenticity of letter of objection,Whether letter of withdrawal amounting to objection to notice of assessment,Whether plaintiff barred from commencing civil action against defendant,Section 25(1) Workmen's Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed) |
| Citation | [2005] SGDC 270 |
30 December 2005
District Judge Aedit Abdullah
1 The Plaintiff appealed the decision of the learned Deputy Registrar ruling against him on questions framed for the court’s determination under O 14 r 12. I dismissed the appeal before me and denied the Plaintiff’s application to amend the questions framed.
2 The Plaintiff now appeals against my decision.
Background
3 The Plaintiff filed a writ claiming damages for personal injuries and other losses due to the negligence of the Defendants or their employees. A claim for workmen’s compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Cap 354) had been made, but the Plaintiff purported to withdraw that claim, by way of a letter to the Ministry of Manpower, and proceed on the common law claim instead. The issue then arose whether the Plaintiff was barred from doing so.
4 Through a Summons in Chambers, Number 9245 of 2005, the Plaintiff sought determination of the following questions under O 14 r 12 of the Rules of Court:
(1) Whether the Plaintiff by way of a letter dated 29 July 2004 to the Ministry of Manpower is deemed to have withdrawn his application for workmen’s compensation;
(2) Whether the said withdrawal is ineffective or valid and contrary to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Cap 354);
(3) Whether the Plaintiff is debarred from commencing an action under Section 33 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Cap 354);
(4) Whether by the making of a Notice of Assessment dated 22 July 2004, there was an order made by the Commissioner for Labour and the Plaintiff’s claim for workmen’s compensation and his common law claim had merged as a result; leaving the Plaintiff with no real cause of action at common law.
5 At the hearing before the Deputy Registrar, according to the certified transcript, the Plaintiff sought to rely not just on a letter of withdrawal, but also on a letter of objection supposedly sent to MOM on the same day. The authenticity of the letter of objection was challenged by the Defendants. The Defendants further argued that the withdrawal could not be an implicit objection.
6 At this point, the Plaintiff’s Counsel sought to amend the SIC, presumably to include the letter of objection in the questions, but this was turned down by the Deputy Registrar as being too late in the day. He then proceeded on the basis that the issue of an objection being made was not before him. He answered the questions in the respective prayers as follows:
(1) As to prayer 1, there was no withdrawal of the application for workmen’s compensation;
(2) As to prayer 2, the purported withdrawal was ineffective and invalid.
(3) As to prayer 3, the Plaintiff was barred from commencing an action under s 33.
The Deputy Registrar thus dismissed the claim and indicated costs at $3,000.
Chronology of material events
7 A brief chronology is as follows:
(i) On 3 September 2003, the Defendants filed a notice of accident with MOM.
(ii) On 22 July 2004, the assessment was made.
(iii) On 29 July 2004, the Plaintiff’s counsel sent two letters to the MOM. One was a notice of withdrawal, supposedly sent at 16.28 hours, reading as follows:
On behalf of our client, Xu Jiang Lin, we hereby, under section 33(2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, inform your good office that our client is withdrawing his application for workmen’s compensation.
The other read:
Please be informed that our client objects to the aforesaid assessment ….
(iv) On 30 July, the Writ of Summons was filed.
(v) On 2 August 2004, MOM sent a letter confirming the withdrawal of the application and that the file had been closed.
The Decision
8 In reaching my decision to dismiss the appeal, I had to consider three issues. Firstly, whether I had the jurisdiction or power to allow an amendment to the O 14 r 12 questions so as to include the objection to the assessment. Secondly, whether if such jurisdiction or power existed, whether I should exercise it in the present case. And thirdly, if no such amendment was possible or permissible, to determine the questions posed, specifically whether the withdrawal alone was effective in preserving the Plaintiff’s ability to pursue a common law claim.
Amendment of the O 14 r 12 questions
9 Order 14 rule 12 reads:
(1) The Court may, upon the application of a party or of its own motion, determine any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or matter where it appears to the Court that —
(a) such question is suitable for determination without a full trial of the action; and
(b) such determination will fully determine (subject only to any possible appeal) the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein.
(2) Upon such determination, the Court may dismiss the cause or matter or make such order or judgment as it thinks just.
(3) The Court shall not determine any question under this Order unless the parties have had an opportunity of being heard on the question.
(4) Nothing in this Order shall limit the powers of the Court under Order 18, Rule 19, or any other provision of these Rules.
10. The essence of this rule is that a full trial with the taking of evidence may be avoided where a determination of the dispute or part of the dispute between the parties turns on a question that can be answered as a matter of law or construction. On such determination, the Court can dismiss the claim or part of the claim or make such orders as just, which must include the power to award what is claimed.
11. In construing this rule, I was of the view that a different approach and emphasis may arise in cases where the questions are formulated by the Court of its own volition as opposed to being framed by the parties. Different consequences may follow.
12 In a situation where the parties or a party chooses to frame his questions for determination, that party should be taken to have given full consideration to the exercise. Once the questions have been framed, and the hearing is underway, the room for amendment shrinks. Any other approach I fear would make a mockery of the process: a question for determination may be framed, reframed, and re-amended constantly, drawing out the process perhaps far longer than a trial on evidence would have.
13 On the other hand, where the questions have been framed by the Court of its own volition, then it is arguably that refinement and amendment should more easily follow, since the Court may not be in as full a position to appreciate the intricacies of the situation as the parties, who presumably would have a better knowledge of the circumstances of the case before all the evidence is presented to the Court.
14 I must also draw a comparison between this rule and O 33 r 2 (and its corollary O 33 r 3(2)), which permits the Court to order any question or issue whether as to fact or law to be tried in a specific way. Order 33 r 2 is concerned, in part, with preliminary issues. A determination under order 33 r 2 may or may not be the final determination of a cause, or part of the cause. That rule contemplates that even when the question is answered, there may still be other determination required in respect of that cause or part of the cause to which the question relates. In contrast, O 14 r 12 is intended, by and large, to be finally determinative of that cause or part of the cause.
15 While there are of course a number of authorities on the issue whether an application under O 14 r 12 should be permitted, such as Kamla Lal Hiranand v Harilela Padma Hari and Ors
16 I do not conclude that O 14 r 12 operates as an irreversible nuclear option, binding the parties or the Court to finally dispose of the matter no matter how badly the question may be framed by the parties, or how poorly the question really disposes of the matter. Order 14 r 12 itself contemplates that the Court may make an order that does not determine the matter: sub-rule (2) allows the Court to make such order or judgement as it thinks just. Furthermore, O 14 r 13 contemplates that the application for determination may be made orally, which seems to indicate that an application for amendment may also arise orally as well in the course of proceedings. I therefore concluded that I was entitled in the appropriate case to allow the amendment of the questions under O 14 r 12. Nonetheless, good reasons must be given for the amendment, and the stage at which the amendment is sought would be a relevant consideration.
Whether the amendment of the SIC should be allowed
17 The appeal before me was of course to be determined de novo. I was entitled though to consider the circumstances in which the application to amend was made,...
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