The Karting Club of Singapore v David Mak and Others

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chan Sek Keong J
• Judgment Date: 16 April 1992
• Neutral Citation: [1992] SGHC 96
• Date: 16 April 1992
• Subject Matter: Discretion to determine by whom costs are to be paid,s 18(2) & (3) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322),Costs,Costs ordered against person not party to proceedings,Civil Procedure,O 59 r 2(2) Rules of the Supreme Court 1970,Court's power to award costs,Exercise of such discretion,Applicant responsible for initiating unwarranted action is prima facie justification
• Docket Number: Originating Summons No 146 of 1984
• Published date: 19 September 2003
• Defendant Counsel: Wong Juan Swee (Wong Juan Swee)
• Court: High Court (Singapore)
• Plaintiff Counsel: Mak Kok Weng (Mak & Partners)

This was an application made on 23 February 1987 by Anthony Wee Soon Kim to intervene in these proceedings to be added as a defendant. The reason for the application was set out in the applicant`s affidavit as follows:

(1) I was the chairman of the plaintiff society which instituted proceedings herein. At the end of the hearing of the originating summons before the Honourable Mr Chua J [his Honour] ordered that the plaintiff`s claim be dismissed and further ordered costs to be personally paid by me. I was not a party to the proceedings and I was not heard at all on the questions of costs. Furthermore I am unable to find any provisions in the law whereby a court can order costs against me personally when the plaintiff, a registered society, is suing in its own name. After obtaining an order for me to intervene and be added as a defendant I intend making an application for the said order ordering me to pay costs personally to be set aside.

In the action, the plaintiffs, an unincorporated club, had claimed a declaration that the four defendants were deemed to have retired as officers and/or committee members of the club by reason of rule 8 of the constitution and rules of the club. Rule 8 provided, inter alia, that members of the committee who failed to attend three consecutive meetings without adequate reason being given to the secretary would automatically be retired from the general committee.

At the conclusion of the hearing of the action, FA Chua J dismissed the plaintiffs` claim [see [1985] 2 MLJ 280 ]. In his judgment given on 19 September 1984, FA Chua J said [at p 283]:

Now what had happened in this case? The chairman requested the secretary to convene a meeting of the general committee on several occasions which the secretary failed to do. The chairman himself could have convened a meeting when the secretary failed to convene a meeting, but he did not do so between October 1983 and January 1984 until 5 February 1984. There is no evidence that notice of the calling of that meeting was served on any of the defendants. Consequently only the chairman and Dennis Kwok were present. At this meeting `it was deemed that the defendants were automatically retired from the general committee` and the chairman proceeded to co-opt three members into the general committee.

It is clear that the defendants had not breached rule 8 and that their expulsion from the general committee was invalid. Consequently the purported appointment of...