Wee Soon Kim Anthony v The Law Society of Singapore (No. 4)

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judgment Date: 07 May 2002
• Date: 07 May 2002
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No 600151 of
• Court: Court of Appeal (Singapore)

Wee Soon Kim Anthony

Plaintiff

and

Law Society of Singapore

Defendant

[2002] SGCA 24

Yong Pung How CJ

,

Chao Hick Tin JA

and

Tan Lee Meng J

Civil Appeal No 600151 of 2001

Court of Appeal

Legal Profession–Disciplinary procedures–Complaint against two solicitors for preparing affidavit containing false statement–Inquiry Committee recommending dismissal of complaint–Role of Inquiry Committee–Whether conflict of evidence precluded Inquiry Committee from making finding–Legal Profession–Professional conduct–Breach–Complaint against two solicitors for preparing affidavit containing false statement–Whether prima facie case of professional misconduct established

The complainant lodged a complaint with the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”) against two solicitors, alleging that they had prepared affidavits, containing falsehood, on behalf of clients in legal proceedings. An inquiry committee (“IC”) was constituted to investigate one of the alleged incidents of misconduct (“the complaint”), which related to a sentence (“the disputed sentence”) contained in an affidavit filed by one Shirreen Sin (“Shirreen”). After considering the written explanation of the solicitors and hearing Shirreen, the IC recommended that the complaint be dismissed. The recommendation was endorsed by the Council of the Law Society. Dissatisfied, the complainant applied to the High Court for an order to compel the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice for a disciplinary committee (“DC”) to be appointed to hear the complaint. The High Court dismissed the application, and the complainant appealed.

The primary issue before the court concerned the role of an IC. The complainant contended, inter alia, that a prima facie case of professional misconduct had been established and the IC should not have gone further to consider the explanations of Shirreen and the two solicitors. He submitted that the IC, in line with its function of sifting out frivolous complaints, should have recommended that the matter be put before a DC.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) To impute fault on the two solicitors, it was necessary to show that they knew at the time the affidavit was prepared that the disputed sentence was false or at least had reasons to believe it was so. There was no general duty on a solicitor to verify the instructions of his client. It would be different if there were compelling reasons or circumstances requiring the solicitor to verify the client's instructions: at [23].

(2) Under s 86 (5) and 86 (7) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Rev Ed), the IC could dismiss a complaint or recommend a lesser punishment without having it referred to a DC if the misconduct in question was minor. To decide whether a complaint was frivolous or was prima facie established, it would be necessary for the IC to evaluate the facts and the applicable law. The fact that the primary function of the IC was to sift out frivolous complaints did not mean that it could not make any determination, especially as to questions of fact: at [28].

(3) Where the nature of a complaint was such that, if proven, it would warrant being referred to a DC, and there was a conflict as to facts, then the IC should not seek to resolve the conflict and instead should leave it to the DC to decide. This did not mean that just because a complainant made an assertion of material facts which were at variance with those advanced by the respondent-solicitor, the IC was thereby precluded from making any determination. If there were objective facts upon which the IC could verify the two opposing versions, the IC would be entitled to make a finding and, if that finding should favour the respondent-solicitor, then the IC should recommend the dismissal of the complaint: at [29].

(4) How an IC should carry out its task depended on the nature of the complaint and the circumstances prevailing in the case. No hard and fast rule could be laid down. As far as procedure was concerned, the IC had to act fairly at all times. It had to hear the solicitor who was the subject of the complaint, unless at that stage and without any explanation from the solicitor, the IC was able to determine that the complaint was frivolous and should be dismissed. In carrying out the inquiry, the IC was entitled to hear from any person that the IC thought was able to shed light on the matter. If the complaint was serious, warranting a reference to a DC, then the IC should not seek to make findings on disputed material facts, but should leave that to the DC: at [31].

(5) The evidence showed that the two solicitors did not know that the instruction was false (assuming that the disputed sentence was false) and there was nothing to suggest to them that they should verify the sentence. In the absence of knowledge of the falsehood by the two solicitors, the complaint could not stand and was correctly dismissed. The primary role of the IC as a filter had to also mean that a solicitor should not be unnecessarily dragged through a DC hearing: at [33] to [34].

Advocate and Solicitor, Re An [1962] MLJ 125 (distd)

James Gray (a Solicitor), Re; Ex parte The Incorporated Law Society (1869) 20 LT Rep NS 730 (distd)

Seet Melvin v Law Society of Singapore [1995] 2 SLR (R) 186; [1995] 2 SLR 323 (refd)

Subbiah Pillai v Wong Meng Meng [2001] 2 SLR (R) 556; [2001] 3 SLR 544 (refd)

Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew [1997] 3 SLR (R) 576; [1998] 1 SLR 97 (folld)

Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [1988] 1 SLR (R) 455; [1988] SLR 510 (folld)

Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 2 SLR (R) 821; [2001] 4 SLR 25 (distd)

Whitehouse Holdings Pte Ltd v Law Society of Singapore [1994] 2 SLR (R) 485; [1994] 2 SLR 476 (distd)

Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Rev Ed) ss 85 (6D), 86 (5), 86 (6), 86 (7), 96 (1)

Appellant in person

Yang Lih Shyng and Candice Kwok (Khattar Wong & Partners) for the respondent.

Chao Hick Tin JA

(delivering the judgment of the court):

1 This was an appeal against the decision of Woo Bih Li JC who refused an application by the appellant (“Mr Wee”) to have a complaint, which he lodged with the Law Society of Singapore (“the Law Society”), referred to a disciplinary committee (“DC”) under Pt VII of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2000 Ed) (“the Act”). Having heard Mr Wee, who appeared in person (being himself an advocate and solicitor but who has ceased practising), and the counsel for the Law Society, we dismissed the appeal with costs. These grounds are released as arguments were raised by Mr Wee touching on the role of the inquiry committee (“IC”) appointed to investigate the complaint.

Background

2 This was the third occasion an appeal had come before this court arising from a letter of complaint dated 18 August 1999 lodged by Mr Wee against two advocates and solicitors, Mr Davinder Singh SC and Mr Hri Kumar. We will hereinafter refer to them as Mr Singh and Mr Kumar respectively or as “the...