UTF v UTG

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Azmin Jailani
• Judgment Date: 07 May 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] SGFC 53
• Court: Family Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: FC/D 2329/2017
• Published date: 14 May 2019
• Year: 2019
• Hearing Date: 25 January 2019,09 January 2019
• Plaintiff Counsel: Mrs Aye Cheng Shone (M/S A C Shone & Co.)
• Defendant Counsel: Mr Rajah Retnam (M/S A Alagappan Law Corporation)
• Subject Matter: Family Law,Ancillary matters,Division of matrimonial assets,Maintenance
• Citation: [2019] SGFC 53

District Judge Azmin Jailani: Introduction

These proceedings relate to my determination of the ancillary matters between the Plaintiff (Wife) and the Defendant (Husband).

By way of brief background, parties were married on xx xxx 1987. After almost 31 years of marriage, interim judgment was granted on 19 June 2018. Interim judgment was granted on the basis of the Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to section 95(3)(b) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev. Ed) (“WC”).

There are two children to the marriage, and elder girl and a younger boy who, at the time of the hearing, were 30 years old and 23 years old respectively. As highlighted by the Plaintiff in her submissions, since both children have reached the age of majority, there were no custody issues or maintenance issues (at least vis-à-vis the Plaintiff and Defendant themselves) in connection with the children.

On that basis, the main ancillary matters in dispute relate to the division of parties’ sole matrimonial asset (i.e., the matrimonial home), the manner in which the asset was to be distributed between parties, and the Plaintiff’s claim for maintenance.

After hearing parties’ submissions and after considering the material before me, I essentially made the following orders, namely that: the matrimonial asset be divided in the ratio of 55:45 in the Plaintiff’s favour; the matrimonial asset be sold in the open market, with consequential orders on the manner and priority of distribution of the sale proceeds; and that the Plaintiff be awarded lump sum maintenance of $24,000. This was after taking into consideration both parties’ submission that it would be better for parties to have a “clean break” from the dispute, instead of there being any lingering order which may necessitate parties coming back to Court and being embroiled in future proceedings.

The full terms of my orders may be found at Annex-A below. I also provided brief grounds of my decision when parties attended before me on 25 January 2019.

Dissatisfied, and by way of HCF/DCA 14/2019, the Defendant appealed against the entirety of my decision. Against that backdrop, I now give the full grounds of my decision.

Salient documents in these proceedings

The salient document tendered by parties for the purposes of these proceedings were as follows:

S/N	Documents submitted by the Plaintiff	Documents submitted by the Defendant
1.	1st Affidavit of Assets and Means dated 10 August 2018 (“P1AOM”)	1st Affidavit of Assets and Means dated 2 August 2018 (“D1AOM”)
2.	2nd Affidavit of Assets and Means dated 16 November 2018 (“P2AOM”)	2nd Affidavit of Assets and Means dated 8 November 2018 (“D2AOM”)
3.	Ancillary Matters Fact and Position Sheet dated 19 November 2018 (“PFPS”)	Ancillary Matters Fact and Position Sheet dated 13 November 2018 (“DFPS”)
4.	Written Submissions dated 7 January 2019 (“PWS”)	Written Submissions dated 2 January 2019 (“DWS”)

The other main document forming part of the record of these particular proceedings were the notes of evidence for the substantive hearing on 9 January 2019.¹

Division of Matrimonial Asset

I first start with the issue of division.

In terms of identifying the asset pool to be divided, there was no dispute between parties that the only asset liable for division would be the matrimonial home. This is evident in parties’ documents.

For completeness, I also note from the documents that parties had listed, as part of their personal assets, their respective bank accounts and CPF monies. Neither party sought to make a claim against the other for those assets.² I saw no reason to depart from parties’ own agreed positions, and did not include those assets into the asset pool.

Turning back to the matrimonial home, there was also no dispute between parties that at the time of the hearing, the estimated value of the matrimonial home ranged between $320,000 to $340,000.³ There was also no dispute that there was still an outstanding mortgage loan of approximately $19,000.⁴ This amounted to an anticipated gross proceed of approximately $320,000 to $300,000. At the time of making my decision, I was inclined to take a more conservative approach and valued the anticipated proceeds at the lower end of the range (i.e., $300,000).

Whilst the Plaintiff was principally a home maker during the subsistence of the marriage,⁵ it was specifically worth noting that it was also not in dispute that both parties had made direct financial contributions towards the purchase of the matrimonial home. In this regard, it was not in dispute that: the Plaintiff had contributed approximately 38% (i.e., approximately $66,000) towards the purchase price of the matrimonial home; and the Defendant had contributed approximately 62% (i.e., approximately $109,000) towards the purchase price of the matrimonial home.

Parties’ respective positions on division

Against that backdrop, parties’ respective positions on the eventual proportions of distribution is as follows:

With regard to the Defendant: the Defendant contended that he had been making indirect financial contributions in terms of the payment of the family’s expenses, the utilities, and the conservancy charges.⁶ As regards indirect non-financial contributions, the Defendant argued that he had “maintained and cleaned the house”, performed “minor repairs”, and “look after the children and ensured they have proper food, clothing, and education”.⁷ Curiously, and without indicating the value of these indirect contributions and supporting calculations, the Defendant arrived at an ultimate uplifted ratio of 70:30 in his favour.

As regards the Plaintiff: Her candid position was that given her status as a home maker during the subsistence of the marriage, there was not much to be said regarding her indirect financial contribution.⁸ That said, and for completeness, she did mention that she did work as a factory worker before the birth of the younger son, ⁹ and did the occasional part time work when the children were in school¹⁰ to supplement the household income. The Plaintiff also highlighted how she was requested by the Defendant to stay home and take care of the family when the 2nd child was born.¹¹ However, being the home make, her principal contention was that her indirect non-financial contributions “far surpass” the Defendant.¹² In her evidence, the Plaintiff listed a fairly extensive narration of how she had taken care of the Defendant, the children, and the household.¹³ This included daily cleaning of the house, washing the family’s clothes, doing the grocery runs and preparing the family’s daily meals,¹⁴ and tending to the Defendant himself during the recovery period after he had suffered a heart attack.¹⁵ More specifically, the Plaintiff contended that the Defendant did not provide any assistance to the general upkeep of the matrimonial home and the family’s welfare.¹⁶ In this regard, the Plaintiff highlighted the Defendant’s aggressive, patriarchal, and controlling attitude towards the Plaintiff and the family.¹⁷ This translated to the Plaintiff not only having to shoulder the entire burden of the domestic duties, but to also manage and pander to the Defendant’s wishes, lest the Plaintiff were to be the on receiving end of the Defendant’s verbal abuse. On that basis, the Plaintiff asserted that her non-financial indirect contribution should be valued at 80:20 in her favour. This would result in an average ratio of 59:46 in the Plaintiff’s favour.¹⁸ Not stopping there, the Plaintiff went further to contend that because of the Defendant’s behaviour, this was not a marriage where there was any equality in the partnership.¹⁹ On that basis, the Plaintiff sought to persuade this Court that parties’ direct contributions only be accorded 30% weightage, whilst indirect contributions be weighted heavier at 70%. On the Plaintiff’s calculations,²⁰ this would result in the ratio of 67.4 : 36.6 in the Plaintiff’s favour. Finally, on account of the fact that the Plaintiff moved out of the matrimonial home sometime in April 2017, and thereby allowing the Defendant to have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, the Plaintiff made a final upward adjustment to the Plaintiff’s proportion. This resulted in a final figure of 70:30 in the Plaintiff’s favour.

At this juncture, it would be useful to highlight, as I did here above and at the substantive hearing, that the Defendant provided no evidence or cogent basis for the uplift in the division ratio of 38:62 (on the basis of direct contributions) to the eventual ratio of 30:70 in his favour. Purely as a matter of mathematics, the Defendant was putting forward a position whereby his indirect contributions would be approximately 22:78 in his favour. This would effectively indicate that not only was he the principal breadwinner, he was also the principal homemaker.

At the hearing, the Defendant’s counsel, Mr Retnam, sought to challenge the Plaintiff’s contention for an uplift on account of her significant indirect contributions. In doing so, he sought to impress on me that both parties made equal indirect contributions.²¹ When I highlighted the mathematical impossibility of the Defendant’s position on the eventual ratio he was submitting even I were minded to accept his position on equal indirect contributions, Mr Retnam candidly submitted that the eventual ratio he was putting forward was driven primarily by the Defendant’s instructions.

I had no reason to question this submission, and given my earlier observation as to a clear lack of substantiation by the Defendant, I also had no hesitation in rejecting the Defendant’s position.

The corollary of my rejection of the Defendant’s position was whether I ought to accept the Plaintiff’s position in its totality.

Parties’ approach in dealing with the ratio of division

I would pause...