VWM v VWN

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeWoo Bih Li JAD
Judgment Date31 January 2023
Neutral Citation[2023] SGHC(A) 4
CourtHigh Court Appellate Division (Singapore)
Docket NumberCivil Appeal No 65 of 2022
Hearing Date31 January 2023
Citation[2023] SGHC(A) 4
Year2023
Plaintiff CounselPatrick Fernandez and Mohamed Arshad Mohamed Tahir (Fernandez LLC)
Defendant CounselThe respondent in person.
Subject MatterFamily Law,Matrimonial assets,Division
Published date02 February 2023
Woo Bih Li JAD (delivering the judgment of the court ex tempore): Introduction

The only matter before the Appellate Division of the High Court (“the AD”) is the issue of a flat at Tampines Street 61 developed by the Housing and Development Board (“the HDB”). On 13 July 2017, parties had applied to purchase the flat from the HDB at a price of $467,130 before divorce proceedings were commenced in March 2019. They were eventually allocated the flat. However, they had not taken possession of the flat or made full payment pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings and hence their purchase of the flat was not completed.

In the division of matrimonial assets before a District Judge (“the DJ”), the wife had asked for the husband to transfer his interest in the flat to her. On 31 May 2021, the DJ made various ancillary orders in which he declined to accede to the wife’s request as he was of the view that the value of the flat had increased and it would be wrong for the wife to benefit from that increase without a corresponding benefit to the husband. The DJ hence ordered that parties were to return the flat to the HDB. The DJ also made orders on other issues.

On 7 June 2021, the wife appealed against the orders of the DJ made on 31 May 2021 including his order in respect of the HDB flat.

The appeal was heard by a judge of the General Division of the High Court (“the Judge”) on 9 March 2022. She dismissed the wife’s appeal on various issues including the flat. The grounds of decision were issued on 16 January 2023 (“the GD”), shortly before the hearing of this appeal. The Judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal was mainly premised on the fact that the husband would not receive a refund of his deposit to his Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) savings while the wife would gain a windfall should the price of the flat increase (GD at [27], [30] and [31]). In this regard, the Judge observed that it would be unjust for the wife to retain the HDB flat without giving “a refund of [the husband’s] CPF moneys used for the deposit to the HDB” (GD at [27]). The Judge also observed that the husband needed a roof over his head (GD at [27]) and that the wife’s position was unreasonable given that she had more money in her CPF account than the husband (GD at [28]–[29]). We will return to address the Judge’s observations in greater detail below. We also add that since the GD was released after the parties’ respective cases were filed, we directed that they be allowed to tender written submissions in response to the GD by 27 January 2023. The wife elected not to tender any written submissions while the husband filed brief submissions of around one page that echoed the findings of the DJ and the Judge.

On 30 March 2022, the wife had applied to the AD for leave to appeal against the decision of the Judge made on 9 March 2022. On 20 July 2022, the AD granted the wife leave to appeal only in respect of the flat. On 22 July 2022, the wife filed her Notice of Appeal. In the wife’s Appellant’s Case, she argued that the flat is not a matrimonial asset because the purchase had not been completed by 31 May 2021 and no loan had been drawn. Neither party had acquired the flat during the marriage as defined in s 112(10)(b) Women’s Charter. We disagree. If the flat was not a matrimonial asset, then the wife should not have sought relief in respect of the flat in the divorce proceedings. In any event, both parties had acquired a right to acquire the flat during the marriage and that is a matrimonial asset even though the purchase had not been completed yet.

Before the DJ and the Judge, the wife did not initially offer to pay the husband: whatever he had paid towards the deposit for the flat; his share of stamp fee already paid; and his share of conveyancing fee already paid.

However, before the hearing of the present appeal, the wife offered to pay these sums with accrued interest in exchange for the transfer by the husband of his interest in the HDB flat to her. This is a material difference that was not mentioned to the DJ and Judge initially. While the husband has not accepted the wife’s offer, we note that this offer directly addresses the Judge’s concern that the wife’s stance of not agreeing to refund the husband his CPF moneys was unreasonable, especially since she had more money in her CPF account compared to him (GD at [27]–[28]). Insofar as the Judge’s comments were made in the context of the wife making no offer to refund the amounts in [6(a), 6(b) and 6(c)] above, the present situation is markedly different and there is no longer any concern of this nature.

Returning to the wife’s offer, she has clarified that the husband paid his share of the deposit, stamp fee and conveyancing fee from his CPF account. For easy reference, we set out below the sums paid by the parties:

S/N Description Wife Husband
(a) Deposit $
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT