The Redwood Tree Pte Ltd v CPL Trading Pte Ltd

• Judge: Leslie Chew
• Judgment Date: 26 June 2009
• Neutral Citation: [2009] SGDC 204
• Citation: [2009] SGDC 204
• Published date: 29 July 2009
• Court: District Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Aloysius Leng (AbrahamLow LLC)
• Defendant Counsel: Ian Chang (Aptus Law Corporation)

26 June 2009

District Judge Leslie Chew:

Background

1. This is a case where the Plaintiffs are suing the Defendants for money had and received in the sum of $ 23,350 being monies paid as ‘good faith deposit’ towards securing a tenancy of 143/143A/143B East Coast Road, Singapore (‘the Tenancy’) from the Defendants.

2. The Plaintiffs’ case is that, pursuant to their intention to take up the Tenancy, they signed the Letter of Intent dated 16 Sep 2008 (‘the Letter of Intent”) for the Tenancy and returned the same to the Defendants. The Plaintiffs then say that the Defendants had however, varied the tenancy terms by inserting a new clause in the Letter of Intent, which the Plaintiffs had not agreed to.

3. Against the above backdrop, the Plaintiffs asserted that there was consequently, “…no agreement between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants on the Letter of Intent…” – see paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim. Even if there was agreement between parties on the Letter of Intent, it is at least doubtful whether or not there was an agreement to lease or merely an agreement to agree to lease. If there was agreement on the Letter of Intent, the parties were to execute a formal tenancy within 14 days of 8 Sep 2009 – that was a term of the Letter of Intent. As presently, put before the court, however, the Plaintiffs have unequivocally premised the present action on there being ‘no agreement’, i.e. there is no contract between parties.

4. It is manifestly clear from the Plaintiffs’ statement of claim that the Plaintiffs seek a declaration that there was no contract though the remedy they seek was cast in terms of the Letter of Intent being ‘null and void’. They then claimed for the return of the ‘good faith deposit’ of $23,540. This, as the Plaintiffs themselves recognized at paragraph 3 of their Statement of Claim, is a claim based on ‘money had and received by the Defendants to the use of the Plaintiffs.’

5. Based on the facts of the case as I have set out in the preceding paragraphs, I was of the view that this court may not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. Accordingly, first at a Pre-trial conference on 20 May 2009 and again at the Confirmatory Pre-trial conference on 26 May 2009, I had given Counsel notice that if the trial should proceed on 18 June i.e. there is no amicable resolution of the matter by then, I would order a trial of the preliminary issue as to whether this court had the jurisdiction to hear and try this action.

6. On 18 June 2009, when the matter came up for hearing, I first saw Counsel in chambers to seek clarification as to whether they had amongst themselves considered the matter of the court’ s jurisdiction. They both indicated that they had and both had reached the conclusion that they thought the court had the jurisdiction to hear and try the case. In view of Counsel’s position I indicated to Counsel that notwithstanding their views, as the matter of the court’s jurisdiction is of fundamental importance, I would direct the trial of the matter of the court’s jurisdiction as a preliminary issue first. If I find that the court has the jurisdiction, then and only then will the court hear evidence on the merits.

7. Arising from the above, I went into open court to explain my position so that the parties would have the benefit of hearing my position themselves. Upon Counsel’s application I also made the following directions in open court:

(1) Counsel are to be prepared to make submission on the following issue:

“Does the District Court have the jurisdiction to hear a claim based on money had and received where there is no contract and the Plaintiffs are seeking an equitable remedy for the return of monies paid over to the Defendants?”

(2) The matter is stood down to 10 am 19 June 2009 whereupon the court will hear submissions on the abovementioned preliminary issue.

(3) Witnesses are dispensed with for tomorrow’s hearing.

8. On 19 June 2009, Counsel returned to Court. When Counsel tendered their written submissions, I noted that Defendant Counsel, after researching the matter overnight, had in fact changed his position on behalf of the Defendants. The thrust of the Defendants’ submission on 19 June 2009 was that in fact this court does not have the jurisdiction to hear and try the present action. Having heard the oral submissions of both Counsel on 19 June and having read their written submissions which they both also tendered on 19 June 2009, I now give my decision.

My Decision

9. As I have already mentioned, the Plaintiff’s case is based on a claim for ‘money had and received’. It is premised on their claim that there is no contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. That is the crux of the matter.

10. Once the claim is properly cast in the correct framework, it is not with respect, too difficult to ascertain whether the court has the jurisdiction to hear and try the case. The general jurisdiction of the District Court in civil matters is of some importance since it deals with the majority of civil cases in Singapore. In dealing with the present case, therefore, I will also deal with the question of jurisdiction in the District Court generally.

The Jurisdiction of the District Court

11. The jurisdiction of the District Court being part of the Subordinate Courts is entirely derived from the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap.321) (‘the Act’). The District Court is a creature of statute. Its jurisdiction and powers are therefore to be found in the Act.

12. Before embarking on an inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the District Court, it is however, important to start right by defining the concept of jurisdiction and its companion concept of power. As has been observed in the High Court case of Lee Kim Cheong v Lee Johnson [1993] 1 SLR 313 at p 319:

“Unfortunately, judges and parliamentary drafters have from time to time used the term ‘jurisdiction’ to mean both:

(a) the authority of a court or judge to entertain an action or other proceedings, as well as

(b) the power of the court to grant the particular kind of relief sought.”

13. It is therefore important in our inquiry into the jurisdiction of this court that these definitions are first clearly stated so that there will be no confusion. In order to do that it is necessary to understand jurisdiction in the sense that we are now inquiring into. For a clear understanding of this concept, I can do no better than to refer to the High Court’s formulation in Mohd Munir v Noor Hidah and other applications [1991] 1 MLJ 276, where the court at p 281, explained the meaning of the two concepts of jurisdiction and power:

“The jurisdiction of a court is its authority, however derived, to hear and determine a dispute that is brought before it. The powers of a court constitute its capacity to give effect to its determination by making or granting the orders or reliefs sought by the successful party to the dispute. The jurisdiction and powers of the High Court are statutorily derived. Whether it has any common law jurisdiction or powers is a question which is not relevant here. A court may have jurisdiction to hear and determine a dispute in relation to a subject matter but no power to grant a remedy or make a certain order because it has not been granted such power, whereas if a court has the power to grant a remedy or make a certain order, it can only exercise that power in a subject matter in which it has jurisdiction.”

14. Adopting the above definitions laid down in Mohd Munir, I would, at the outset, state that throughout this judgment, for the purposes of answering the question posed in the preliminary issue before me, it is clear that we are here in the present case, dealing with ‘ jurisdiction’ in the sense of ‘the authority of a court to hear and try an action’ and the term ‘power’ refers to ‘the power of a court to grant the relief sought by the claimant’ – see also Lee Kim Cheong, supra at pp 319H -320A. The formulation in Mohd Munir has since been referred to with approval in the Court of Appeal case of Salijah bte Ab Latef v Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1996] 2 SLR 201 at [40]. In both Mohd Munir and Salijah, the respective courts were dealing with the jurisdiction and power of the Syariah Court and the interpretation of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3). Nevertheless, the meanings to be given to the concepts of ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘power’ of a court, as laid down in Mohd Munir are no doubt applicable generally.

15. Before undertaking an examination of the jurisdiction of the District Court in order to deal with the present action it would be useful to first mention that there is only one case so far, which has dealt in any detailed fashion with the issue of the jurisdiction of the District Court. That is the case of Lee Kim Cheong, to which I have referred. Very soon after Lee Kim Cheong, however, there was another decision of the High Court which was a case which appears to be a ‘spin-off’ of the factual scenario in Lee Kim Cheong. That is the High Court case of Yoong Yuet Hoe v Shenson Engineering & Trading (S) Pte Ltd [1994] 2 SLR 675 which although referred to Lee Kim Cheong distinguished it on the facts and more particularly on the pleadings in that case.

16. I will return to examine Lee Kim Cheong in some detail but for the moment it is important to highlight an important development that followed both Lee Kim Cheong and Yoong Yuet Hoe. Soon after or at about the time when the two cases were heard, the Act was amended. These amendments first took place in 1993 and since then there have been other amendments. In this judgment I will in due course deal with some of these amendments which are relevant to the present inquiry. Since Lee Kim Cheong also, there has been a fundamental shift in the rules of court. The most significant being the fact that both the Subordinate Courts and the High Court now share the same Rules of Court. To the extent these rules, are relevant, I will discuss these as well.

17. In...