Trickle-down hegemony? China's "peaceful rise" and dam building on the Mekong.

• Author: Liebman, Alex

Introduction

After its rise, will China display restrained or self-interest maximizing behaviour toward its neighbours? This question is at the heart of the propaganda line that was espoused by the Chinese leadership from 2003 until mid-2004: the theory of China's "peaceful rise" (helping jueqi). The government, anxious that smaller states on its periphery will react negatively to growing Chinese economic and military power, built a new line out of old themes, stressing that China's rise will not turn it into an aggressive hegemon who uses its power strictly to maximize its own interests. Instead, all nations will benefit in the "win-win" situation created by the Middle Kingdom's new power. While the actual term "peaceful rise" appears to have been shelved, the basic themes it encompasses have not: China continues to portray itself as a status quo power whose increasing stature will not negatively affect those around it. Nor does the apparent disappearance of the term "peaceful rise" itself diminish the importance of the analytical question: namely, how will China act towards its neighbours as it gains more power?

This article asks: how can we know whether Chinese protestations of its "peaceful rise" are more than just empty words? How can we know whether China will help its neighbours, or is actually a wolf in sheep's clothing, luring its neighbours into complacency or working them into relationships in which China is the principal beneficiary ("playing possum", in the words of one China expert)? This article suggests a framework for evaluating Chinese behaviour. Clearly, there is a need to look not only at Chinese words, but also at their actions. But which actions? This essay argues that some issue areas will prove more illuminating about future Chinese behaviour than others. After laying out the framework, it focuses on one under-studied issue in China's multilateral relationship with ASEAN countries: agreements (or lack thereof) to manage the Mekong's water resources. China's relationship with Southeast Asia is chosen principally because some analysts have asserted that China's new multilateral diplomacy and "charm offensive" (see Medeiros and Fravel 2003; Beeson 2003; Stubbs 2002) are succeeding in drawing Southeast Asia into a proto-Chinese sphere of influence. Therefore, the purpose of this article is both to lay out a framework for assessing Chinese actions as well as to call attention to an important issue often below the radar of Western experts on Asian security.

The Theory of the "Peaceful Rise"

From 2003-2004, Chinese government officials, academics, and the press promoted a new propaganda term: China's "peaceful rise". The theory was formulated explicitly to reassure countries, particularly smaller ones on its periphery, that China's increasing economic and military power will not pose a threat to them. Zheng Bijian, the dean of the influential Central Party School, agreed with an interviewer's assessment that "the concept of a 'peaceful rise' initiated by China has forcefully addresses [sic] 'the China threat theory' and the 'China collapse theory' and also allows China's neighbouring countries and various countries in the world to feel more relief". (1) While the term "peaceful rise" itself is apparently no longer in vogue, the basic ideas it encompasses continue to reflect the image China wants to project to its neighbours. Indeed, the "peaceful rise" theory itself was not particularly new, but rather a slightly extended version of Deng Xiaoping's "peace and development" line, The theory has three key points.

The first point amounts to not much more than a restatement of the standard "peace and development" line. Zheng Bijian writes that China is "both striving for a peaceful international environment in which to develop ... and also to safeguard world peace through China's development". (2) The key problems China faces are domestic, and the answer to these problems is the development of the economy. In order to develop the economy, China requires a peaceful international environment. Finally, and this point seems aimed at reassuring major powers like Japan and the United States, development is not merely an end, but a means by which to preserve peace.

Second, China will never seek hegemony. The word for hegemony in Chinese (buquua) has overwhelmingly negative connotations. For the Chinese, hegemony is not an objective description of the international distribution of power; rather it is a description of a certain kind of behaviour. Wang Jisi, an influential Chinese intellectual, has recently argued that in this sense the Chinese conception of hegemony differs from the Western version (Wang 2003). The argument of the peaceful rise theory is that, even if China builds up a large amount of military and economic power (what those in the West might objectively describe as a "hegemony"), China will never use this power in a domineering, aggressive, or dictatorial (the Chinese "hegemonic") way. Zheng Bijian writes that China will not "rely on warfare and aggression ... or group confrontation and expansion to fight for hegemony that has been taken by large countries around the world in modern times". (3) Zheng further cites the historical precedent of countries who sought hegemony (notably Japan and Germany) to argue that such policies only lead to the devastation of the country and failure. This point seems aimed primarily at smaller countries that would have more to fear from a China which sought regional dominance.

Third, the peaceful rise theory argues that increases in Chinese power, far from posing a threat to other countries, actually presents them with a "win-win" opportunity. China has mainly emphasized the potential for trade and economic growth and its willingness to open its door to imports. (4) China, building on its legacy from the Maoist days, has tried to cast itself as the champion of the developing world who cares about the well-being of the people in other countries. This "win-win" theme was reiterated by Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premiere, in his speech at the ASEAN meeting in late 2003. (5) The countries surrounding China, therefore, should welcome increases in China's power because it will allow for mutual gain.

Chu Shulong, the head of the Institute for International Strategy at Tsinghua University, argues that China should take actions to demonstrate its benign intent. These comments provide a useful starting point for the next section, which is to determine whether China's actions will match the rhetoric of the peaceful rise:

In our effort to convince others that China is not a 'threat,' we should not remain at merely talking about this matter, but instead we should do more work, pay some price and sustain some loss. For example, even if we have had a certain amount of military capability, we can hardly use the capacity to solve disputes over territory and territorial waters with other countries; we should provide more aid to other countries and regions, particularly those less developed than China, for their development; we are going to establish 'free trade areas' with ASEAN countries and regions, open our market, expand exports and even take the initiative to give assistance to some of them on preferential terms, so that they can have a share of the benefit from China's rise. These are not merely a matter of wish and writing, but of actual deeds. (6) Criteria for a Suitable Issue Test

Are such professions of Chinese intentions sincere? When describing their national strategy, the Chinese often use the phrase "hide one's capacities and bide one's time" (tao guang yang hui); are the Chinese simply waiting until they have a preponderance of power to reveal their true intentions? Or, even if intentions are pure, will the temptation in the future to gain benefits commensurate with their power simply be irresistible? To attempt an answer, we need a framework through which to evaluate Chinese actions. We need a way to distinguish actions that would confirm the "peaceful rise" theory from behaviour betraying more realpolitik intentions. Which issue areas are most likely to reveal Chinese intentions or tendencies in the future? The best issues to evaluate whether today's words will guide tomorrow's actions are those that satisfy as many of these six criteria as possible.

1) Importance: The issue is of substantial importance to both China and to the Southeast Asian countries.

2) Zero-Sum: The issue cannot be explained away as a "win-win" situation, but rather clearly has significant zero-sum elements.

3) Costs: There is some cost to China for pursuing a friendly and cooperative policy.

4) Power: The other countries in the region have no effective means to block an aggressive or unfriendly Chinese policy on the issue.

5) Central Control: The policy in question is not the result of a province out of central control; Beijing either created the policy or has the power to change it.

6) Irreversibility: Cooperative and friendly actions on the issue impose substantial costs to reverse or change policy at a later date.

First, is the issue of substantive importance? Obviously, sacrifices on trivial issues are relatively easy to make, or can be rolled into larger deals with other compromises. We need to find an issue of enough importance that it cannot be bargained away or solved by linking with other issues.

Second, the Chinese argue that their rise will create a "win-win" distribution of benefits for Southeast Asian countries. But even in "win-win" situations, one side is likely to get more than another--trade, for example, may be mutually beneficial, but the terms of a trade deal will still be fought over to get as much of the pie as possible. In a dispute over new benefits in which one side gets 99 per cent and the other one per cent, it is unlikely that the side which gets less would characterize the situation as "win-win". To gain insight about how much of the pie the...