UGR v UGQ

JurisdictionSingapore
JudgeDarryl Soh
Judgment Date09 March 2021
Neutral Citation[2021] SGFC 21
CourtFamily Court (Singapore)
Docket NumberDivorce 1091 of 2018
Year2021
Published date13 March 2021
Hearing Date25 November 2020,30 October 2020
Plaintiff CounselSi Hoe Tat Chorng (M/s Acacia Legal LLC)
Defendant CounselStephanie Looi and Sarah Wong (M/s Optimus Chambers LLC)
Subject MatterFamily law,Ancillary matters,Division of matrimonial assets,Maintenance for wife,Maintenance for children,Custody,Care and control,Access
Citation[2021] SGFC 21
District Judge Darryl Soh: Introduction

This matter concerns ancillary reliefs arising from acrimonious divorce proceedings between the Plaintiff-Wife (“Wife”) and the Defendant-Husband (“Husband”) (collectively referred to as the “Parties”). Multiple proceedings were commenced prior to the hearing on 30 October and 25 November 2020. Orders arising from earlier proceedings provided the critical context and background between the Parties. Final orders in the divorce proceedings were made on financial matters and the child’s care on 25 November 2020. The Wife has since appealed against the whole of my decision. In these grounds, I explain my decision in detail.

Background Facts

The Parties were married in June 2014. Later in the same month, their daughter (the “Child”) was born. Both are in their mid-30s. The Husband is a United Kingdom citizen and holds an Employment Pass in Singapore. The Wife and Child are both Singapore citizens, though the Child only possesses a British passport at the time of the hearing. As at the time of issuance of these Grounds, the Child would have commenced her first year in a Primary School in the central part of Singapore. The Husband was employed throughout the marriage and is currently an executive. In contrast, a year into the marriage, the Wife ceased employment. According to her, she was effectively a full-time mother and a homemaker during the marriage. Two years later, the Parties’ relationship broke down in June 2016 and they lived in separate bedrooms. They subsequently moved into separate residences from 25 November 2016 when the Wife was made to leave the matrimonial home that the Parties were then renting. After leaving the matrimonial home, the Wife returned to employment and took up pre-school and administrative roles.

After the Parties’ moved into separate residences, legal proceedings quickly followed. It marked the start of five years of bitter litigation with numerous affidavits of child-related allegations against each other.

The Parties took out cross applications for interim custody and care and control of the Child vide OSG 220/20161 by the Husband and OSG 235/20162 by the Wife. Both OSGs were heard by the learned District Judge Michelle Elias Solomon (“DJ Elias”) and orders were made on 20 July 2017. Inter alia, the Parties were granted joint custody and shared care and control of the Child. The full list of orders made can be found at Annex 1. The learned District Judge issued detailed Grounds of Decision in UGQ v UGR [2017] SGFC 125 on 31 October 2017 (the “2017 OSG GD”), which included the relevant and material background to the Parties’ dispute at [5] – [14]. I shall adopt and refer to that background (for the period prior to 31 October 2017) for the purposes of these Grounds. Both Parties appealed against the orders made on 20 July 2017 vide DCAs 105/2017 and 106/2017 by the Husband and DCAs 110/2017 and 111/2017 by the Wife. The appeals were heard and dismissed by the learned Judicial Commissioner Tan Puay Boon on 30 April 2018.

I find it relevant to point out that after DJ Elias issued the 2017 OSG GD, the Wife filed an application for interim maintenance on 24 November 2017 vide MSS 801882/2017. The application was contested by the Husband. The application was heard and dismissed by DJ Elias on 8 February and 16 March 2018 respectively. There were also proceedings for a Personal Protection Order commenced by the Husband vide SS 466/2017 on behalf of the Child. These proceedings were subsequently withdrawn on 19 July 2017 on account of both Parties providing an undertaking to the court.

Shortly before the appeals against the orders made on 20 July 2017 were heard, the Wife commenced divorce proceedings against the Husband on 9 March 2018. The Husband subsequently filed a counterclaim on 5 April 2018. The divorce proceeded on an uncontested basis for both the claim and counterclaim. The marriage was dissolved on account that both behaved in a way that the opposing Party cannot be reasonably be expected to live with the other Party. Interim Judgment was granted on 18 September 2018 and ancillary reliefs were adjourned to be heard in Chambers.

The Parties subsequently filed several interlocutory applications. They filed for discovery and interrogatories vide SUM 2121/2019 by the Husband and SUM 3336/2019 by the Wife. In SUM 2716/2019, the Husband applied for variations to be made to the 20 July 2017 orders pertaining to the safeguarding and renewal of the Child’s passport and for the Husband to bring the Child overseas during several stipulated periods. The Parties reached an agreement on 16 September 2019 for the Husband to bring the Child to Thailand for a holiday in December 2019. However, on 11 November 2019, the Wife filed for a stay of execution of the order vide SUM 3883/2019 as she came to know that the Husband’s employment had ceased with his then-employer and was of the view that the Husband was a flight risk. The Wife’s application was subsequently heard and dismissed by DJ Elias on 26 November 2019. On 22 October 2020, shortly before the ancillary reliefs were due for hearing on 30 October 2020, the Wife applied for further interrogatories vide SUM 3201/2020 to be answered by the Husband following his change in residence. I heard the application and made no order on the Wife’s application on 30 October 2020.

Issues in Dispute and Orders Made

The following ancillary reliefs necessitated adjudication: Child’s care arrangements; Division of matrimonial assets; Wife’s maintenance; and Child’s maintenance.

After hearing the Parties’ evidence and submissions, I made the following summarised orders: The Parties were granted joint custody by consent and shared care and control of the Child. This involved a continuation of applicable orders made on 20 July 2017; The Parties were granted liberty to bring the Child out of the jurisdiction during their respective school holiday time with the Child. Similarly, I granted the Husband liberty to bring the Child to the United Kingdom every other year for the year-end Christmas and New Year holidays. Both orders were subject to travel advisories against non-essential travel issued by the Singapore government; With respect to the division of matrimonial assets, I ordered the Parties to retain their respective assets that were in their sole names; No spousal maintenance to be paid to the Wife; and The Husband to be responsible for the Child’s school fees, several specific expenses, and specified enrichment classes. If a Party wishes to enrol the Child for additional enrichment classes, that Party is to be solely responsible for those expenses. If the Child has been asked to go on an overseas trip by the school, the Parties are to share the costs of that trip equally.

The full list of orders I made on 25 November 2020 can be found at Annex 2. The Wife has appealed against all orders. I now set out my reasons for those orders in turn.

Child’s Care Arrangements

The Parties were on common ground that they be granted joint custody of the Child. This order was consequently recorded by consent.3 They however could not agree on the Child’s care and control.

Care and Control

Both Parties submitted that they individually be granted sole care and control, arguing for a departure from the shared care and control orders made on 20 July 2017.

The Husband contended that he would be the parent to provide the Child with the stability and care necessary for her continued development.4 The Child would be in a familial environment where she had essentially grown up, was accustomed to, and that he is the parent that is more willing to facilitate access and attempt to co-parent with the Wife. He emphasised that he is a more stable position financially compared to the Wife and has consistently shown himself to place the Child’s interests above all else by changing and maintaining his lifestyle towards such goals. The Husband argued that a shared care and control arrangement would effectively disrupt the Child’s education. He alleged that the Wife has a lack of concern over the Child’s education and that the Wife will not mutually respect him or cooperate with him in raising the Child.

The Wife advanced three main reasons why she ought to be granted sole care and control of the Child.5 First, that she has been the Child’s primary caregiver since birth and is more familiar with the intricacies of the Child’s care than the Husband. Second, that jurisprudence sets forth that when all things being equal, care and control of a young infant or child would usually be granted to mothers. Finally, she argued that shared care and control is not feasible as the Parties have an extremely tumultuous relationship and the lack of co-operation is likely to be harmful to the Child if the shared care arrangement subsisted.

In deliberating the appropriate care orders to be made, s. 125 of the Women’s Charter [Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed] (“the Women’s Charter”) prescribes that the paramount consideration for the court shall be the welfare of the child. Having considered the Parties’ respective submissions and affidavits, I did not agree with either Party as I was of the view that it would be in the Child’s best interests in the circumstances of this case that the Parties continue with their share care and control arrangement. Both Parties are good parents individually and they have the Child’s best interests at heart.

In TAU v TAT [2018] 5 SLR 1089 at 1095, Justice Debbie Ong observed that in considering whether shared care and control would be in the child’s welfare, the court will have to consider several factors. This included the particular child’s needs at that stage of life, the extent to which the parents are able to co-operate within such an arrangement, and whether it is easy for that child, bearing in mind his or her age and personality, to live in two homes...

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