TQU v TQT
Jurisdiction | Singapore |
Judge | Judith Prakash JA |
Judgment Date | 25 February 2020 |
Neutral Citation | [2020] SGCA 8 |
Court | Court of Appeal (Singapore) |
Docket Number | Civil Appeal No 228 of 2018 (Summons Nos 67 and 78 of 2019) |
Year | 2020 |
Published date | 28 February 2020 |
Hearing Date | 03 January 2020,25 September 2019 |
Plaintiff Counsel | The appellant in person |
Defendant Counsel | the respondent in person |
Subject Matter | Family Law,Matrimonial assets,Division |
Citation | [2020] SGCA 8 |
The sole issue on appeal appears straightforward: how should the court achieve a just and equitable division of matrimonial assets? Courts have long strived to reach a fair outcome on the facts of each case, and the factual matrix of the marriage before us has complicated the matter and made our task more challenging.
This is the appeal of the appellant husband (“the Husband”) against the decision of the High Court judge (“the Judge”) to award 75% of the matrimonial assets to the respondent wife (“the Wife”). Having heard the submissions of the parties, we reserved judgment. We now furnish our decision and the accompanying reasons.
BackgroundThe Husband and the Wife were married on 6 March 1990.1 Interim judgment of divorce (“IJ”) was granted on 24 March 2016.2 They have three children, a daughter and two sons, who were born in 1993, 1996 and 1998 respectively.3
Legally speaking, this was a marriage of 26 years. In reality, it is not disputed that the marriage broke down sometime in 2001, 11 years after the parties were married. In fact, the grant of IJ in 2016 was pursuant to the Wife’s third application for divorce; her first application in December 2001 and second application in December 2010 had both been dismissed. That the marriage broke down sometime in 2001 is also evident from the numerous legal proceedings the parties have been embroiled in, including a criminal trial.
We raise this to highlight that although this was a long marriage, the facts relating to the breakdown of the marriage were highly unusual. First, as mentioned, the marriage broke down in 2001 even though IJ was granted only in 2016. Second, there was a negative value in the Wife’s indirect contributions (see [130] to [132]). Third, the Wife herself acknowledged the absence of indirect contribution from her to the family from March 2010. We discuss the implications of the Wife’s conduct below (at [128] to [134]).
The Husband is a medical doctor. He began his career with the Ministry of Health in 1989, until he paid off his bond and set up a clinic as a sole proprietorship (“the Clinic”) in April 1991, where he worked as the resident doctor until it closed down in 2003. The Wife, who was then working as an accountant, quit her job to work in the Clinic from the time it was set up until 2001. In 2001, the parties also set up a bubble tea shop within the same premises as the Clinic to generate income on the side, although this closed down within a year.
In 1989, prior to the marriage, the Husband’s father passed away. It is not disputed that he was generous with the Husband and gave assets to the Husband during his lifetime and by his will. These included 500,000 shares and 35,000 shares in two family companies, “TQA” and “TQB”, respectively. In 1993, during the marriage, the Husband incorporated a company named “TQCDE” and transferred 499,909 of his 500,000 TQA shares and all 35,000 of his TQB shares to TQCDE.4 The Husband held approximately 90% of the 100,000 shares in TQCDE, while the Wife held approximately 10%. The Husband’s mother held one of the 100,000 shares. The Husband’s mother passed away in 2000 and, according to the Husband, he inherited even more assets upon her death. TQCDE was eventually liquidated in 2014. By then, the Husband’s two sisters had become shareholders of TQCDE. When TQCDE was liquidated, its shares in TQA and TQB were distributed to its shareholders according to their shareholding at that time. Both the Husband and the Wife thereafter held shares in TQA and TQB directly.
The Wife left the matrimonial home on 1 September 2001. She filed her first divorce action on 14 December 2001 and, two weeks later, took the two sons to live with her. The first divorce application was dismissed in 2005, whereupon the Wife moved back into the family home with the two sons. Less than a year later, she moved out again and never moved back to live with the family. The two sons were shuttled between the two homes until March 2010, when they moved back in with the Husband, and there they have stayed. The Wife’s second divorce action was filed on 27 December 2010 and dismissed in February 2015. The third divorce action, filed less than two weeks later, led to the grant of IJ and the ancillary matters proceeding below.
The parties’ submissions and the decision belowDuring the marriage, the parties acquired properties in Singapore, China and Malaysia. The source of funds for these acquisitions is heavily disputed. According to the Husband, the properties were acquired with money given to him by, or inherited from, his parents.5 The properties could not have been acquired with income from the Clinic as the Clinic was barely profitable while it was in operation.6 Most of the properties therefore do not qualify as matrimonial assets and should be excluded from division. The Husband submitted that the Wife should only be awarded 3% of the properties he alleged were matrimonial assets.7
On the other hand, the Wife alleged that the properties were acquired with income earned from the Clinic.8 As this was a long marriage of 26 years, she submitted that the starting point should be equal division of the matrimonial assets.9 She submitted that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband for his conduct and failure to disclose assets, and she should be awarded 67% of the matrimonial assets.10
The parties appeared before the Judge on 24 September 2018. In his decision in
The parties returned before the Judge on 21 January 2019 because they could not agree on a draft order. On 28 January 2019, the parties signed a draft order (“the Draft Order”) listing the assets to be sold,11 which were identified as:
These were the assets the Judge found to make up the matrimonial assets. This list did not include a property that the Husband used to own at Pender Court (“the Pender Court property”) even though the Judge found that it was a matrimonial asset, as it had been sold in a collective sale in November 2010: GD at [9].
The parties’ cases on appeal The Husband raises several issues in this appeal:
The Husband submits that the Judge should have used the classification methodology. He submits that the value of the foreign properties and the Singapore...
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