Wong Hong Toy and Another v Public Prosecutor

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 10 November 1986
• Date: 10 November 1986
• Docket Number: Magistrate's Appeals Nos 374 and 375 of 1985
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

Wong Hong Toy and another

Plaintiff

and

Public Prosecutor

Defendant

[1986] SGHC 41

Lai Kew Chai J

Magistrate's Appeals Nos 374 and 375 of 1985

High Court

Criminal Procedure and Sentencing–Sentencing–Principles–Accused convicted of making false statutory declaration–Whether accused having knowledge that declaration statement false–Whether accused having knowledge of purpose of declaration–Sections 193 and 199 Penal Code (Cap 103, 1970 Rev Ed)–Words and Phrases–“Declaration”–Meaning of “declaration” in s 199 Penal Code (Cap 103, 1970 Rev Ed)

At all material times, the appellants were the chairman and secretary-general respectively of the Workers' Party. As a consequence of dismissal of earlier civil claims which had been brought before the High Court, the Workers' Party was ordered to pay costs and interest. The judgment debt was not satisfied. The judgment creditor then obtained an order for the appointment of a receiver in aid of the execution process. The receiver requested for the Workers' Party's accounts to be furnished in order to ascertain and call in the assets. The receiver further required the appellants to file a joint statutory declaration to confirm that a set of unaudited accounts drawn up in respect of the Workers' Party's financial transactions covering the accounting period from 1 January 1982 to 16 June 1982 (“the accounting period”) reflected a true and fair view of these transactions.

Three cheques were received by the Workers' Party but not reflected in the accounts filed for the accounting period. As such, the appellants were separately charged with making false declarations under s 199 of the Penal Code (Cap 103, 1970 Rev Ed) (“the Penal Code”). They were jointly tried in a District Court on these charges. At the close of the Prosecution's case, the Senior District Judge held that a prima facie case had been established against both appellants. The appellants did not give evidence in their defence. They were convicted and each of them was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. They appealed against their convictions and sentences. The main ground of appeal was that the joint declaration, not having been made on oath or affirmation, could not by itself stand as evidence of the fact therein stated in lieu of personal testimony under such oath or affirmation within the scope of s 199.

Held, dismissing the appeals against conviction and increasing the sentences:

(1) An offence under s 199 of the Penal Code was statutorily regarded - for the purposes of punishment - as serious as it was equivalent to the offence of perjury under English law: at [3].

(2) A “declaration” falling within the ambit of that expression in s 199 of the Penal Code might be: (a) a statutory declaration duly made in accordance with the Statutory Declarations Act (Cap 13, 1970 Rev Ed) by reason of the statutory presumption under s 4 thereof; or (b) a declaration voluntarily made or subscribed, though not sworn or affirmed, if it was made or subscribed under circumstances in which the declarant knew or must have known that the statement in his declaration would be and was received by a court or a public officer as evidence of a fact in issue under O 41 r 5 (2) of The Rules of the Supreme Court 1970: at [43].

(3) At the time the request was made by the receiver, the purpose of and the need in those circumstances for independent verification of the accounts were plain to any reasonable person. It was undoubtedly plain and appreciated by both the appellants at the time they made the declaration. They clearly knew the serious purport of the declaration: at [14].

(4) When the appellants made the joint declaration they: (a) knew or must have known that it would be exhibited by the receiver in the receivership proceedings; (b) knew that serious questions were raised about the Workers' Party's fraudulent conduct; and (c) made the declaration with the intention of persuading or convincing the judgment creditor and the assistant registrar that the relevant accounts had exhibited a true and fair view of the transaction of the Workers' Party during the crucial accounting period: at [44].

(5) The convictions of both appellants were affirmed. However, the sentences of both appellants were increased because of the aggravating circumstance of the case: at [48] to [53].

A Vedamuttu [1868] 4 Madras HCR 185 (distd)

Asgarali Mulla Ibrahimji v EmperorAIR 1943 Nagpur 17 (folld)

Baban Singh v Jagdish SinghAIR 1967 SC 68 (refd)

Davies v R (1974) 59 CrAppR 311 (refd)

Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981-1982] SLR (R) 133; [1980-1981] SLR 73 (refd)

Ismail v Emperor (1914) 15 Cr LJ 603; AIR 1914 LB 30 (distd)

Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577; [1968] 3 All ER 304 (refd)

Teh Kim Chooi v R [1955] MLJ 37 (distd)

Velumailum v PP [1947] MLJ 152 (distd)

Wong Hong Toy v PP [1985-1986] SLR (R) 371; [1984-1985] SLR 298 (refd)

Workers' Party v Tay Boon Too [1974-1976] SLR (R) 204; [1972-1974] SLR 621, HC (refd)

Workers' Party v Tay Boon Too [1974-1976] SLR (R) 429; [1975-1977] SLR 124, CA (refd)

Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 113, 1970 Rev Ed,1980 Reprint)s 195 (2)

Penal Code (Cap 103,1970 Rev Ed)ss 193, 199 (consd);ss 34, 191,200, 421

Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, TheO 30rr 4 (1),4 (2),4 (3),4 (4), O 41rr 5 (1),5 (2)

Statutory Declarations Act (Cap 13, 1970 Rev Ed)ss 3, 4,Schedule

Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 15, 1970 Rev Ed)s 44 (1)

Code of Criminal Procedure1973 (No 2 of 1974) (India) s 479A

Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860) (India) ss 191,192, 199

Penal Code (Cap 45,1935 Rev Ed) (FMS) s 199

Statutory Declarations Act1835 (c 62) (UK)

Lord Hugh Emlyn Hooson QC and Subhas Anandan (M P D Nair & Co) for the appellants

Tan Teow Yeow and Loke Yuen Kee (Deputy Public Prosecutors) for the respondent.

Lai Kew Chai J

1 In September 1985 the appellants, who I will refer to as “Wong” and “Jeyaretnam” respectively, underwent a fresh joint trial in the District Court. They were separately charged for having made a false declaration which a public officer was authorised by law to receive as evidence which they knew contained a false statement on a material point within the meaning of s 199 of the Penal Code.

2 Section 199 of the Penal Code reads:

Whoever, in any declaration made or subscribed by him, which declaration any court of justice, or any public servant or other person, is bound or authorized by law to receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, touching any point material to the object for which the declaration is made or used, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.

3 An offence under s 199 of the Penal Code is by the terms of that section statutorily regarded for the purposes of punishment as serious as the offence of giving false evidence under s 191 of the Penal Code which is equivalent to the offence of perjury under English law. Under s 193, the prescribed punishment for giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding is imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and a fine.

4 After the close of the case for the Prosecution, the Senior District Judge held that a prima facie case against the appellants had been established which, if unrebutted, would have warranted their convictions. After the usual allocution was administered by the Snr District Judge, the appellants proffered no evidence in their defence. In consequence, the Snr District Judge could “draw such inferences from the refusal [to give evidence] as appear proper”: see s 195 (2) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the leading case of Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981-1982] SLR (R) 133. The appellants were convicted.

5 In spite of the seriousness of the offences for which the appellants were found guilty, they failed to take the opportunity to make a mitigation plea. They were each sentenced to three months' imprisonment. They brought this appeal to the High Court against both the convictions and sentences. There is no appeal from the Public Prosecutor on the sentences. The hearing of the appeal concluded last Tuesday and I reserved judgment.

6 The factual matrix giving rise to the prosecution is, on a review of the entire evidence, largely beyond dispute. It started in 1972 as a result of civil litigation initiated by the Workers' Party, a political party of which Wong and Jeyaretnam were at all material times the chairman and the secretary-general respectively. By two consolidated actions in the High Court, it claimed damages for alleged defamation against one Tay Boon Too, who was then a Member of Parliament and who I will refer to as “the judgment creditor”, and against the Attorney-General representing what was then the Department of Broadcasting. In those proceedings, Jeyaretnam appeared as counsel of and his firm acted as solicitors for the Workers' Party. Its claims were dismissed on the ground, inter alia, that the Workers' Party had failed to set out in the statement of claim and had also failed to prove at the trial the original words allegedly spoken in Hokkien, which the learned trial judge, F A Chua J, held was a fatal flaw as a matter of law: see Workers' Party v Tay Boon Too [1974-1976] SLR (R) 204. The learned trial judge was plainly right in this and in other respects. He was accordingly affirmed by the Court of Appeal: see Workers' Party v Tay Boon Too [1974-1976] SLR (R) 429. In consequence, the Workers' Party, like any other unsuccessful litigant, was mulcted in costs. The judgment creditor alone was owed taxed costs as on 10 July 1975 in the sum of $17,101 together with interest thereon at 8% per annum until payment.

7 During the intervening period of more than six years, the Workers' Party failed to pay the judgment creditor his judgment debt. I now come to the written demand sent by his solicitors to J B Jeyaretnam...