VTW v VTX

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeLim Keng Yeow
Judgment Date06 August 2021
Neutral Citation[2021] SGFC 82
CourtFamily Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberDivorce No 4166 of 2012 (Summons No 2166 of 2020)
Published date14 August 2021
Year2021
Hearing Date22 April 2021,28 October 2020,03 February 2021,10 March 2021,20 April 2021,16 December 2020
Plaintiff CounselPrasanna d/o T V Prabhakaran (M/s Raj Prasanna & Partners)
Defendant CounselThe Defendant in-person
Subject MatterMaintenance for Ex-wife,Variation,Rescission,Material change in circumstances
Citation[2021] SGFC 82
District Judge Lim Keng Yeow:

This is an application by the Defendant (“the ex-husband”) to vary the existing maintenance orders made in favour of the Plaintiff (“the ex-wife”). I eventually made orders reducing but not discharging the ex-husband’s maintenance obligations. He appealed against the order and these Grounds address his appeal.

The parties were married on 25 September 2003. Nine years later, on 25 September 2012, Interim Judgment of divorce was granted containing Consent Orders entered into by both parties. A clause of the Orders provided that the ex-husband was to pay the ex-wife $3,000 per month for her maintenance on the first day of every month with effect from 1 September 2012. On 6 August 2020, the ex-husband filed this application, asking to be completely relieved of his obligation to pay spousal maintenance.

The first main issue to be determined was whether any variation or rescission of existing maintenance orders was possible or warranted in the circumstances.

Under s 117 WC, maintenance orders in favour of a wife that are not expressed to end at any given time continue until either ex-spouse deceases, or until the wife remarries, unless the order is subsequently rescinded. Whether and when such an order is to be rescinded is provided for in s 118 WC: the court may “vary or rescind any subsisting order for maintenance…where there has been any material change in the circumstances”.

Not every change in circumstances satisfies the requirements of s 118 WC. In ATS v ATT, the High Court held that three conditions have to be met1: The material change asserted is a change from circumstances prevailing during the ancillary matters hearing; The change arose after the ancillary matters hearing; and The change is sufficient enough to satisfy the court that a variation or rescission of maintenance is necessitated.

Before me, the ex-husband relied on his termination from his work due to the COVID pandemic and on the assertion that he had already paid the ex-wife a large amount of money over the years.

He claimed that he earned some $17,000 around the time of the Consent Order, working as an Industry Sales Manager at XXX, a company based in XXX. In March 2016, he was laid off. He worked as an Uber driver from August 2016 to December 2016. In January 2017, he was re-employed by XXX, earning over $14,000 per month until his termination on 28 June 2020 resulting in this application.

The fact of his termination in June 2020 was not disputed. I was prepared to accept that it amounted to a material change in circumstances. I turn to the issue of whether this should result in a full discharge of his maintenance obligations, or whether a downward variation was more appropriate.

The following were the key facts that I relied on: A huge disparity in income earning capacity existed between the parties, both at the point of divorce and when the variation application was made. The ex-wife had mostly not worked during the marriage, last worked some 15 years ago, and had longstanding debilitating health issues including cancer of the kidney and severe cervical spondylosis which continued to incur considerable expenses. Furthermore, she was already aged 62 when the matter came before me. Her earning capacity was unfortunately quite negligible. In comparison, the ex-husband was aged only 52, and did not raise any health issues. Despite his termination, he was able to engage in consultancy work of various forms. He would continue to enjoy a reasonably good earning capacity for some years to come. The ex-husband contended that his ability to find work and his earning capacity would be affected by a decline in the oil and gas sector, the area of his expertise and experience. In my view, this assertion was rather sweeping and speculative. There was insufficient evidence for me to conclude that any such a decline would inevitably affect him, or that his expertise could not...

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