The tyranny of geography: Vietnamese strategies to constrain China in the South China Sea.

• Author: Thayer, Carlyle A.

This article analyses Vietnamese strategies to constrain China in the South China Sea. It tests Brantly Womack's theory of asymmetry as a framework for analysing bilateral relations. Mature asymmetry exists when the weaker state gives deference to the more powerful state in return for the stronger state's recognition of the weaker state's autonomy. Vietnam attempts to achieve this balance through a process of "struggle and cooperation" with China on key issue areas. Vietnam pursues three strategies to manage its relations with China: codification of bilateral relations through high-level visits by party and state leaders; enmeshment of China in a web of cooperative relations including economic ties: and self-help, particularly military modernization. This article analyses the bilateral mechanisms that structure political, economic and defence relations. The party mechanisms include summit meetings, exchange visits by party commissions and ideological seminars. State-to-state relations are managed by a Joint Steering Committee at deputy prime minister level and comprise a dense network of ministerial exchanges. Defence relations are managed at ministerial level and include senior high-level visits and a range of defence cooperation activities including joint ship patrols and naval port visits. The article concludes with a discussion of tensions arising from territorial and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. In summary, the "tyranny of geography" dictates to Vietnam that it judiciously apply the levers of cooperation and straggle through various party state, military and multilateral structures in order to better manage its relations with China.

Keywords: China, Vietnam, asymmetry, South China Sea, autonomy.

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Ever since the Vietnamese nation emerged as separate entity in the first millennium, it has had to contend with "the tyranny of geography". Vietnam shares a common border with China, its giant neighbour to the north. Even today, with a population of 89 million, Vietnam ranks as a middle-sized Chinese province. As a major study by Brantly Womack notes, the bilateral relationship has been embedded in a structure of persistent asymmetry throughout recorded history. (2)

This article focuses on how Vietnam's leaders manage relations with a rising China. Womack's theory of asymmetry provides a useful framework for analysing this relationship. Womack argues that "disparities in capacities create systemic differences in interests and perspectives between stronger and weaker sides". (3) The larger power always looms as a bigger concern for the weaker than the reverse. This structural factor results in excessive attention to the bilateral relationship on the part of the weaker state because more is at risk. The result, Womack concludes, is that weaker states are "prone to paranoia". (4) Conversely, the stronger power is less attentive to the details of the bilateral relationship with a weaker state. These contrasting views often lead to misperception.

Womack argues that Sino-Vietnamese hostility over Cambodia in the 1980s (which he terms "hostile asymmetry") led to a stalemate when both sides realized that they could not prevail. This led to a period of negotiated normalization (1990-99) in which both parties came to recognize and accept the interests of the other. Normalcy, according to Womack, does not alter the asymmetric nature of relations; but it ushers in a new phase that he characterizes as normal or mature asymmetry. According to Womack, "[n]ormalcy might be called 'mature asymmetry' because it is grounded in a learning experience and it has the capacity to be long term and stable". (5) In other words, both parties adopt mutual expectations of the other's behaviour. The stronger expects deference, while the weaker expects that its autonomy will be acknowledged.

Mature asymmetric relations are kept peaceful by careful management by both parties. Womack identifies a number of methods to manage bilateral relations. (6) One method is to rely on past precedent to shape common expectations of how the bilateral relationship should proceed. Another method is through "diplomatic ritual" or the exchange of high-level delegations, through which each party reassures the other. For example, Vietnam can be expected to offer assurances to China that its power will be respected and not challenged; in return Vietnam can expect assurance from China that its autonomy will not be violated.

A third method for managing bilateral relations is to remove contentions issues from the political front burner. This can be done by reformulating the issues in dispute in order to stress common interests. For example, territorial disputes can be reformulated as a border control issue designed to promote trade. Or contentious issues can be relegated to the purview of specialist working groups for resolution. Both parties can also buffer their relations through common membership in multilateral associations and adherence to international agreements. The weaker party also has the option of joining other smaller states in a regional organization or allying with a third party.

This article reviews the structural dynamics of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the current period of mature asymmetry. It will examine the key bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that assist in managing Sino-Vietnamese relations and the challenges posed by territorial disputes in the South China Sea to the stability of mature asymmetric relations.

Key Bilateral Mechanisms

This section provides an overview of the structure of bilateral relations involving party-to-party, state-to-state and military-to-military relations. (7)

Political Relations

In March 1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) adopted a sixteen-character guideline calling for "long-term, stable, future-orientated, good-neighbourly and all-round cooperative relations". In June 2008, following another summit of party leaders in Beijing, bilateral relations were raised to that of a strategic partnership, and a year later this was upgraded to a strategic cooperative partnership. These diplomatic expressions provide the framework for the conduct of bilateral relations.

Vietnam and China hold regular summit meetings of their party leaders. These meetings provide the opportunity for wide-ranging discussions and serve as an impetus for the resolution of various outstanding issues. Party-to-party relations are cemented by the frequent exchange of party delegations from Central Committee Departments, administrative units, and specialists on socialist ideology. For example, the VCP and CCP inaugurated an annual series of seminars on party ideology in 2005. The sixth, and most recent seminar, was held in Hanoi in September 2010. In sum, party-to-party ties have been used to identify common ground between former antagonists.

In 2000, a summit meeting of state presidents from China and Vietnam codified their bilateral relations in a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century. This document has served as the framework for long-term state-to-state relations up to the present. In 2006, in a major development, Vietnam and China set up a Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation at deputy prime ministerial level to coordinate all aspects of their relationship. The Steering Committee meets on an annual basis alternating between capital cities. The first meeting was held in November 2006, the second in January 2008, the third in March 2009 and the fourth in June-July 2010. At the third meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, Vietnam and China agreed to set up a hotline to deal with urgent issues, such as clashes in the South China Sea.

Vietnam and China initiated their first defence contacts since the 1979 border war in 1992. In April 2005, they initiated their first annual defence security consultations; and in November 2010 they held their first Strategic Defence Security Dialogue in Hanoi. (8)

As early as June 1992, immediately after the normalization of relations with China, the third plenum of the VCP Central Committee concluded that political adversaries could both cooperate and struggle (hop tac va dau tranh) while maintaining relations of peaceful coexistence. (9) In July 2003, the VCP Central Committee's eighth plenum redefined its ideological approach to interstate relations with all countries by adopting the concepts doi tac (object of cooperation) and doi tuong (object of struggle). In other words, Vietnam has come to view its relations with China (and the United States) as containing elements of both cooperation to advance national interests and struggle when Vietnam's national interests were adversely affected. This ideological dialectic provides the rationale for Vietnam's persistent attempts to stand up to China over South China Sea territorial disputes while at the same time pursuing a diplomatic strategy of emphazing convergent interests.

Vietnam pursues three strategies in its relations with China. First, it utilizes high-level party, state and military visits as diplomatic tools to codify its relations with China. Vietnam has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreements and treaties in an effort to quarantine contentious issues from intruding on and negatively affecting other areas of cooperation and to make Chinese behaviour more predictable and less likely to harm Vietnam's national interests.

High-level meetings have resulted in the adoption of guidelines to regulate bilateral relations and set deadlines for lower officials to settle particular disputes. A prime example may be found in Vietnam's approach to managing border disputes with China. (10) Vietnam stresses the legacy of close relations in the past and the gains of mutual benefit as they seek to overcome contemporary differences. Vietnam obtained Chinese agreement to detach these issues from high-level...