USC v USD

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Azmin Jailani
• Judgment Date: 15 September 2020
• Neutral Citation: [2020] SGFC 76
• Court: Family Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: D 4250/2017
• Year: 2020
• Published date: 22 September 2020
• Hearing Date: 30 January 2020,27 August 2019,30 July 2019
• Plaintiff Counsel: Rina Kalpanath Singh, Steffi Huang (Kalco Law LLC)
• Defendant Counsel: Liew Tuck Yin, David (David Liew Law Practice)
• Subject Matter: Family Law,Ancillary Matters,Pleadings,Party seeking to depart from reliefs prayed in Statement of Claim
• Citation: [2020] SGFC 76

District Judge Azmin Jailani: Introduction

This decision relates to the court’s determination of the ancillary matters (“AM”) for D 4250/2017 (“D 4250”).

By way of background, I granted the plaintiff-wife’s application for a judgment of judicial separation in D 4250 on 1 October 2018. The defendant-husband appealed against that decision, the full grounds of which are found in my decision in USC v USD [2019] SGFC 6 (“USC”). In USC, I had discussed the multitude of points raised by the plaintiff in respect of the defendant’s unreasonable behaviour (see, inter alia, [59] to [193] of USC). For the present purpose, it suffices to state that I was satisfied that the defendant’s cumulative conduct towards the plaintiff was objectively unsustainable for any relationship, let also his relationship with the plaintiff.

After USC was released, the defendant withdrew his appeal in respect of the judgment of judicial separation.

In addition to my decision on judicial separation, USC also dealt with the defendant’s appeals relating for two related applications – OSG 61/xxxx (“OSG 61”) and OSG 2/xxxx (“OSG 2”). OSG 61 and OSG 2 were cross applications by parties in respect of, among other things, care and control, access, and maintenance of the two children¹ of the marriage. As I had explained in USC, the interplay between D 4250, OSG 61 and OSG 2 was such that while the orders made in respect of the children in OSG 61 and OSG 2 were final orders, they were ‘temporary’ in that they may, depending on circumstances, be modified with the final ancillary orders in D 4250.

As I noted earlier, the defendant withdrew his appeal against the judgment of judicial separation, but maintained his appeal in respect of OSG 61 and OSG 2. At the conclusion of those appeals², certain appeal orders were made (the “Appeal Orders”). The Appeal Orders are relevant to these proceedings because at the hearings of the ancillary matters, parties agreed to be bound by the Appeal Orders in respect of the Children: custody³; care and control⁴; access; maintenance (to the extent that the defendant was to maintain [E] as she was under his care and control); and certain other supplementary orders relating to, among other things, parties undergoing counselling to “improve co-parenting work and the parent-child relationship”.

In light of the above, what was left to be determined for the purposes of the ancillary matters essentially related to: the identification and division of the matrimonial assets; spousal maintenance for the plaintiff, and child maintenance (to the extent the plaintiff had care and control of [T]).

After hearing parties and considering the matter, I made the following orders (and set out my broad reasons for the same): First, that the plaintiff be awarded 55% of the identified pool of matrimonial assets (with the defendant being awarded 45%); second, that the defendant pay the plaintiff monthly maintenance of $2,300 for [T];⁵ third, that the defendant pays the plaintiff monthly spousal maintenance of $2,500. Additionally, I ordered that the order of maintenance be backdated to the time the judgment of judicial separation was made (ie, 1 October 2018); and fourth, that there be certain supplementary orders to ensure harmonisation with the Appeal Orders parties agreed to be bound to. (the “AM Orders”)

After issuing my AM Orders, I invited parties to first attempt to arrive at an agreement on the consequential orders for division (ie, which specific assets are to be divided, and how they were to be divided), maintenance (ie, calculation and repayment of arrears), and costs. If parties were not able to reach an agreement, they were to submit their submissions setting out their position on the aforementioned matter.

Before the timelines for submissions had expired, the defendant filed his appeal against the AM Orders. On that basis, I now set the full grounds of my decision.

Brief Procedural History after the AM Orders

Much of parties’ backgrounds and the breakdown of their relationship has been set out in fairly extensive detail in USC. As such, I do not propose to rehash those points again. As mentioned earlier, I had considered the numerous contentions made by the plaintiff against the defendant’s conduct (including the defendant’s conduct in his application for a stay of execution pending the appeal of D 4250, OSG 61 and OSG 2). I was satisfied that the defendant’s conduct, at least vis-à-vis the plaintiff, was sufficiently wanting and clearly indicative of a irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.

I also highlighted some reservations I had with the manner in which the defendant presented his case and how he sought to leverage his position during those proceedings.⁶

For the purposes of this judgment, I first touch on what took place after the defendant filed his appeal against the AM Orders.

FC/SUM 361/20200

After filing his appeal against the AM Orders, the defendant also, as with the earlier set of orders I made, sought a stay of execution of the AM Orders pending the disposal of the appeal (vide SUM 361/2020, or “SUM 361”).

After hearing parties, I made the following orders: I granted a stay of execution of the AM Orders dealing with the identification and division of matrimonial assets. I granted a stay of execution of the AM Orders dealing with the plaintiff’s spousal maintenance on condition that the defendant pay the plaintiff the sum of $20,000; and I made no orders in respect of the defendant’s application to stay of execution of child maintenance payments for [T]. This was on the basis that first, the defendant had actually been making payments of the maintenance orders in the Appeal Orders. Second, parties were able to come to a consensus on the arrears of [T]’s maintenance for the months of February 2020 and March 2020. The upshot of this was that the children’s financial requirements, as envisaged under the AM Orders, were being met. As such, there was no real necessity to make any substantive orders on whether the AM Orders relating to [T]’s maintenance ought to be stayed. For clarity, this means that the AM Orders relating to child maintenance remain in force.

Main Issues Arising in This Decision

As alluded to above, in light of the appeal orders, the main issues for determination relate to: The identification and division of the matrimonial assets; Maintenance for the plaintiff; and Maintenance for [T].

I deal with each of these issues in turn below.

Analysis and Findings Identification, Valuation, and Division of Matrimonial Assets

Parties broad positions on the issue of division can be seen in their respective ancillary fact and position sheets.⁷

At the outset, parties were ad idem insofar as there be a division of the matrimonial home (but the proportion and manner of division was disputed).

Where parties significantly differed was the division of the matrimonial assets other than the matrimonial home. On one hand, the plaintiff sought a division of those assets.⁸ On the other hand, the defendant’s position was that each party were to keep their own assets acquired before or during the marriage in their own names.

Significantly, the defendant adopted this position because it was “in agreement with the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim”.⁹

The upshot of this was the suggestion that the plaintiff had, in her own pleadings¹⁰, prayed for such relief. Whilst the plaintiff’s counsel, Ms Huang, did not substantively dispute that the language of her pleadings suggested this, she sought to persuade this court to depart from the terms of the plaintiff’s pleadings.

After considering parties submissions, I was not inclined to accept the defendant’s submissions, and determined that I was allowed, under the circumstances of this case and on the wording of section 112(2) of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353) (“WC”), to assess the matrimonial pool of assets in its entirety for the purposes of division.

Was the Plaintiff Limited to the Reliefs as Prayed in her Statement of Claim?

I first start with the plaintiff’s statement of claim. At [7(d)] and [7(e)] of the plaintiff’s SOCA1, the plaintiff specifically prayed for the following reliefs in terms of division:

7 Relief Claimed

…

(d) Division of matrimonial home

That there be a just and equitable division of the matrimonial flat situated at and known as [Property P] (the “Matrimonial Flat”) and the matrimonial assets.

(e) Division of the matrimonial assets (aside from the matrimonial home)

Parties are to retain all other assets in their own names… (emphasis added)

I first observe that the lack of clarity in the plaintiff’s drafting was regrettable. The issue with the plaintiff’s drafting was, in my view, further exacerbated by the fact that the manner in which she pleaded her reliefs replicated Form 6 (the applicable form as stated in the Family Justice Rules (“FJR”) for a statement of claim).

At this point, it bears mentioning that the forms to be filled by parties, especially in family proceedings are, in my view, exceedingly facilitative to the point that they go into very specific detail of the information which the court requires in adjudicating the dispute. As I mentioned earlier, the plaintiff replicated the structure of Form 6¹¹, which is the required form for the statement of claim under Rule 44(a) FJR.

In section 7 of Form 6, under the heading entitled “Relief Claimed”, a clear distinction is made between, on one hand, the “division of the matrimonial home” (section 7(d)), and on the other, the “division of the matrimonial assets (other than the matrimonial home)” (section 7(e)).

The language of what the above section of Form 6 seeks for parties to apply their minds to could not be any clearer.

Each field of entry requires the party to apply their mind to a specific aspect of the proceedings to ensure...