UUV v UUU

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Tan Puay Boon JC
• Judgment Date: 17 March 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] SGHCF 7
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: District Court Appeal from the Family Courts No 150 of 2018
• Year: 2020
• Published date: 20 March 2020
• Hearing Date: 15 October 2019,01 November 2019,07 August 2019
• Plaintiff Counsel: Alyssa G Mundo (M/s Yeo & Associates LLC)
• Defendant Counsel: Steffi Huang Yujia (M/s Kalco Law LLC)
• Subject Matter: Family Law,Divorce,Ancillary matters,Division of matrimonial assets,Maintenance
• Citation: [2020] SGHCF 7

Tan Puay Boon JC: Introduction

This is an appeal by the Defendant (“Husband”) against the decision of the District Judge (“DJ”) in the Ancillary Matters (“AM”) hearing of the divorce proceedings between him and the Plaintiff (“Wife”). The appeal concerns four issues: care and control of, and access to, the two children to the marriage (“Children”); maintenance of the Children; maintenance of the Wife; and the division of the matrimonial home (“the Flat”) (see UUU v UUV [2019] SGFC 37 (“GD”) at [1]).

Background facts

The parties were married in Singapore on 23 October 2010. The first child (“C1”) was born in March 2011, and the second child (“C2”) was born in November 2013. The parties lived in the house of the Husband’s parents from the start of their marriage until June 2013, at which point they moved to a rented flat in Ang Mo Kio. The parties stayed in the Ang Mo Kio flat until February 2015, when they moved into the Flat that they purchased. The parties lived together until the Wife moved out of the Flat with the Children on 5 May 2017. The Wife filed the Writ of Divorce on 20 July 2017, before returning to the Flat with the Children in August 2017. Interim Judgment (“IJ”) was granted on 9 January 2018, on the ground that both parties have behaved in such a way that the other party could not reasonably be expected to live with him/her. It brought to an end a marriage of about seven years. The AM hearing took place on 28 September 2018 and 13 November 2018, and the AM Order was made on 29 November 2018.

The Husband is 37 years old this year. He is a full-time safety instructor, but he also takes on part-time jobs as a private car hire driver and a bartender. The Wife is 31 years old, and she works as a personal assistant. C1 is nine years old and C2 is seven years old.

The Flat, a Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flat in Yishun, was purchased in August 2014 in the parties’ joint names.¹ There was a 5-year Minimum Occupancy Period (“MOP”) imposed on the Flat, which has expired in August 2019 (GD at [36]).

The Husband appealed against the following terms of the AM Order (see FC/ORC 6175/2018): Care and control of the Children was granted to the Wife, and liberal access was granted to the Husband; The Husband was to pay $800.00 per month, along with other education fees, for maintenance of the Children; The Husband was to pay a nominal sum of $1.00 per month for maintenance of the Wife; The Flat was to be divided in a 55:45 ratio between the Wife and the Husband; and The Wife was given the first right to purchase the Husband’s share of the Flat.

Regarding the order set out in [5(e)], the Husband has successfully obtained a stay on the disposal of the Flat pending the determination of this appeal (see FC/ORC 1746/2019). As a result, the Husband and the Wife are still living together at the Property along with the Children.

The appeal

The Husband raised the following issues in this appeal:² The DJ erred in granting care and control of the Children to the Wife; The DJ erred in ordering the Husband to pay $800.00 monthly plus disbursement for maintenance of the Children; The DJ erred in ordering the Husband to pay nominal maintenance to the Wife; The DJ erred in dividing the Flat in a 55:45 ratio between the Wife and the Husband; The DJ erred in her valuation of the Flat.

Over the course of the appeal, the Wife filed HCF/SUM 118/2019 and the Husband filed HCF/SUM 145/2019 to seek to adduce further evidence. I have admitted the affidavits filed in both summonses for this appeal.³

I will deal with each of the issues raised by the Husband.

Care and control of, and access to, the Children

Under the AM Order, care and control of the Children was granted to the Wife and liberal access was granted to the Husband. The access terms include, inter alia, weekday access during the school term every Monday to Friday from after school to 9.00pm.

The Husband submitted that the AM Order should be amended to state that he be given the care and control of the Children, with no changes to the access arrangements made in the AM Order.⁴ In response, the Wife submitted that the AM Order should be amended to state that the Husband should only have weekday access on Monday and Friday (as opposed to Monday to Friday).⁵

It is unclear whether the Husband wanted care and control to be given to him solely, or shared between him and the Wife. In any event, I am of the view that care and control should be given to the Wife solely. I am also inclined to amend the AM Order, such that the Husband is only given weekday access on Monday and Friday.

Legal principles

Section 124 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“the Charter”) provides that “[i]n any proceedings for divorce … the court may … make such orders as it thinks fit with respect to the welfare of any child”. Such orders which the court may make include orders for care and control, and access.

The parent with care and control is the daily caregiver with whom the child live with primarily. Consequently, that parent is generally responsible for making day-to-day decisions for the child (CX v CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR(R) 690 at [31] and TAU v TAT [2018] 5 SLR 1089 (“TAU”) at [9]).

The parent with access, while not the child’s daily caregiver, would also spend regular periods of time with the child. Access can take many forms. When the parent with access is with the child, he or she can make some day-to-day decisions for the child, as it would be impractical for the parent with care and control to be consulted on every decision (TAU at [9]).

In making orders for care and control and access, the court’s paramount consideration is the welfare of the child: s 125(2) of the Charter.

Application Care and control to the Wife

As stated in [13]–[15] above, care and control should be given to a parent if it would be in the child’s best interest to have that parent be the primary, day-to-day caregiver. I am of the view that the DJ was justified in awarding care and control to the Wife for two reasons.

First, the Husband’s commitments in the earlier part of the marriage suggest that he could not have been the primary caregiver in the earlier years of the marriage. During the period from March 2011 when C1 was born to July 2014, the Husband worked as a flight attendant.⁶ The Husband also did not dispute the Wife’s claim that he was pursuing a university degree between 2011 and 2014.⁷ The Wife, on the other hand, stopped working as a flight attendant when she was pregnant with C1 in 2010.⁸ As a result, the Wife would more likely be the primary caregiver of C1 between 2011 and 2014, and of C2 between 2013 (when C2 was born) and 2014. While the parties did live in the house of the Husband’s parents until June 2013,⁹ the Husband’s parents did not claim that they took over the primary caregiver role.¹⁰ In any event, after the parties moved out of the house of the Husband’s parents in June 2013, the Wife would have at least been the primary caregiver of both C1 and C2 from this point until July 2014.

Second, the parties’ conduct at the twilight of the marriage lends the inference that the Wife is the primary caretaker of the Children. The Wife moved out of the Flat with the Children in May 2017 (before returning three months later). This means that the Wife would be the primary caregiver of the Children during this period. Further, the Wife claimed that she reached an agreement for simplified divorce with the Husband on 23 March 2017, under which she had care and control of the Children.¹¹ She also furnished email correspondence of the agreement,¹² and the Husband did not dispute that there was such an agreement.¹³ In my view, this evidence supports the inference that there was an expectation between the parties that the Wife would be the primary caretaker of the Children when the parties separate.

I turn to address the arguments made by the Husband. He argued that the DJ erred in basing her decision on a statement that he made to the Wife in 2013 when the latter was nine months’ pregnant with C2, viz, “just tell the baby her father is dead” (GD at [19]). I am of the opinion that this statement was not the “determinative” factor behind the DJ’s decision.¹⁴ Nevertheless, this statement is “relevant” (GD at [19]) since it is inconsistent with the Husband’s position that he has been involved in the Children’s lives from when they were born.¹⁵

The Husband argued that his parents were more involved in the Children’s lives than the Wife’s mother.¹⁶ I agree with the DJ that this is a neutral factor (GD at [14]). The Husband’s parents¹⁷ and the Wife’s mother¹⁸ are equally capable of caring for the Children. The Husband’s claim that the Wife’s mother was preoccupied with caring for her other grandchildren in Malaysia is speculative.¹⁹ Even if the Wife’s mother was preoccupied, I am of the view that the Wife can rely on assistance from her domestic helper.²⁰

The Husband placed much emphasis on the Wife’s history of mental instability. In response, the Wife has furnished a report dated 12 February 2018 from the Institute of Mental Health (“IMH”) certifying that she was capable of caring for the Children.²¹ In rebuttal, the Husband claimed that the Wife contemplated self-harm as recently as 5 November 2018, after the parties got into an argument.²² In support of his claim, he furnished screenshots of WhatsApp messages from a mutual friend of the parties.²³ These showed a message from the Wife saying “I almost jump off”.²⁴ I note that the Wife’s message could be interpreted as an expression of her frustration and anger. Further, this was a one-off message from the Wife. Therefore, I am of the view that the Husband’s evidence is insufficient to show that the Wife contemplated self-harm on 5 November 2018.

I also note that both the Husband²⁵ and the Wife²⁶ raised allegations of...