TJP v TJQ

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Eugene Tay
• Judgment Date: 20 November 2015
• Neutral Citation: [2015] SGFC 148
• Court: Family Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: MSS 1389/2015
• Year: 2015
• Published date: 15 January 2016
• Hearing Date: 04 June 2015,14 May 2015
• Plaintiff Counsel: Mr Che Wei Chin (M/s Central Chambers Law Corporation
• Defendant Counsel: Respondent in person
• Subject Matter: Family Law,Variation of Maintenance Order,s72 of Women's Charter
• Citation: [2015] SGFC 148

District Judge Eugene Tay: Introduction

The complainant (“TJP”) in MSS 1389/2015 (“this Application”) is the ex-husband of the respondent (“TJQ”). This appeal arises out of my decision to dismiss this Application by TJP against TJQ under section 72 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353) (“the Women’s Charter”) to vary the following maintenance orders given by District Judge xxx (“DJ xxx”) on 16 December 2014:- EMO 2031/2014, which was ordered pursuant to TJQ’s application in MSS 3974/2014 under section 71 of the Women’s Charter for enforcement of maintenance order VO 134/2014 and EMO 446/2014 both dated 25 March 2014 (collectively, “the March 2014 Orders”); and VO 537/2014, which was ordered pursuant to TJP’s application in MSS 3980/2014 under section 72 of the Women’s Charter to vary the March 2014 Orders.

For ease of reference, EMO 2031/2014 and VO 537/2014, which were encapsulated in a single order of court, will collectively be referred to as “the Current Orders”.

Background

The Current Orders are as follow:- VO 134/2014 and EMO 446/2014 dated 25 March 2014 is varied such that [TJP] shall pay [TJQ] $2,800.00 per month ($1,000 for [TJQ] and $1,800 for xxx) for 2 months on 1 January 2015 and 1 February 2015. The monthly maintenance of $4,000 ($1,500 for [TJQ] and $2,500 for xxx) shall be restored on 1 March 2015 and be payable by [TJP] on the 1st day of every month thereafter. [TJP] pay to [TJQ] arrears of $15,500 as at 11.12.14 in monthly instalments of $1,000 with effect [sic] 1st April 2015 and thereafter on the last day of the month. Payments are to be made directly into [TJQ]’s POSB bank account no. xxxx. [TJP] shall show proof of maintenance payments by 4pm at the Maintenance Mediation Chambers (Level 2 Family Court) as follows: $5,000 ($4,000 towards current maintenance and $1,000 towards arrears) on 2 April 2015. $5,000 ($4,000 towards current maintenance and $1,000 towards arrears) [sic] on 4 May 2015. $5,000 ($4,000 towards current maintenance and $1,000 towards arrears) on 2 June 2015. $5,000 ($4,000 towards current maintenance and $1,000 towards arrears) on 2 July 2015. $5,000 ($4,000 towards current maintenance and $1,000 towards arrears) on 4 August 2015. $5,000 ($4,000 towards current maintenance and $1,000 towards arrears) on 2 September 2015. If [TJP] fails to show any of the above payments, he shall serve 3 days’ imprisonment for each non-payment.

Just over three (3) months after DJ xxx had passed the Current Orders on 16 December 2014, TJP took out this Application on 30 March 2015. He sought a reduction in the existing monthly maintenance payments and monthly instalment payments towards arrears (as stated at [4] above) to a combined figure of $1,800.00 a month for both monthly maintenance and monthly instalment payments towards arrears.

I should state that this Application was initially fixed before me on 14 May 2015, together with the following three (3) applications: MSS 900/2015, being the application taken out on 2 March 2015 by TJQ against TJP under section 71 of the Women’s Charter to enforce VO 537/2014; MSS 965/2015, being the application taken out on 4 March 2015 by the parties’ adult son xxx (“xxx”) against TJP under section 71 of the Women’s Charter to enforce maintenance order VO 539/2014 given on 16 December 2014 by DJ xxx; and MSS 1390/2015, being the application taken out on 30 March 2015 by the TJP against xxx under section 72 of the Women’s Charter to vary maintenance orders VO 539/2014 and EO 2032/2014 given on 16 December 2014 by DJ xxx, both orders of which were similarly encapsulated in a single order of court.

At this point, I should also state that at the time of the hearing of this Application, TJP’s current monthly maintenance obligations towards TJQ, xxx as well as another minor child from TJP’s marriage to TJQ, namely xxx (“xxx”) (including instalment of arrears) stands at a total of $7,800.00 a month, based on the following orders: Under the Current Orders – monthly maintenance for TJQ and xxx at $4,000.00 a month ($1,500.00 for TJQ and $2,500.00 for xxx) plus instalment of arrears at $1,000.00 a month (sub-total - $5,000.00 a month); and Under VO 539/2014 and EO 2032/2014 – monthly maintenance for xxx at $1,800.00 a month plus instalment of arrears at $1,000.00 a month payable to xxx (sub-total - $2,800.00 a month). [Total (a) plus (b): $7,800.00 a month]

I first heard this Application on 14 May 2015 and 4 June 2015, and dismissed the same. I proceeded to hear MSS 1390/2015 on 29 June 2015 and 20 July 2015, and dismissed the same. (At the time of the writing to this decision, TJP had on 31 July 2015 filed an appeal against the dismissal of MSS1390/2015 under HCF/DCA 131/2015, wherein I had rendered my grounds of decision at [2015] SGFC 138). I then heard MSS 900/2014 and MSS 965/2015 on 20 July 2015, and gave my orders for both on 31 July 2015.

On 18 June 2015, being the last day for an appeal to be filed, TJP’s solicitors attempted twice to file the Notice of Appeal and the other necessary documents (“the Appeal Documents”). Unfortunately, in both attempts, the documents (“the Appeal Documents”). Unfortunately, in both attempts, the Appeal Documents were rejected as the incorrect forms were used and there was incorrect reference to the Rules of Court instead of the Family Justice Rules. When TJP’s solicitors attempted to file the Appeal Documents a third time on 19 June 2015 together with a request for a back-dating of the Notice of Appeal, the Appeal Documents were rejected as they were filed out of time, since the deadline for filing as 18 June 2015.

TJP’s solicitors then applied to the Family Division of the High Court for extension of time to file the Appeal Documents. On 20 August 2015, the Learned Judicial Commissioner xxx granted TJP extension of time of one (1) day to file the Appeal Documents. That same day, the Appeal Documents were successfully filed.

Applicable law

Section 72 of the Women’s Charter states:

“72(1) On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly allowance under this Part and on proof of a change in the circumstances of that person, his wife or child, or for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court, the court by which the order was made may rescind the order or vary it as it thinks fit.”

It is trite that an applicant who seeks a downward variation of a maintenance order must prove an adverse material change in his financial circumstances (AMY v AYL and another appeal [2014] SGCA 46 at [23], and Chua Chwee Thiam v Lim Annie [1989] 1 SLR(R) 426) at [6]). However, variation would be disallowed if the adverse change in circumstances is self-induced (Toh Eng Foong v Chew Cheng Moi, Divorce Petition No. 2181 of 1997, District Court (unreported), and Peh Chui Choo v Kuah Peng Ah [2000] 4 SLR 110). Further, it should be emphasised that the change relied upon by the applicant must be an event or circumstances that is new and which occurred after the grant of the latest order, which in this case would be the Current Orders. Naturally, the burden of proving material adverse change in circumstances is on the applicant.

Apart from proof of material change in circumstances, the other factor under section 72 of the Women’s Charter that the court would consider is whether there is “other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court.” Insofar as this factor is concerned, the court in AGT v AGV [2010] SGDC 162 had pointed out at [18] and [20] as follows:- “18 There is no definition of the words “for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court” in Section 72. A perusal of case law shows that in referring to this phrase, the court had possibly (as there is no real case law on point) considered as “good cause”: a whether the parties had a subsequent agreement on the amount of maintenance to be paid notwithstanding the maintenance order made in court (see pp 4-16 of R1 Lai Ching Kin v Ng Chin Chye [2001] SGDC 228 b whether there was a delay on the enforcing party’s...