VUA v VUB

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Christine Lee
• Judgment Date: 17 August 2021
• Neutral Citation: [2021] SGFC 84
• Court: Family Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Divorce No 3477 of 2004 and Summons No 1072 of 2020
• Year: 2021
• Published date: 21 August 2021
• Hearing Date: 22 September 2020,03 May 2021,28 October 2020,10 December 2020,20 January 2021,05 March 2021
• Plaintiff Counsel: Ms Dorothy Chai of M/S DCMO LAW PRACTICE LLC
• Defendant Counsel: Ms Peggy Yee with Ms Rachel Chua of M/S PY LEGAL LLC
• Subject Matter: Family Law,Maintenance for Wife and children
• Citation: [2021] SGFC 84

District Judge Christine Lee: Introduction

This case involves the Father’s application in SUM 1072/2020 to vary two Court Orders relating to the maintenance payable by him for the two children of the marriage and to the Mother.

The Father’s application was heard over five hearing days on 22 September 2020, 28 October 2020, 10 December 2020, 20 January 2021 and 5 March 2021. Following which, Counsel agreed for my decision to be rendered in writing and sent to them by way of Registrar’s Notice (“RN”).

Having heard the submissions and after considering the evidence on the Father’s application, I delivered my Decision together with my Brief Reasons to Counsel by RN on 3 May 2021.

On 14 May 2021, the Father filed an appeal against those parts of my decision with regard to the payment of maintenance by him for the younger child of the marriage and to the Mother. This was rejected as it was filed as a Registrar’s Appeal. On 17 May 2021, the Father filed the current appeal against the same decision.

Facts The Parties

The Plaintiff Father (the Father) and Defendant Mother (the Mother) married on 28 November 1992 in Singapore. Parties are both Singapore citizens. There are two children to the marriage namely, N (m) DOB xxx 1998 now aged over 21 years and J (m) DOB xxx 2000 now also aged over 21 years (“the said 2 children”). The Father filed Petition for Divorce on 23 August 2004.

Decree Nisi was granted on 11 January 2005 and the marriage was dissolved by reason of the unreasonable behaviour of the Mother. All the Ancillary Matters were dealt with under a Court Order dated 24 November 2006 (“AM Court Order”). Accordingly, the Certificate of making the Decree Absolute was issued on 5 June 2007.

Previous Court Orders

Under the AM Court Order, the Father was to pay the sum of $2,000.00 per month as maintenance for the said 2 children with effect from 15 January 2005 and thereafter on the 15th day of every month. The Father was also ordered to pay the sum of $400.00 per month as maintenance for the Mother also with effect from 15 January 2005 and thereafter on the 15th day of every month.

On 4 October 2012, the Mother filed SUM 15497/2012 to increase both monthly maintenance payments from $2,000.00 to $4,500.00 for the said 2 children and from $400.00 to $2,000.00 for herself. The Mother’s application for increased maintenance for herself was dismissed but the maintenance payable by the Father for the said 2 children was increased from $2,000.00 per month to $3,600.00 per month by an Order of Court dated 20 February 2013 with effect from 15 October 2012.

Applications before me

On 17 April 2020, the Father filed SUM 1072/2020 to seek a variation of his monthly maintenance payments for the said 2 children and the Mother under the relevant Court Orders.

On 13 May 2020, the Mother applied for enforcement of the outstanding payment in MSS xxx/2020 against the Father for arrears of the monthly maintenance payments solely with regard to the maintenance payable for the elder child (“N”) after November 2019.

At the first hearing on 22 September 2020, I noted that none of the Court Orders had provided that the maintenance payable for the said 2 children was to extend beyond the age of 21 years. I also drew Counsels’ attention to the general provisions for maintenance under section 69 of the Women’s Charter, in particular to section 69(5)(6).

At the second hearing on 28 October 2020, the Mother’s Counsel informed that the Mother was not proceeding with her enforcement application and sought leave to withdraw MSS xxx/2020. I granted leave accordingly.

The hearings therefore proceeded on the issues of the maintenance payments for the younger child (“J”) and for the Mother.

In total, I noted that there were 9 Affidavits filed for the hearing of the Father’s application as follows: Father’s Affidavit in support of his application dated 3 April 2020 Mother’s Reply Affidavit dated 25 June 2020 Father’s Reply Affidavit dated 22 July 2020 Mother’s Further Reply Affidavit dated 20 August 2020 Father’s Further Reply Affidavit dated 10 September 2020 J’s Affidavit dated 20 October 2020 Father’s Final Affidavit dated 21 October 2020 J’s Supplementary Affidavit dated 11 November 2020 Mother’s Final Affidavit dated 17 February 2021.

The Father’s Appeal

The crux of the Father’s appeal is against Clauses 1(b), 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the decision that I issued on 3 May 2021. All these Clauses relate to the maintenance to be paid by him for J and the Mother.

As the first part of the Father’s appeal relates to the maintenance to be paid to J, I will deal with this issue first.

Issue 1

My orders regarding the monthly maintenance to be paid by the Father to J were set out in Clauses 1(b) and 3 of my Decision dated 3 May 2021. These orders related to the Father’s application for variation as set out in Prayer 1(i) of SUM 1072/2020 which was as follows: Prayer 1(i): That Paragraph 5(1) of the Order of Court dated 20 February 2013 be varied in that there shall be no monthly maintenance payable by the Plaintiff for the children of the marriage namely N and J or to such other reduced sum as this Honourable Court deems fit.

At the first hearing on 22 September 2020, I noted that J would be reaching the age of 21 years on xx April 2021. I also noted that it was not disputed that J had received a Public Service Commission (PSC) scholarship in April 2019 to study in the United Kingdom (UK) and that J had left Singapore for the UK in September 2019 but returned to Singapore in March 2020 and remained here because of Covid-19.

The Father’s Counsel submitted that as the PSC Scholarship provided a sum sufficient to cover J’s monthly maintenance, the Father was no longer liable to pay any maintenance for J after he commenced receiving the scholarship monies. As such, the Father’s Counsel submitted that the monthly maintenance payable for J with effect from August 2019 should be reduced to zero or whatever amount the Court deemed fit.

The Mother’s Counsel informed that the PSC scholarship amount for J’s living expenses varied, depending on whether J was in the UK or in Singapore. The Mother’s Counsel submitted that J’s monthly expenses in London was around S$3,580.00 and that J’s monthly expenses in Singapore was at S$3,323.19 per month as he had to continue paying for his accommodation in London at S$1,928.30. As such, the Mother’s Counsel submitted that the PSC scholarship monies was insufficient for J’s monthly expenses.

There followed extensive submissions by both Counsel on J’s monthly expenses in Singapore and in the UK. As such, I directed that J was to file an Affidavit to provide the Court with specific information on his monthly expenses. However, at the next hearing on 28 October 2020, the Father's Counsel submitted that J’s Affidavit had failed to answer some key points. As such, I directed that J was to file a further Affidavit which was done on 11 November 2020.

Summary of Father’s Counsel’s submissions

The Father’s Counsel submitted that based on J’s Affidavits, there was a surplus from the month of August 2019 onwards, between the PSC Scholarship monies paid to J, and his monthly expenses.

In view of this surplus, the Father's Counsel referred to the case of TYA v TYB [2017] SGHCF 29 which was a decision by the Honourable Justice Valerie Thean at paragraphs 68 and 69, to seek back-dating of the Father’s variation application to August 2019 because that was when J received the first tranche of the PSC scholarship monies.

The Father's Counsel also submitted that there was an excess sum of $22,075.35¹ from the months of August 2019 to December 2020, less the Father’s maintenance obligations from January 2021 to April 2021 to J, and that this should be paid back to the Father by the Mother. It was submitted that this was because the monthly maintenance sum of $1,800.00 for J, had been paid by the Father to the Mother.

The Plaintiff’s Counsel further submitted that the justice of this case was such that it warranted that the Court vary the maintenance order “all the way back to August 2019” when there was a material change in J’s circumstances in that he was awarded the PSC scholarship².

Summary of Mother’s Counsel’s submissions

The Mother’s Counsel responded that the case relied on by the Father’s Counsel of TYA v TYB was distinguishable from the present case based on the facts.

The Mother’s Counsel submitted that if one looked at the justice of the case, then it was inequitable for J to be penalised because he was hardworking enough to obtain a PSC scholarship. Therefore, there was no equitable reason for the Father to have “a windfall of over $22,000.00 on the back of J’s hard work”³.

The Mother’s Counsel relied on the case of AUA v ATZ [2016] SGCA 41 at paragraphs 40 and 41 on the joint parental responsibility of the Father and Mother to maintain their children under sections 68 and 69(4) of the Women’s Charter. It was submitted that as such, both Parents were equally responsible to maintain their children, but their precise obligations differed based on their means and capacities.

My assessment

In my view, the first issue to be dealt with regarding the Father’s variation application, was whether there was a material change of the Father’s financial circumstances to provide a good basis for a downward variation or recission of the maintenance order regarding J. I referred to the case of AYM vs AYL [2014] SGCA 46 at paragraph 23 as guidance for this point.

I also took note that the same case of AYM vs AYL at paragraph 47, also made the point that the Father’s fresh obligations to his new family should not affect or compromise his existing obligations to his old family.

Hence, in my view, it was not a question of material change per se in the Father’s financial circumstances, but whether the change was sufficiently...