Understanding recent political changes in Myanmar.

• Author: Hlaing, Kyaw Yin
• Position: Report

On 30 March 2011, Myanmar's ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), handed power to a new government led by President Thein Sein that had come into being in the wake of elections held in November 2010. Because all administrative and legislative bodies--both at the central and local levels--were controlled by members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), political activists and Myanmar watchers did not expect more than superficial changes under the new government. Although President Thein Sein mentioned his plan to introduce administrative and economic reforms and to launch an anti-corruption campaign in his inaugural speech doubts remained that the president would actually be able to deliver on his promises. However, on 19 August 2011, to the surprise of many people, President Thein Sein met Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), at his official residence. Two days earlier, the President had invited exiled activists to return to the country.

Aung San Suu Kyi publicly stated that she was very encouraged by her meeting with Thein Sein and that she had trust in his determination to bring about positive political change to the country. (1) The United States and some members of the European Union (EU) welcomed the meeting. On the other hand, several exiled activists had reservations about the sincerity of the President, with some going so far as to say that what Thein Sein had done was little more than a publicity stunt and that there was little difference between the new government and its predecessor.

This article, drawing on interviews with serving and retired government officials, and political activists including leading NLD members, argues that since the new government has taken office a new era of political openness has begun in Myanmar. It goes on to illustrate that in order to understand recent political changes, one should pay attention to shifts in the internal power structure of the government. However, it is not a given that Myanmar will become a full-fledged democracy any time soon. Indeed this article suggests that the country is at a critical juncture, and that the expansion of political openness in the country will depend on whether liberals within the government and those from the pro-democracy movement can work together to further political changes without prompting the country's armed forces, the tatmadaw, to stage a coup.

The Power Structure and Political Change in the SLORC/SPDC Government

The military government that ruled Myanmar between late 1988 and early 2011 was formed in response to the nation-wide pro-democracy movement against the military-dominated socialist government led by General Ne Win. Although the junta, which was initially known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and later renamed the SPDC, held multi-party elections in 1990, it refused to transfer power to the NLD even after the latter had won a landslide victory. Instead, the junta convened a decade long National Convention (NC) to adopt guidelines for a new constitution. Although opposition groups and the international community called for the transfer of power to the NLD, the SLORC ignored these calls. In fact, after the 1990 elections Myanmar's military leaders decided to defer political change for as long as possible. Political activists, on the other hand, continued to campaign for swift political change. As Huntington and many others have pointed out, democratization under an authoritarian regime might take place under the following conditions: when the regime is toppled by a social movement or seriously weakened by a crisis; when reformers from within the regime and liberals from the movement find a way to work together; or when the regime feels that it cannot survive without initiating political reform. (2)

Some activists had hoped for a split in the government and tried to identify liberal officials they could work with. Although factional struggles did take place within SLORC/SPDC, they were never intense enough to split the regime. In addition, no senior members of the military government were prepared to turn their back on the tatmadaw and side with Suu Kyi or any other pro-democracy leaders or groups. In fact, from its inception, the SLORC was dominated by hardliners and officers who were unwilling to work with groups that had toppled its predecessor. The SLORC came into being not because the generals disliked the previous government, but because they were unhappy with the chaos and instability brought about by the pro-democracy movement. Subsequently the SLORC tried to legitimize itself by delegitimizing the pro-democracy movement. In response, opposition groups, especially the NLD, tried to legitimize themselves by delegitimizing the military government. When Suu Kyi and the NLD emerged as the leader of the pro-democracy movement, the generals viewed her and her followers as enemies of the state. The junta then tried to undermine opposition groups by detaining many of its members, including Suu Kyi who was placed under house arrest for more than a decade.

The regime sought to marginalize the opposition. Military officers who had close relatives in the opposition camp were often forced to retire or were denied promotion if they did not openly distance themselves from their activist relatives. Three retired senior government officials noted that no senior military officer would have friendly relations with a member of the opposition. (3) The hostility that NLD members held against the military also made cooperation between the two sides next to impossible. As one senior government official noted:

We simply did not trust the leaders of the pro-democracy groups. They were very hostile to us. We all considered the NLD a common enemy. If Suu Kyi became the leader of the country, we at that time thought that she could, perhaps unintentionally, leak state secrets to her British husband. Some senior officials also believed that the NLD-led government could take vengeance on us. A leading member of the NLD, Kyi Maung, talked about indicting some military leaders at a Nuremberg-style tribunal. After the elections in May 1990, General Saw Maung [chairman of the SLORC] considered handing power to the NLD but senior officers were opposed. When some officials openly said that we should not transfer power to the people we did not trust, many agreed with them. Some officials said we should at least wait for a few more years before we transferred power to the NLD. General Saw Maung himself did not appear to be enthusiastic about handing power to the NLD. He just wanted to keep his promise. When many of his colleagues, including Khin Nyunt, were against handing over power to the NLD immediately, he went along with them. (4) Not surprisingly, after the elections, the junta and the opposition groups became increasingly hostile to each other.

In 1992, the Chairman of the SLORC, Senior General Saw Manng, was forced to retire after suffering a nervous breakdown and his Vice-Chairman, Senior General Than Shwe, took over as leader of the government. Than Shwe was a hardliner with the ambition to become Myanmar's paramount leader. He moved to consolidate his position by placing his loyalists in important positions in the government and by practising a policy of divide and rule in dealing with junior colleagues. In 1997 Than Shwe, in collaboration with Deputy Commander-in-Chief Maung Aye and Intelligence Chief and Secretary One of the military council General Khin Nyunt, dismissed several corrupt senior ministers and officials who were senior to him thus allowing Than Shwe to cement his position at the apex of power. Than Shwe was able to maintain his position at the top by playing off Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye against each other. He continued, however, to allow Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt to do their work freely. Maung Aye was responsible for military and economic matters while Khin Nyunt oversaw political affairs and foreign relations.

While undertaking his foreign policy duties, Khin Nyunt had a chance to interact with many foreign government officials and employees of international organizations and non-government organizations (NGOs). This experience persuaded Khin Nyunt that the military had to improve its international image if the government was to remain in power. Khin Nyunt and his associates also tried to convince political activists that if they wished to achieve political liberalization, they should work with the government. The regime then utilized political activists to reach out to Western governments. In so doing, they portrayed themselves as liberal officers who supported democratic reform. In a letter sent to a prominent political activist, a senior intelligence officer asked the addressee to try and convince the US State Department and other Western foreign ministries to work with liberals in the government. (5) Maung Aye introduced reforms within the military in an attempt to increase understanding among the officer corps concerning the problems facing Myanmar. For instance, military officers had to graduate from the National Defence College (NDC) before being promoted to the rank of colonel and above. The trainees at the NDC had to learn how to analyze the problems facing the country from different perspectives.

Despite these changes, however, neither intelligence officers nor graduates of the NDC emerged as Young Turks who were willing to fight for political reform. Although a few intelligence officers appeared to have genuinely liberal views, most only feigned liberal values when meeting with foreigners. Within the military, interviews with ten NDC graduates reveal that officials avoided being identified as liberals, for fear of being branded as supporters of the pro-democracy movement. (6) According to one senior government official: "if we acted like liberals when...