UYH v UYI

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Azmin Jailani
• Judgment Date: 05 July 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] SGFC 73
• Court: Family Court (Singapore)
• Hearing Date: 15 March 2019,18 March 2019
• Docket Number: D 321/2009, FC/SUM 831/2019
• Plaintiff Counsel: Mr David Liew [David Liew Practice]
• Defendant Counsel: Defendant in person
• Subject Matter: Family Law,Child Maintenance,Variation
• Published date: 13 July 2019

District Judge Azmin Jailani: Introduction

SUM 831/2019 (“SUM 831”) was an application by the plaintiff-mother against the defendant-father for an upward variation in the quantum of child maintenance previously ordered in an interim judgment dated 24 March 2009 (the “IJ”). The increase sought was from $300 to $500.

Whilst not the subject of any appeal, parties also appeared before me at the time for SUM 4419/2018 (“SUM 4419”). SUM 4419 was the defendant’s earlier application to remove the provision in the IJ which provided for spousal maintenance. Notably, the amount ordered in the IJ for spousal maintenance was $200.

At all material times and for the purposes of these proceedings, the defendant was acting in person. On the other hand, the plaintiff was represented by her counsel, Mr David Liew.

As highlighted earlier, the defendant first commenced SUM 4419 on 13 December 2018. The plaintiff, on the other hand, only commenced SUM 831 on 8 March 2019, 1 week before the scheduled hearing of SUM 4419. I will touch on the procedural history of both applications and my observations on the same in greater detail below.

On 15 March 2019, parties appeared before me to present their respective cases. After reviewing parties’ evidence and submissions, I gave my decision on 18 March 2019, and provided brief reasons for the same.

In essence, I granted the defendant’s application in SUM 4419, and dismissed the plaintiff’s application in SUM 831. Dissatisfied, the plaintiff filed HCF/DCA 33/2019 appealing my dismissal of SUM 831 only.

Against that backdrop, I now provide the full grounds of my decision.

I would pause at this juncture and highlight that the manner in which both proceedings had unfolded invariably resulted in certain overlap insofar as parties’ evidence conceivably traversed both SUM 4419 and SUM 831. The upshot of this was that certain contentions relied on for SUM 4419 may be applicable to SUM 831. However, as I mentioned earlier, the defendant did not appeal against my decision in SUM 4419.

In other words, SUM 4419 is not the subject matter of these grounds.

That said, and insofar as it would be useful to briefly highlight the documents and evidence filed in SUM 4419 and the decision therein in the context of the present appeal for SUM 831, such matters have been stated herein. However, insofar as the plaintiff may conceivably seek to criticize this court’s decision in SUM 4419 (be it in support of this present appeal or otherwise), that, in my view, would be procedurally and legally improper, and quintessentially a backdoor appeal. More importantly, as I noted earlier, such critique falls outside the boundaries of the present appeal, and I say no more on the matter.

For all intents and purposes, the plaintiff’s present appeal is to be viewed on the basis of there being no disturbance of the findings reached in SUM 4419.

Background Parties and the terms of the IJ

Parties were married on xx xxx 2005. The child of the marriage (the “Child”) was born some time in December 2005. IJ was granted on xx xxx 2009. At the time of IJ, the Child was a little over 3 years old.

The salient terms of the IJ were as follows: 3(c) The Defendant shall pay a monthly sum of S$200.00 for the maintenance of the Plaintiff. The Defendant shall pay the monthly maintenance into the Plaintiff’s POSB Account no. XXXXXXXXX on the 3rd day of each month commencing 3rd December 2008. 3(d) The Defendant shall pay a monthly sum of S$300.00 for the maintenance of the child. The Defendant shall pay monthly maintenance into the Plaintiff’s POSB Account no. XXXXXXXXX on the 3rd day of each month commencing 3rd December 2008.

As regards the aforementioned provisions, parties diverged insofar as the defendant asserted that the maintenance orders were made by consent.¹ The plaintiff disputes this.² I was inclined to accept that plaintiff’s position. A review of the plain terms of the IJ did not suggest that the maintenance orders were consent orders.

Putting that aside, what was more pertinent to my mind was that the IJ made a clear distinction between spousal maintenance and child maintenance. On the plaintiff’s own narrative that the orders were not consent orders, the necessary conclusion was that the court had duly considered and specifically allocated the defendant’s liability for spousal and child maintenance. In other words, the court made an assessment on the defendant’s contribution for the plaintiff’s and the child’s maintenance respectively and separately.

I make this observation at this juncture to provide the legal nature of those maintenance orders vis-à-vis the plaintiff’s narrative on how she personally utilised those monies. I will touch more on this in the subsequent sections below.

Documents filed by Parties

For the purposes of these proceedings, parties submitted the following documents:

S/N	Documents filed by Plaintiff	Documents filed by Defendant
1.	Plaintiff’s 1st affidavit dated 31 January 2019 (“P1”)	Defendant’s 1st affidavit dated 13 December 2018 (“D1”)
2.	Plaintiff’s 2nd affidavit dated 8 March 2019 (“P2”)	Defendant’s 2nd affidavit dated 21 February 2019 (“D2”)

Other documents relevant to the proceedings were as follows:

S/N	Other hearing documents
1.	The Notes of Evidence on 15 March 2019 (“NE Day 1”)
2.	The Notes of Evidence on 18 March 2018 (“NE Day 2”)

Procedural history

I now turn to the procedural history of these proceedings.

On 13 December 2018, the defendant commenced SUM 4419. Concurrently, the defendant filed his supporting affidavit for the application.³ At a case conference on 10 January 2019, directions were given for the plaintiff to file her reply affidavit for SUM 4419. The plaintiff did so on 31 January 2019⁴.

As directed at the same case conference, the defendant filed his final reply affidavit on 21 February 2019⁵.

At a further case conference on 26 February 2019, the plaintiff specifically sought leave to file a further response to the defendant’s final reply affidavit, specifically contentions regarding her expenses and that of the Child. By the defendant’s consent and pursuant to the court’s directions at that case conference, leave was granted to the plaintiff to a further reply limited to the issues I stated above.

The plaintiff was directed to file such affidavit by 5 March 2019. At that same case conference, the hearing for SUM 4419 was fixed for 15 March 2019.

On 8 March 2019 (3 days after the deadline directed by the court), the plaintiff filed what appeared to be her further reply⁶. However, it was only at that stage that the plaintiff filed the summons for SUM 831. In doing so, the plaintiff expressly stated in the summons that the affidavit in support of this newly commenced application was the further reply affidavit (i.e., P2). Put another way, the plaintiff’s further reply to SUM 4491 (which was granted on a limited basis) had now manifested itself into becoming the supporting affidavit for a freshly initiated SUM 831.

This was something which fell outside the scope of the directions given at the case conference of 26 February 2019.

Moreover, at the hearing on 15 March 2019, it was brought to my attention that the summons for SUM 831 and P2 were only served on the defendant on 10 March 2019,⁷ 5 days before the hearing of SUM 4419.

In summary, not only did the defendant receive the plaintiff’s affidavit late (in breach of the directions at the case conference of 26 February 2019), he found himself at the receiving end of a fresh application at the doorstep of the hearing of his own application.

Given the circumstances, the plaintiff sought the court’s leave for both applications to be heard together.

Prior to the hearing on 15 March 2019, I directed the plaintiff to provide a consolidated bundle for both proceedings. I had also preliminarily fixed both applications to be heard together to hear parties’ position on the conduct of both applications.

At the hearing on 15 March 2019, and after hearing parties, I granted Mr Liew’s request for both matters to be heard together, and proceeded with the substantive hearing. This was principally due to the defendant’s express intimation that he did not wish to exercise his right to file any further affidavits for SUM, and was prepared to proceed with the hearing of both matters.

Parties’ respective cases in brief

I now set out parties’ respective cases.

Plaintiff’s case to increase the quantum of child maintenance in SUM 831

The plaintiff’s case for SUM 831 can be encapsulated in the following paragraphs of P2 (being the affidavit in support of SUM 831): 5. Firstly, I have in my reply Affidavit of 31st January 2019, in effect prayed for order in terms of my cross-application to vary [Clause 3(d) of the IJ] to increase the Defendant’s contribution towards the maintenance of our son, YYYY, from $300.00 to $500.00 per month with effect from the date that the Defendant seeks in his application, in the event that he succeeds in his application to set aside [Clause 3(c) of the IJ] therein that he was to contribute $200.00 per month towards my maintenance. 6. I have just filed my cross application together with this reply Affidavit. 7. There is a significant change in my circumstances and that of our son which prompted me to file in this application. The very fact that the Defendant now seeks to vary [Clause 3(c) of the IJ] to cease his contribution towards my maintenance at $200.00 per month is in itself a significant change to my circumstances if allowed.⁸

(emphasis added)

On the plaintiff’s own affidavit, it was essentially her case that the Defendant’s application in SUM 4419 (a variation of spousal maintenance), if allowed, necessitated a corresponding increase in child’s maintenance in SUM 831. In other words,...