District Judge Goh Zhuo Neng:
Introduction
The parties were married on 27 October 2006. They have a child aged 13 this year.
On 26 August 2021, the Plaintiff Husband (“Plaintiff”) filed an Writ of Summons for divorce on the grounds under Section 95(3)(b) of the Women’s Charter 1961 that the Defendant Wife (“Defendant”) had behaved in such a way that the Plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to live with her.
On 24 September 2021, the Defendant filed a Defence and her Counterclaim, for a divorce on the grounds of the Plaintiff’s unreasonable behaviour and the adultery with a Co-Defendant (“CD”) under Section 95(3)(b) and (a) respectively of the Women’s Charter 1961. This Defence and Counterclaim was subsequently amended, with the latest version (Amendment No.2) dated 19 December 2022.
The trial lasted from 19 to 21 June 2023 and I also considered the written submissions filed by the parties, giving my decision on 28 June 2023. I set out my decision on their respective claims below.
The Law
Unreasonable Behaviour
In Wong Siew Boey v. Lee Boon Fatt [1994] SGHC 35, the High Court found that the question whether the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent must be answered subjectively; and it is for the court to answer the question of whether the petitioner can reasonably be expected to live with the respondent, using an objective test and having regard to the personalities of the individuals, however far these may be removed from some theoretical norm.
The court must also assess the impact of the respondent’s conduct and the particular petitioner in the light of the whole history of the marriage and their relationship, and must look at behaviour by taking into account the cumulative effect of behaviour, in relation to all the relevant circumstances. The question whether the Husband has behaved in such a way that it is unreasonable to expect the Wife to live with him is therefore essentially a finding of fact. The principles in Wong Siew Boey have been applied in the subsequent cases of Castello Ana Paula Costa Fusillier v. Lobo Carlos Manuel Rosado [2003] 4 SLR (R) 331 and Teo Hoon Ping v. Tan Lay Ying [2009] SGHC 244.
Adultery
In Koh Teng Lam v Koh Chen Chee Elsie [1975] SGHC 18, the High Court cited the case of Ross v Ross [1930] AC 1, where it was said at [7] and [21]:
“… Adultery is essentially an act which can rarely be proved by direct evidence. It is a matter of inference and circumstance. It is easy to suggest conditions which can leave no doubt that adultery has been committed, but the mere fact that people are thrown together in an environment which lends itself to the commission of the offence is not enough unless it can be shown by documents, eg letters and diaries, or antecedent conduct that the association of the parties was so intimate and their mutual passion so clear that adultery might reasonably be assumed as the result of an opportunity for its occurrence …” [7]
“… But from opportunities alone no inference of misconduct can fairly be drawn unless the conduct of the parties prior, contemporaneous, or subsequent justifies the inference that such feelings existed between the parties that opportunities if given would be used for misconduct …”[21]
The Plaintiff’s Claim of Unreasonable Behaviour
I made the finding that the Plaintiff’s Claim of unreasonable behaviour was made out.
In this regard, the Plaintiff made several allegations, which I addressed below. That the Defendant prevented him from communicating with his friends. This was a bare allegation, with no supporting evidence. I found it to be unsubstantiated. That the Defendant reneged on her agreement for the Plaintiff’s Father to move into their home. This resulted in the Plaintiff’s Father being made to sell his home in the expectation that he would live with them, only to be forced to rent his own home when the Defendant refused to let him move in. The Defendant admitted there was an original agreement for the Plaintiff’s Father to move into their home, but she changed her mind during the period of time when the parties lived with the Plaintiff’s parents in their flat after marriage. During this period, she saw the Plaintiff’s parents quarrel, fight, and she was even kicked by the Plaintiff’s Father during an argument with his brother in March 2008. After that, the parties left the Yishun flat to move into a rented flat and after that, the matrimonial home in 19 April 2008. Subsequently she refused to let the Plaintiff’s Father move into the matrimonial flat. I make the finding that there was an incident where the Defendant had been assaulted by the Plaintiff’s Father in March 2008 which had been communicated to the Plaintiff, who then arranged for parties to move out of his parent’s flat. This was in my view a justifiable reason for the Defendant to refuse to allow the Plaintiff’s Father to move into her home. That the Defendant wrongfully accused the Plaintiff’s Father of molesting their child. The Plaintiff’s Father subsequently started to take care of their child, overseeing their domestic helper. However one day he was informed by his Father that the Defendant had accused his Father of molesting their child. This was denied by the Defendant, who claimed that she had heard the child say “Tata (grandfather”) don’t do it.” In her sleep. The Defendant admitted that she had then spoken with the Plaintiff’s Father to ask him why the child would say something like that, but had not accused him of molesting the Child. She did however admit that the Plaintiff’s Father was given the impression that he was being accused of molesting the child, and stopped coming to care for the child. I took the view that this was just an unfortunate misunderstanding between the Defendant and the Plaintiff’s Father, and there was no intention on the Defendant’s part to accuse the Plaintiff’s Father of molesting their child. That the Defendant accused the Plaintiff of having an affair with the Defendant’s Mother. On the stand, the Plaintiff admitted that the Defendant had never confronted him with this allegation, and he had actually heard this from his friends, who alleged that the Defendant had shared that suspicion with him. This was a contradiction of his position in his pleadings and so I made the finding that no such accusation had ever been made by the Defendant against the Plaintiff or to his friends. Assaulting the Plaintiff on 3 June 2016. During an argument between the parties, the Defendant threw her handphone at the Plaintiff but missed, and then sunk her nails into his forehand. The Defendant claimed that while there was an argument, the Defendant threw her handphone away from the Plaintiff. She denied injuring him. The Plaintiff exhibited pictures showing the injuries from the Defendant’s nails. During cross examination it was also confirmed that when the Defendant threw her phone, she was standing very close to the Plaintiff. In those circumstances, it was not possible that she was aiming to hit him when she threw her phone. Therefore I found that the Defendant did not throw her phone at the Plaintiff, but did injure him by scratching him with her nails. This was however a reaction to the Plaintiff slapping her in the face after she threw her phone, so I found that it was not reasonable for the Plaintiff to expect the Defendant to remain unmoved after slapping her in her face. That the Defendant tried to get the Plaintiff to move out of the home by hiding his items. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant hid his toothbrush and iron to irritate him, which prompted him to start sleeping in the hall from April 2017 onwards. There was little substantial evidence of this, and on the stand, the Plaintiff explained that he actually started sleeping in the hall as he was accused of disturbing...
