The maritime strategy of the United States: implications for Indo-Pacific sea lanes.

• Author: Bradford, John F.
• Position: Company overview - Report

It has become cliche to refer to the twenty-first century as the Asian Century. Indeed, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently said in Kuala Lumpur, "We know that much of the history of the twenty-first century will be written in this region, because it is the center of so many of the world's greatest opportunities and biggest challenges", she was merely restating what most US strategic planners have taken for granted for some time. (1) A more controversial idea related to her statement is whether the rise of Asia means the relative decline of the United States. In this regard, US strategy appears to be focused on the concept that America can continue to rise with Asia. During his first trip to Asia as president, Barrack Obama observed that "the fortunes of America and the Asia Pacific have become more closely linked than ever before", and pointed out that Asia and the United States are not separated by an ocean, but bound by it. (2) Indeed, the United States is a maritime nation, and its prosperity is intrinsically connected to and sustained by active commerce with its partners. The sea lanes to, from, and within Asia carry the bulk of that commerce, and therefore US maritime strategy is focused on sustaining free communication over those waters.

During an address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided an overview of how the United States sees strategic priorities in Asia within the context of broader US defence priorities. Gates underscored that the United States is a Pacific nation and that it will remain a power in the Asia Pacific. He explained that with sovereign territory and longstanding economic and cultural ties to this region, US security interests and economic well-being are integrally tied to those of Asia. Specifically, he highlighted United States commitment to: free and open commerce; a just international order that emphasizes the rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity to the rule of law; open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space, cyberspace; and the principle of resolving conflict without the use of force. (3)

These priorities, which he reiterated in his address to the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue, clearly reflect that maintaining safe, secure sea lanes and upholding the principle of freedom of navigation is at the very core of US interests in Asia. (4) These critical sea lanes are not just those of the Pacific, but extend into the Indian Ocean and carry trade between East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Therefore, Indo-Pacific sea lanes are not only vital to those states at their termini, but to all nations with economic and security interests in Asia.

In October 2007 the United States issued a new maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, referred to by the shorthand, CS21. Some critics have asserted that this document is too broad-based, is more a collection of public affairs-friendly abstract statements than a hard strategy and lacks the concrete substance necessary to drive action or guide decisions. (5) Many of those skeptics should have been answered by the 2010 publication of the Naval Operations Concept (NOC10), a document which "describes the ways with which the sea services will achieve the ends articulated in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21)". (6) That said, CS21 was being implemented in real and practical ways well before the publication of NOC10. From its inception, CS21 has provided the common principles guiding maritime strategic decisions and served as a vital reference for leaders at all levels in the US sea services. Comprehensive by necessity, the language in CS21 was carefully and intentionally developed. Every word was deliberately selected and thoroughly vetted. (7) At first read the strategy does indeed appear expansive and general, but a closer review reveals the specific details needed to guide decision making. Strategy and policy staff officers working on the Navy Staff (OPNAV) since CS21's creation were directed to continually reference CS21 in the course of formulating and executing their work and to flame all recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations and other senior maritime leaders in reference to the strategy. (8)

Two sentences from CS21 describe the strategic imperative driving US decisions regarding Indo-Pacific sea lanes. The first reads, "Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors." (9) The second, "We will not permit conditions under which our maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of maneuver and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines of communication and commerce." (10) Given these imperatives, it can be understood that the United States has chosen to concentrate maritime power at the eastern and western edges of Asia because the nations of both areas are key trade partners of the United States, and because both areas are home to threats from state and non-state actors that could disrupt that commerce.

State Actor Capacity to Disrupt Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes

CS21 states that US maritime power will be concentrated to "deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors". The strategy does not name specific states, but several states have displayed capability and intent to interfere with freedom of navigation and have thereby affirmed the prudence of this strategic observation. Most notable in this regard is the recent behaviour of North Korea, whose artillery attack on the South Korean civilian population of Yeongpyeong Island in November 2010, numerous missile tests, and the recent unveiling of nuclear enrichment facilities, all demonstrate the dangerous and reckless nature of the Pyongyang regime. The unprovoked sinking of the South Korean frigate, ROKS Cheonan, off the west coast of the peninsula in March 2010 provides a stark example of irresponsible North Korean provocations reaching into the maritime domain. The United States has worked especially closely with its two Northeast Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, to fashion appropriate responses to these actions. Among those responses have been demonstrations of naval power and increased trilateral defence activities. In July 2010 Japanese observers joined Exercise Invincible Spirit, the first in a series of South Korean-United States combined naval exercises developed in response to the attack on ROKS Cheonan. Later, in December 2010, South Korean Navy observers joined the United States-Japan combined Exercise Keen Sword. The United States, South Korea and Japan continue to deepen these ties through ministerial-level discussions, trilateral chiefs of defence consultations, ministry-level defence trilateral talks and trilateral staff talks at the fleet level. The United States is also seeking greater cooperation with China --North Korea's primary benefactor--in the hope that Beijing can use its influence to shape Pyongyang's behaviour.

As two great trading nations, the United and China share many common interests in the maritime domain and both nations have vested interest in sea lanes that are safe for commerce. (11) In this arena they have recently achieved some successes. (12) For example, the Chinese surface group conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden has regularly exchanged information with the United States and its partners during the mission, which is now in its third year. (13) In addition, in the last few years the United States and China have hosted each other's senior maritime leaders, conducted port visits in each other's countries, and, in 2006, Chinese and US forces conducted a limited scale search-and-rescue exercise. In October 2009, Secretary Gates and General Xu Caihou, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, agreed on a relationship agenda that includes seven priority areas for developing military-to-military relations, one of which is invigorating existing diplomatic mechanisms to improve military maritime operational and tactical safety. (14)

The October 2010 plenary session of the United States-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), held in Hawaii, was a modest, yet positive step forward. The session included professional and frank exchanges between military leaders of both countries, with a focus on the safety of sailors and airmen operating in close proximity. (15) Maritime security was also an important topic of discussion at the December 2010 Defense Consultative Talks between the United Sates and China. More recently, maritime security was among those issues discussed during Defense Secretary Gates' January 2011 visit to China and the May 2011 visit to the United States by People's Liberation Army (PLA) Chief of the General Staff General Chen Bingde.

The fact that China's military modernization proceeds uninterrupted despite superficial improvements in cross-straits relations raises important questions about the ultimate intentions of Beijing, especially given the limited transparency associated with the country's military build-up. Developments in the maritime domain are particularly worrisome because of their potential to disrupt commerce beyond Chinese territory. While China's robust anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities are primarily focused on a potential conflict with US forces over Taiwan, these capabilities now extend far beyond that theatre. (16) These systems appear to be designed to deny others access to operate in regional sea lanes, an approach that threatens to undermine the basic norms that have underpinned the region's peace and prosperity. This is significant when one considers the...