UJM v UJL
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA |
Judgment Date | 15 December 2021 |
Neutral Citation | [2021] SGCA 117 |
Court | Court of Appeal (Singapore) |
Hearing Date | 06 October 2021 |
Docket Number | Originating Summons No 21 of 2021 |
Plaintiff Counsel | Mahmood Gaznavi s/o Bashir Muhammad and Julian Martin Michael (Mahmood Gaznavi Chambers LLC) |
Defendant Counsel | Remya Aravamuthan (Remya. A Law Practice) |
Subject Matter | Civil Procedure,Appeals,Leave,Section 47 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) |
Published date | 18 December 2021 |
It is sometimes the case that matters which appear, at the first glance, to be wholly unrelated to each other are in fact deeply and inextricably intertwined. The application before us in CA/OS 21/2021 (“OS 21”) is rooted in a matrimonial dispute arising from the division of matrimonial assets and costs in a Pakistani divorce under Islamic law. The resolution of OS 21, however, hinges upon the applicable laws and principles on the grant of leave to appeal from a decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court (“AD/CA Leave Application”).
In
By way of a brief procedural overview, OS 21 arises from the
The matrimonial dispute that resulted in OS 21 concerns the division of matrimonial assets and costs, a large part of which centres on an alleged “Settlement Agreement” which we refer to in more detail below at [10].
The parties were born in Pakistan, but are now Singapore citizens. They were married in Pakistan on 3 August 1995 under Islamic marriage laws and moved soon after to Singapore in mid-August 1995. They have four sons (collectively, the “Children”), all of whom are Singapore citizens. Both parties have been living in Singapore since 1995, except for a period when the Wife lived in Pakistan from 1999–2002 and another period in the lead-up to their divorce (see the Gen Div Judgment at [2]).
The Husband is the director and shareholder of Company [A], out of which he operates as a property agent. He also works as a marketing manager with Company [B]. He had worked previously in an electronics company and an apparel business. The Wife was a housewife during her marriage to the Husband (see the Gen Div Judgment at [4]). She has been a Singapore citizen since 25 September 2007.
The Husband purchased various properties during the marriage. As at the date of the divorce, there were four properties in Singapore (see the Gen Div Judgment at [3]) and three properties in Pakistan which formed part of the pool of matrimonial assets. As referred to in the Gen Div Judgment at [83], the three properties are “R-022”, “A01” and “R228” (collectively, the “Three Properties”).
The parties were divorced on 4 May 2016 by the court in Karachi, Pakistan (see the AD Judgment at [1]). However, cracks in the marriage had been apparent since the early 2000s. In 2002, the Wife commenced a suit for the dissolution of marriage by way of
On 18 April 2019, the Wife applied to the Singapore Syariah court for
The two-page Settlement Agreement was the focal point of the parties’ dispute before both the Gen Div and the AD (see the AD Judgment at [9] and the Gen Div Judgment at [5]–[6]). The Husband claimed that the Wife should not be granted any financial relief under Ch 4A because she had agreed to the terms contained within the Settlement Agreement. The Wife disagreed. While she admitted to signing on its second page which starts with the word “
OS 21 is the latest episode in a series of protracted legal proceedings commenced originally by the Wife to seek financial relief from the Singapore court (pursuant to Ch 4A) following foreign matrimonial proceedings, namely, the parties’ divorce in Karachi, Pakistan. The majority of these prior applications (and appeals) are irrelevant to OS 21 and we therefore summarise only the key episodes in this ongoing saga. A fuller picture of the procedural history can be found in the Gen Div Judgment at [8]–[14].
For context, an applicant for financial relief under Ch 4A must show under s 121B of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”) that:
The various applications in this case broadly follow the two-stage process for the grant of financial relief as stipulated under Ch 4A.
On 7 April 2017, the Wife applied in FC/OSF 37/2017 seeking,
The Wife successfully obtained the requisite leave from the District Judge (the “DJ”) who also ordered that the Husband pay interim maintenance of $1,500 per month for the Children and the Wife (see the Gen Div Judgment at [10]).
The Husband’s appeal against the DJ’s grant of leave in HCF/RAS 1/2018 was dismissed by the Gen Div Judge on 2 May 2018. The Gen Div Judge also varied the DJ’s interim maintenance order, such that the Husband would pay interim maintenance of $1,500 per month for the Children, and not the Wife. This was on the basis that the Wife was not entitled to maintenance beyond the
The parties appeared before the Gen Div Judge again in 2019 and 2020 and, after seven days of hearing, the Gen Div Judgment was published on 28 January 2021. It concerned two matters (see the Gen Div Judgment at [1]):
The Gen Div Judge allowed OSF 1/2019 as he found it appropriate for the Singapore court to make an order for financial relief under s 121G of the Women’s Charter. He ordered the Husband to pay the Wife $2,586,088.01 in three instalments, respectively, within three, six and nine months of the date of the Gen Div Judgment (see the Gen Div Judgment at [213]). The Gen Div Judge also granted maintenance of $2,750 per month for the Children (see the Gen Div Judgment at [254]–[255]). This was to last until their eldest child graduates or ceases to study. After this point in time, the Husband was ordered to pay the Wife a sum of $1,980 per month. The Gen Div Judge made no order as to costs (see the Gen Div Judgment at [256]–[257]).
Dissatisfied, the Husband filed an appeal against the Gen Div Judge’s decision in AD/CA...
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