TS Video and Another v Lim Chee Yong

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Gilbert Low Teik Seang
• Judgment Date: 31 August 2001
• Neutral Citation: [2001] SGDC 278
• Year: 2001
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Citation: [2001] SGDC 278
• Court: District Court (Singapore)

JUDGMENT:

Grounds of Decision

1. On 13 August 2001, I heard an application by the complainant to grant the respondent in PSS 39/2001, TS Video & Laser Pte Ltd, a discharge not amounting to an acquittal. The application was resisted by the respondent’s counsel who urged me to grant his client a discharge amounting to an acquittal. On 14 August 2001, I delivered my written judgement on the matter, reproduced in full as follows:

"1. The complainant, Mr Lim Chee Yong, through his solicitors, Messrs Tan Peng Chin & Partners and acting under fiat from the Public Prosecutor, instituted the following charges against the respondent, Messrs TS Video & Laser Pte Ltd:

First Charge

"You … are charged that you, on the 11^th day of May 2000 at 1 Jurong West Central 2, Jurong Point, #B1-24 Singapore 648886, at a time when copyright subsists in the Pokemon series, did sell 12 VCDs of the Pokemon series which you knew or ought reasonably to know to be infringing copies of the Pokemon series and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 136(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, Chapter 63 (1999 Revised Edition)."

Second Charge

"You … are charged that you, on the 16^th day of May 2000 at 1 Jurong West Central 2, Jurong Point, #B1-24 Singapore 648886, at a time when copyright subsists in the Pokemon series, did sell 264 VCDs of the Pokemon series which you knew or ought reasonably to know to be infringing copies of the Pokemon series and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 136(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, Chapter 63 (1999 Revised Edition)."

2. On the first day of trial yesterday, Mr Lee applied, after consulting the senior deputy public prosecutor, under section 184(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code that the respondent company be granted a discharge not amounting to an acquittal on the ground that the copyright owners in Japan, were not in a position to come to Singapore to testify because of a legal dispute with their licensee based in Hong Kong, who in turn had granted a license to the Singapore distributor (who took steps to institute the present proceedings). According to Mr Lee, this legal dispute, which is taking place in Hong Kong, may take about 6 months to resolve.

3. Mr Singh, on the other hand, contended that his client should be granted a discharge amounting to an acquittal mainly on two grounds. First, there is non-compliance with the provisions of section 136(10) of the Copyright Act owing to the delay in issuing the summons beyond the 6-month period as specified in the section and second, the delay in prosecution arising from the dispute between the copyright owner and the licensee in Hong Kong. In support of his second contention, Mr Singh submitted two Singapore cases: K Abdul Rasheed v. PP [1985] 1 MLJ 193 and Goh Cheng Chuan v. PP [1990] 3 MLJ 401. In the course of his submissions, Mr Singh also alluded to the fact that this was purely a commercial matter and in this regard, made reference to the case of Summit Holdings Ltd v. Business Software Alliance [1999] 3 SLR 197.

4. With regard to the first contention, I agreed with Mr Lee’s submission that section 136(10) of the Copyright Act does not act as a time-bar against criminal prosecutions. Section 136(10) states as follows:

"(10) If an article was seized under subsection (9) and -

(a) in proceedings brought under this section, no order is made under subsection (8) as to the article; or

(b) no such proceedings are instituted within 6 months of the seizure,

the article shall be returned to the person in whose possession it was when it was seized or, if it is not reasonably practicable to return it to that person, shall be disposed of in accordance with the law regulating the disposal of lost or unclaimed property in the hands of police authorities."

From its plain reading, it simply allows the owner of the seized items to apply for their release if the conditions in sub-sections (a) or (b) are satisfied, including if, for instance, in sub-section (b), no proceedings are instituted within 6 months of the seizure. It does not act as a time-bar against criminal prosecutions.

5. With regard to the...