Uwf v Uwh

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Tan Puay Boon JC
• Judgment Date: 22 December 2020
• Docket Number: Suit No 2 of 2017
• Year: 2020
• Court: High Court (Singapore)

UWF and another

and

UWH and another

[2020] SGHCF 22

Tan Puay Boon JC

Suit No 2 of 2017

High Court (Family Division)

Succession and Wills — Testamentary capacity — Mental disability — Testator suffering from bipolar disorder — Whether testator lacking testamentary capacity at time of making and executing will

Succession and Wills — Testamentary capacity — Plaintiffs alleging testator's will was made under undue influence of defendants — Whether testator made and executed will under undue influence of defendants

Held, dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims:

(1) For a will to be found valid, three elements had to be satisfied: the testator had to (a) have the mental capacity to make a will; (b) have knowledge and approval of the contents of the will; and (c) be free from undue influence or the effects of fraud: at [134].

Whether Mother lacked testamentary capacity at the time of making and executing the Will

(2) For the purposes of their Joint Expert Report, the Plaintiffs' experts, Dr Tan Chue Tin (“Dr Tan”) and Dr Ung Eng Khean (“Dr Ung”), were instructed to retrospectively assess Mother's testamentary capacity at the time of the making and executing of the Will when they did not have the opportunity to see Mother at the material time. Dr Tan first saw Mother about one year later when she suffered a lithium overdose and Dr Ung had never met her. The expert evidence of Dr Tan and Dr Ung on Mother's condition at the time of making and executing the Will was thus given limited weight. Dr Chee saw Mother on 30 May 2002, which was relatively proximate to the time of the making and executing of the Will on 22 and 29 May 2002 respectively. In that regard, more weight was attributed to Dr Chee's assessment of Mother on 30 May 2002: at [147] and [148].

(3) Both the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' experts agreed that Mother suffered from bipolar 1 disorder. At trial, they agreed that a more holistic diagnosis of Mother's mental condition was that she suffered from bipolar disorder with psychosis: at [149].

(4) The Plaintiffs had simply not proved that Mother had schizo-affective disorder at the time of making and executing the Will. The Plaintiffs' own expert, Dr Tan, had conceded that it was unlikely that Mother suffered from schizo-affective disorder and contradicted the Plaintiffs' own position. Dr Ung merely took the view that there was a “possibility” that Mother might have been suffering from schizo-affective disorder on or around the time of making and executing the Will. A possible diagnosis of schizo-affective disorder was plainly insufficient to prove that Mother suffered from the said disorder. Dr Lim also concluded that Mother did not manifest features of schizo-affective disorder at the time of making and executing the Will. Finally, the Plaintiffs' submission also went beyond its pleaded case since it was never pleaded that Mother had schizo-affective disorder: at [152] and [153].

(5) In determining testamentary capacity, the court had to consider the totality of the evidence as a whole, including both factual and medical components, and generally accord equal weight to both types of evidence so long as the factual and medical witnesses had the opportunity to observe the testator at the material time. The law was clear that in cases where the expert witnesses disagreed, the court could place greater weight on factual witnesses: at [170].

(6) The court found that on a balance of probabilities, Mother's bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission at the time of making and executing the Will on 22 and 29 May 2002: at [180].

• (a) The court found Dr Chee's assessment of Mother's medical condition on 30 May 2002 and the absence of the change in Mother's medication a day after the execution of the Will to be crucial and highly probative of Mother's euthymic state. Dr Chee confirmed that he did not make any observation that would have made him consider Mother to be at a risk of relapse of her bipolar disorder on 30 May 2002: at [156] to [159].

• (b) The court rejected the position taken by Dr Tan and Dr Ung in the Joint Expert Report that Mother was probably influenced by her paranoid delusions against Derek and his wife, and was experiencing a manic episode at the time of making and executing the Will: at [168].

• (c) The court gave considerable weight to Mdm L's evidence on Mother at the time of making and executing the Will on 22 and 29 May 2002. Mdm L's evidence was of paramount importance as she was the only one who had contemporaneous evidence of Mother's behaviour and mental condition at the time of making and executing the Will, since Mother had the meeting in Mdm L's personal office alone on 22 May 2002 and possibly on 29 May 2002: at [169] to [171].

• (d) Further, the court found it significant that Mother exhibited rational decision-making in changing her mind about giving Derek $10,000 instead of $5,000 at the meeting with Mdm L on 22 May 2002. Mother's behaviour of doubling the pecuniary sum for Derek was inconsistent with someone who had delusions or overvalued ideas of Derek harming her: at [172].

(7) Given the court's finding that Mother's bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission at the time of making and executing the Will on 22 and 29 May 2002, the Plaintiffs' original position that Mother suffered from delusions or overvalued ideas against Derek as a symptom when her bipolar disorder with psychosis relapsed and was in a manic phase was rejected: at [184].

(8) The court also found that the Plaintiffs' case that Mother suffered from delusions or overvalued ideas that Derek was out to harm her stemming from the Plaintiffs' pleaded psychosis that was independent of her bipolar condition could not be sustained. To base the case theory that Mother experienced delusions or overvalued ideas arising from an undiagnosed psychosis independent of her bipolar disorder on Eric's wife's (“Ellen's”) non-medical assessment that Mother's mood was “fine” was simply untenable. In light of Mother's actions at the time of making and executing the Will, there was simply insufficient factual evidence to support the proposition: at [187] and [189].

(9) The court had to be cautious not to displace a testator's personal subjective preferences against a beneficiary in his or her will, especially when the testator's decision in relation to the Will could be logically explained by his or her personal preferences and the will was rational on its face: at [190] and [218].

(10) Further, the shift in the Plaintiffs' positions from the start of the trial to the second tranche of the trial undermined their case. Even taking the Plaintiffs' case at its highest that the delusion did “persist” in Mother's mind at the time of making and executing the Will, this would have been insufficient to deprive her of testamentary capacity. The mere existence of a delusion in the mind of Mother would not suffice. The testator would only be deprived of testamentary capacity if the testator's mind was “so dominated by the insane delusion that he is unable to exercise judgment in disposing of his property reasonably and properly, or of taking a rational view of the matters to be considered in making a will”. The Plaintiffs had also not shown how such delusions, which concerned only Derek, affected Mother in any way that resulted in Celine receiving only a half share under the Will: at [198] to [201].

(11) The essential requisites of testamentary capacity were that: (a) the testator understood the nature of the act and what its consequences were; (b) he knew the extent of his property of which he was disposing; (c) he knew who his beneficiaries were and could appreciate their claims to his property; and (d) he was free from an abnormal state of mind (eg, delusions) that might distort feelings or judgments relevant to making the will. The propounder of the will bore the burden of proving that the testator possessed testamentary capacity: at [211] and [212].

(12) The burden would prima facie be established by the due execution of the will in ordinary circumstances where the testator was not known to be suffering from any kind of mental disability. The evidence had to be considered as a whole. If during the period prior to the execution of his or her will the testator was shown to have suffered from an incapacitating mental illness prior to the execution of the will that resulted in a loss of testamentary capacity, a presumption would arise that the testator continued to lack testamentary capacity. This presumption might be rebutted by the person propounding the will by establishing that the testator made the will during a lucid interval or after recovery from the illness, and the element of whether the testator had the mental capacity to understand the nature of the will and its consequences was not necessarily determined by the existence of some form of mental impairment: at [213] and [214].

(13) The court held that the Defendants successfully rebutted the presumption that Mother continued to lack testamentary capacity. The medical evidence supported a finding that Mother had testamentary capacity when her bipolar disorder with psychosis was in remission, and she would have been capable of making and executing the Will at the material time: at [216].

(14) An indication of testamentary capacity was the rationality of the will, having regard to its terms and the identities of the beneficiaries. If a duly executed will was rational on its face, the testator was presumed to have had testamentary capacity. The party challenging the will might rebut this presumption by adducing evidence to the contrary, such as evidence that the testator was suffering from a medical illness that was serious enough for the court to find that the testator lacked testamentary capacity. The evidential burden of proving the unsoundness of mind would shift to the party alleging it. The court found that Mother's Will was rational on its face such that...