TLS v TLT

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Suzanne Chin
• Judgment Date: 06 January 2016
• Neutral Citation: [2016] SGFC 30
• Court: Family Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Divorce No. 421 of 2014
• Published date: 22 March 2016
• Year: 2016
• Hearing Date: 02 December 2015,23 December 2015,01 December 2015
• Plaintiff Counsel: Ms Thian Wen Yi (M/s Harry Elias Partnership LLP)
• Defendant Counsel: Mr Kevin Lee and Ms Janice Yuen (M/s Wnlex LLC)
• Subject Matter: Ancillary Matters Division of Assets Care and control maintenance for wife
• Citation: [2016] SGFC 30

District Judge Suzanne Chin: Introduction

This is my judgement in respect of ancillary orders made in the divorce proceedings between the Plaintiff husband and the Defendant wife. The parties were married on 11 February 2006 and there are 3 sons from the marriage of ages 8, 6 and 4. The Plaintiff commenced divorce proceedings on 27 January 2014 and the Defendant filed a defence and counterclaim on 10 March 2014. Eventually, the parties proceeded on an uncontested basis and Interim Judgement was granted on 5 August 2014 on the counterclaim on the grounds of the Husband’s unreasonable behaviour.

When the matter came for hearing before me, the parties indicated that they had reached consent on issues of custody and the children’s maintenance. I recorded consent orders on these issues. After hearing from the parties on the other disputed issues, I made orders as follows: 2. It is further ordered that:

(i) care and control of the three children shall be granted to the Plaintiff with access to the Defendant as follows: (a) weekly from 9am on Sunday to 9pm on the Monday; (b) on alternate public holidays from 9am to 9pm starting with Christmas 2015. This holiday access is to supersede weekly access. (c) on even years commencing with 2016, the 2nd half of the March, May/June, September and November/December holidays and on odd years commencing from 2017, the 1st half of March, May/June, September and November/December holidays. This holiday access is to supersede weekly access. (d) on even years, the Defendant shall be entitled to have dinner with the children from 6pm to 10pm on the eve of the children’s birthdays as well as on her own birthday. On odd years, the Defendant shall be entitled to have dinner access with the children from 6pm to 10pm on the children’s birthdays as well as on her birthday. (e) on odd years, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to have dinner with the children from 6pm to 10pm on the eve of the children’s birthdays as well as on his own birthday. On odd years, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to have dinner access with the children from 6pm to 10pm on the children’s birthdays as well as on his birthday. (f) All issues relating to education and medical in relation to the children shall be decided upon jointly.

(ii) At the start of each access session, the Plaintiff is to drop the children off at the Defendant’s residence and the Defendant is to send the children back to the Plaintiff’s residence at the end of the access session.

(iii) Parties shall not take children overseas except during their access times and shall only do so upon providing to the other no less than 14 day’s notice of their intention to do so together with a copy of the relevant itinerary of overseas travel and contact details while away. Where the Defendant is taking the children overseas, the Plaintiff shall provide the children’s passports to the Defendant no later than 5 days before the date of departure and the Defendant shall return the passports to the Plaintiff no later than 5 days from the date of arrival back to Singapore.

(iv) The order of court dated 2 September 2015 is hereby discharged and the Indonesian and NZ passports of all three children are to be handed by the Defendant Counsel to the Plaintiff within 7 days of this order. In addition, the Defendant shall handover to the Plaintiff, the following documents for the children: (a) birth certificates; (b) Entry and embarkation passes; (c) copies of school certificates and school reports.

3. In full and final settlement of all issues pertaining to the division of matrimonial assets: (a) the matrimonial flat at xxx and the shophouse at xxx shall be sold on the open market within six (6) months of the date of Final Judgement and the net sale proceeds, after repayment of the outstanding mortgage and interest, costs and expenses relating to the sale including agent’s commission, shall be divided in the proportion of 50% to the Defendant and 50% to the Plaintiff. There shall be joint conduct of sale of both properties (b) The Defendant shall have the first option to purchase the Plaintiff’s interest in the matrimonial home at the agreed market value of $1,850,000 less the outstanding mortgage and term loan as at the date of transfer and shall notify the Plaintiff of her intention to do so within one (1) month from the date of this order. The parties shall agree to have the Plaintiff’s interests transferred to the Defendant on such terms as may be agreed upon to give effect to paragraph 3(a) above. (c) The Plaintiff shall have the first option to purchase the Defendant’s interest in the shophouse at the agreed market value of $2,200,000 less the outstanding mortgage as at the date of transfer and shall notify the Defendant of his intention to do so within one (1) month from the date of this order. The parties shall agree to have the Plaintiff’s interests transferred to the Defendant on such terms as may be agreed upon to give effect to paragraph 3(a) above. (d) That the monies in the OCBC Joint Current Account and UOB Joint current Account no xxx be transferred to the Plaintiff and the bank accounts closed thereafter. (e) The Registrar or Deputy Registrar of the Family Justice Courts under section 31 of the Family Justice Act (Act 27 of 2014) is empowered to execute, sign or indorse all necessary documents relating to matters contained in this order on behalf of either party should either party fail to do so within seven (7) days of written request being made to the party. (f) Each of parties are to retain all of the other assets held in their names. 4. There shall be no maintenance payable by the Plaintiff for wife maintenance. 5. Liberty to apply.

The Defendant has appealed against my orders relating to care and control and access to the 3 children, division of matrimonial property and maintenance for the wife. I now set forth the reasons for my decision.

Brief Background

The Plaintiff who is 42 years old is a citizen of both New Zealand and Argentina and a permanent resident of Singapore and Australia while the Defendant is an Indonesian citizen holding permanent residence status in Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. The Defendant is 40 years old.

Both parties are trained and practicing dentists and met in New Zealand in 2002 when they were both attending dental school. They graduated in 2007 but were married in 2006 before completing university. Shortly thereafter the eldest child was born and in September 2008, the Defendant came to Singapore with the eldest child. The Plaintiff joined them in January 2009 and the parties obtained Singapore residency in 2010.

In May 2014, the Plaintiff moved out of the matrimonial home as the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to a point where there were frequent quarrels. The Defendant remains at the matrimonial home with the 3 children while the husband rented an apartment within walking distance of the matrimonial home.

Care and Control and Access Position of the parties

It is to be noted that on the 4 March 2015, the parties had entered into various interim orders by consent whereby parties had agreed that interim care and control of the children would be granted to the Defendant with specified interim access to the Plaintiff. Through written submissions via their respective counsel, both parties proposed their positions on this issue but during the hearing, both took modified positions.

The Defendant was proposing shared care and control but wanted to have the children only on weekends. Initially she indicated that she would want to have them from Thursday after school till Monday morning but during the hearing, her counsel notified the court that she had changed her position and only wanted the children from Sunday 9am to Monday 9pm. While she contended that she had always been actively involved in taking care of all 3 children, she explained that the responsibility of having to deal with them had affected her work and consequently her ability to provide for the children financially. She also had difficulties with retaining domestic helpers and had in the past taken the children to Indonesia to be cared for by her family. It was for this reason that she was asking that the Plaintiff take over the care of the children during the week. This would allow her to concentrate on her work and she could then spend time with the children on the weekend.

The Plaintiff was agreeable to having the children with him during the week but did not accept the Defendant’s initial proposal of having the children from Thursday to Sunday of every week. He asserted that this arrangement would result in him having very little “fun” time to spend with the children. He pointed out that the Defendant’s proposal clearly showed that she was abdicating all of her responsibilities towards supporting the children’s schoolwork and was more concerned with having weekend “fun” time with the children. Upon being advised by Defendant counsel at the hearing of the Defendant’s changed position on access from Sunday 9am to Monday 9pm, the Plaintiff through counsel argued that this should not be a weekly arrangement. He also changed his earlier position on shared care and control to one of sole care and control arguing that this was more appropriate based on the Defendant’s proposed access arrangements.

The Law

Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122) states as follows:

“ Where in any proceedings before any court, the custody or upbringing of an infant or administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant or the application of the income thereof is in question, the court, in deciding that question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration and save insofar as...