The Great Eastern Life Assurance Company Limited v Lau Tung-Hua Timothy Michael

• Jurisdiction: Singapore
• Judge: Chua Wei Yuan
• Judgment Date: 31 December 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] SGMC 54
• Court: Magistrates' Court (Singapore)
• Docket Number: Magistrate’s Court Suit No 2941 of 2019 (MC/Summons No 2689 of 2019)
• Published date: 07 May 2020
• Year: 2019
• Hearing Date: 31 May 2019,24 May 2019,04 May 2019
• Plaintiff Counsel: Seet Qianren Timothy (Rajah & Tann LLP)
• Subject Matter: Civil Procedure,Jurisdiction
• Citation: [2019] SGMC 54

Deputy Registrar Chua Wei Yuan:

The word “jurisdiction” can mean many things, especially in the legal context (see, eg, Yeo Tiong Min, “Jurisdiction of the Singapore Courts” in The Singapore Legal System (Kevin Y L Tan ed) (Singapore University Press, 2nd Ed, 1999) at pp 249–250). This case concerns what is often called subject-matter jurisdiction, that is, whether the court has the authority to adjudicate a claim in a particular cause of action or which seeks a particular relief. It may seem surprising, even ironic, that something as fundamental and important as the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court is a chequered history in the making.

The jurisdictional issue, however, arose for my consideration in a slightly unusual way. The plaintiff, a lessor, had just obtained judgment in default of appearance in an action for outstanding rent and interest of some $24,000, and for the recovery of vacant possession of the tenanted premises, for which monthly rent had been $4,700. The matter before me was an ex parte application under O 45 r 3 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) for leave to issue a writ of possession.

Nothing about the application appeared controversial, save for the fact that the action had been commenced in the Magistrate’s Court (“MC”). This being the first hearing since the writ was filed, I expressed concern over whether the MC had jurisdiction to hear and try such an action, given that the popular view seemed to be that the MC did not (in which case, the question might arise whether the court should set aside the default judgment of its own motion).

Ultimately, I took the view, on a prima facie basis only, that the MC had the requisite jurisdiction. Accordingly, I granted the leave sought.

While the defendant has neither appealed nor applied to set aside my decision, and my decision (having been made ex parte) has not been made with the benefit of full argument, I consider it useful to set out the reasons for my view, as I am unaware of any decision that has considered this issue.

Analysis

To decide if the MC had the requisite jurisdiction, my analysis proceeded in two stages: whether the MC can ever have jurisdiction to hear and try an action for recovery of immovable property (“vacant possession claim”); and if so, whether this case fell within the MC’s jurisdictional limits.

Whether the MC has jurisdiction to hear/try a vacant possession claim

In my view, the MC in principle has jurisdiction to hear and try claims for vacant possession, subject only to the limits in ss 52(1A)(a)–(c) and 52(2) of the State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCA”). I say this, having considered: the plain text of the SCA; and the legislative history of the SCA, in particular of: sections 19, 20 and 52; and section 25.

Analysis of the plain text

The jurisdiction and power of a MC are generally governed, respectively, by s 52 of the SCA (in particular ss 52(1)–(1A) and s 52(1B)):

Civil jurisdiction of Magistrates’ Courts

52.—(1) Subject to subsection (1A), a Magistrate’s Court shall have all the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and try any action in personam where — (a) the defendant is served with a writ of summons or any other originating process — (i) in Singapore in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or (ii) outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or (b) the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate’s Court. (1A) The jurisdiction of a Magistrate’s Court under subsection (1) shall not include jurisdiction to hear and try any action where — (a) there is no claim for any sum of money; (b) the amount claimed in the action exceeds the Magistrate’s Court limit; or (c) any remedy or relief sought in the action, in addition or as an alternative to the amount claimed in the action, is in respect of a subject-matter the value of which exceeds the Magistrate’s Court limit. (1B) A Magistrate’s Court shall have, in any proceedings within its jurisdiction under subsection (1) — (a) the power — (i) to grant such relief, redress or remedy or combination of remedies, either absolute or conditional; and (ii) to give such and the like effect to every ground of defence or counterclaim equitable or legal, as ought to be granted or given in the like action by the High Court and in as full and ample a manner; (b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), the power — (i) to grant an injunction; (ii) to make binding declarations of rights; and (iii) to order medical examination of a person who is a party to any proceedings where the physical or mental condition of the person is relevant to any matter in question in the proceedings; (c) the power to make any order or to exercise any authority or jurisdiction which, if it related to a proceeding pending in the High Court, might be made or exercised by a Judge of the High Court in chambers; and (d) the powers conferred on a District Court by — (i) section 43; and (ii) section 12 of the Civil Law Act (Cap. 43). (2) In exercising its jurisdiction under subsection (1) or powers under subsection (1B), a Magistrate’s Court shall be subject to the same limitations and provisions as are applicable to a District Court under this Act. (3) The President may, after consulting the Chief Justice, by order vary the Magistrate’s Court limit.

On a plain reading of s 52(1), the MC’s civil jurisdiction is founded on service of originating process or submission. It derogates from the High Court’s jurisdiction—which undoubtedly includes that to hear and try actions to recover immovable property—only in two ways: by virtue of s 52(2), if it is a limitation to which the District Court (“DC”) is also subject to (this refers to, among other things, s 19(3) of the SCA); and more pertinently, if it offends any of the three criteria in s 52(1A)(a)–(c), that is, if the claim: is for exclusively non-monetary relief; seeks an amount beyond the MC limit; or seeks a relief/remedy in respect of a subject-matter the value of which exceeds the MC limit.

Apart from the above, nothing curtails the MC’s jurisdiction based on the nature of the relief sought. Accordingly, the MC appears to have jurisdiction to try vacant possession claims in some cases.

Analysis of the legislative history of the SCA

In my view, a study of the history of the SCA also compels the conclusion that the MC has the jurisdiction to hear claims to recover immovable property.

Sections 19, 20 and 52 of the SCA

Suffice it to say that the history of the SCA, especially ss 19, 20 and 52, is a vexed one. The extent to which the MC had jurisdiction over claims to recover immovable property is unclear.

Before the 2011 amendments

One view today seems to be that the MC did not have such jurisdiction (see, eg, Report of the Committee to Review and Update the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and the Subordinate Courts Act (July 2009) (“Committee Report”) at para 257, reproduced below at [17]).

This view is perhaps reinforced by the reasoning that, first, that the DC had been explicitly conferred jurisdiction under s 25 of the then-Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCA 2007”) to hear claims to recover immovable property whereas the MC had no equivalent provision and, second, that the MC’s jurisdiction took reference not from the HC’s jurisdiction but directly from some provisions that conferred jurisdiction on the DC. Specifically, those provisions were ss 20, 21 and 29 (ie, for claims in contract/tort, claims to recover money under written law, and claims for interpleader relief, respectively). Thus, for example, between 1993 and 2010, s 52(1) of the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1985 Rev Ed) (“SCA 1985”), the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1999 Rev Ed) (“SCA 1999”), or the SCA 2007 (as the case might be) read as follows:

Civil jurisdiction of Magistrates’ Courts

52.—(1) Subject to Rules of Court, a Magistrate’s Court shall have the jurisdiction … conferred on a District Court by sections 20 (except 20(1)(b)), 21, 29, … in any proceedings where the amount claimed or the value of the subject-matter in dispute does not exceed the Magistrate’s Court limit. During this time, the relevant parts of ss 20, 21 and 29 read:

Jurisdiction in actions of contract and tort

20.—(1) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action founded on contract or tort where — (a) the debt, demand or damage claimed does not exceed the District Court limit, whether on balance of account or otherwise; or (b) there is no claim for money, and the remedy or relief sought in the action is in respect of a subject-matter the value of which does not exceed the District Court limit. (2) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action where the debt or demand claimed consists of a balance not exceeding the District Court limit after a set-off of any debt or demand claimed or recoverable by the defendant from the plaintiff, being a set-off admitted by the plaintiff in the particulars of his claim or demand.

Jurisdiction in actions for recovery of money under any written law

21.—(1) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action for the recovery of a sum which is recoverable under any written law, if — …

…

Jurisdiction to grant relief by interpleader

29.—(1) A District Court shall have jurisdiction to grant relief by way of interpleader — … In contrast, s 25 (as it stood between 1993 and 2010) was a standalone provision that afforded the DC jurisdiction to hear and try vacant possession claims:

Jurisdiction in actions for recovery...